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PREFACE
^ first became interested in the Protagoras as an
undergraduate when I read it in a Greek class. I had by then
taken a course or two in which I read some of the other Platonic
dialogues, and I had formed some sort of notion of Socrates'
character and his general philosophical project.
I had what probably amounted to the standard picture of
Socrates one gets from reading the Apology and the Crito and the
Euthyphro . He struck me as something of an austere character,
pursuing truth and avoiding pleasure, someone who closely
resembled the hero of the Gorgias in his insistence oh a division
between pleasure and moral virtue.
So with this picture I read the Protagoras and found it
puzzling, and a little disturbing. Especially puzzling to me was
the section in which Socrates appears to be airguing that really
what we should be pursuing is pleasure.
I didn't think much about the Protagoras and Gorgias after
that until I spent a summer a few years ago reading Terence
Irwin's Plato ' s Moral Theory with Gary Matthews and Cynthia
Freeland. There Irwin raises that same problem of fitting the
Protagoras with the Gorgias . and attempts to fit both dialogues
into a single theory, which is both clever and provocative.
Irwin's theory, however, seemed to me to be wrong on a number of
V
fundamental issues. So, when I was discussing thesis topics with
my committee, a thesis in which I examined the hedonism of the
two dialogues as well as Irwin’s views on the subject seemed
natural
.
Once I started looking around in the literature, I found
that most of the discussions pointed in one of two directions
.
They either looked at the role of hedonism in the dialogues
(raising questions of interpretation) or they examined the
various arguemnts involving hedonism ( raising questions of
formulation )
.
Since both questions interested me, I decided to pursue
both. On the one hand, I have reviewed closely many of the
attempts in the literature to discover Plato’s purpose in
introducing hedonism to the Protagoras discussion. On the other
hand, especially in the latter chapters, I have tried to
formulate and evaluate the alleged arguments for and about
hedonism in the Protagoras and Gorgias .
Throughout the year and a half it has taken me to write the
thesis, I have incurred many debts, from friends and family,
colleagues and teachers. I, of course, owe much to my parents
for their financial and moral support, even when they weren't
quite sure what they were supporting. I also owe much to my
sister Barbara and her family for their generosity and
encouragement. They have put up with my odd priorities and oddly
timed trips to Massachusetts ( usually in their car ) on and off
VI
for this whole summer. Over the past months Tom and Suzi Ryckman
have often rearranged their schedules and habits to accomodate my
weekly visits to Amherst, even as Tom was finishing his own
dissertation and they were preparing to move to Iowa. I hope I
can be as much help when Tom comes to defend.
My colleagues at Franklin and Marshall College have been
very helpful in allowing me time to write. I have especially
enjoyed the friendship of Glenn Ross with whom I have spent many
pleasant hours formulating strategies for completing a
dissertation during one's first year of teaching.
Needless to say, I owe much to my teachers, particularly
those on my committee: Fred Feldman, Cynthia Freeland and George
Dimock, who often refused to allow me merely to meet my
standards, but prodded me to try to meet theirs. My thesis is
much the better for that prodding.
My greatest debt and the one I am happiest to acknowledge is
to my director, Gary Matthews. I can only guess how many hours
he has spent reading and commenting on my thesis in its various
forms. Much of what is good in here I owe to his comments and
the discussions we had to and from string qucurtet concerts. I
especially thank him for his encouragement during the times when
the project seemed endless.
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ABSTRACT
Hedonism in Plato's Protaaorag and Goraiag
September 1982
Richard Alan Bidgood, B.A., Franklin and Marshall College
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by; Professor Gareth B. Matthews
In this dissertation, I focus on the hedonism in Plato's
and Goraias
.
paying close, but not exclusive,
attention to the recent discussion by Terence Irwin in his
Plato ’ S HQi:aI Theory and his translation of and commentary on the
Goraias .
I argue that there is a genuine ethical hedonism discussed
in the Protagoras . but that we are not forced by considerations
in the Protagoras to ascribe that hedonism to Socrates.
Furthermore, I argue, contra Irwin, that Socrates is not
committed to hedonism by his earlier ethical views. In fact, I
suggest, hedonism plays no real role in the logical structure of
the main argument in the dialogue ( namely the argument against
Protagoras for the unity of the virtues
.
)
In the Gorgias Socrates is clearly out to attack some
version of hedonism, this attack consists of two arguments: one
attempting to show that pleasure has a property which goodness
viii
lacks, the other attempting to show that the identification of
goodness and pleasure has unacceptable ethical consequences
.
When properly formulated, neither argument is successful against
hedonism, but at best only against an identification of the good
person with the pleased person, a doctrine which is logically
independent from the first. There are, however, some passages in
the Ggxgias which suggest an argument whereby Plato may have
supposed a refutation of this latter doctrine constituted a
refutation of hedonism. I examine a number of ways in which the
resulting argument is unsuccessful.
In general, I eirgue that Socrates is not committed to
accepting hedonism in the Protagoras . and hence, that there is no
need to view these two dialogues as reflecting a fundeunental
change in Platonic ethics. We need not say that Plato's ethical
views were based on hedonism in the Protagoras and based on its
rejection in the Gorgias . Rather, both dialogues work toward
standard Socratic doctrines such as the unity of the virtues and
the happiness of the good person.
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CHAPTER I
For I say that things are good in so far as they
are pleasant if they have no consequences of
another sort, and in so far as they are painful
they are bad... What is good and praiseworthy, I
said, is also pleasant. ( Protagoras 351c, 360a)
[NOTE 1]
Are pleasure and goodness the same? They are not
the same, as Callicles and I have agreed. i Orirgi as
506C6-7
)
These two passages are discomforting for at least two
different reasons. In the first place, they seem to be in such
opposition that, in the absence of a special explanation, it is
difficult to see how Socrates could hold both views. In the
second place, even putting aside the Goraias passage, the passage
from the Protagoras suggests an ethical view quite at odds with
our usual picture of Socrates as a man far more concerned with
virtue and truth than with pleasure.
These passages are not, of course, isolated; they are
typical of what appear to be the general views of the Protagoras
and Goraias respectively. The Protagoras seems to be very
sympathetic to an identification of goodness with pleasure; the
1
2g<?rgias appears to be strongly opposed to precisely that
identification
.
This opposition is paralleled in the Platonic corpus perhaps
only by the discussion of the Forms. Even there, however, Plato
provides the Paoasnidgg to shed some light on the development and
nature of his doubts about the Forms. We are provided with no
such "dialectical" guide to his thinking about pleasure and
goodness
.
What we find, instead, is an apparent reliance on this
identification in the Protagoras . There is no clear argument for
the view; rather it forms the basis for an argument concerning
the nature of virtue. On the other hand, we find in the Gorgias
a bitter attack on the identification with no hint that Plato
might have accepted hedonism, or considered accepting it.
Further, there is no dialogue which can be seen as a transition
between the two dialogues in the way that the first part of the
Parmenides can be seen as a transition between the view of Forms
that came before it and the view that came after it.
In fact, before the Protagoras and Gorgias . there is very
little discussion of the nature of pleasure, or goodness, or how
one is related to the other. The so-called definitional
dialogues search for characterizations of justice, piety,
friendship, and so forth, but rarely provide any sustained
attempt to analyze the notion of goodness itself.
The only relevant early discussions of either goodness or
1pleasure occur in the Hippifts Major and the Lvsis . in Hipoias
Majpr ( 303e8-304a3 ), Socrates considers and shows himself
uncomfortable with the claim that praiseworthiness is beneficial
pleasure (to <aAov ^ivai^
n.<Spvnv ik£LUiOv_). His discomfort stems
in part from the fact that he supposes this yields the result
that praiseworthiness and goodness must be different (since
goodness and benefit differ). Socrates has already said at
297c2—d2 that he cannot accept the claim that praiseworthiness
and goodness are different. This suggestion that
praiseworthiness and goodness are identical is also found in the
Lxsis at 216d2 ( Acyu) yao TayaBov KaXo\) civai ).
So, if the Hippias Major is an early work, as Friedlcuider
and Grube suppose it is, [NOTE 2] we have an indication that
before the Protagoras Socrates at least considered a relation
between goodness and pleasure (beneficial pleasure anyway) and
rejected it.
The Protagoras and Gorgias raise many questions. Do these
two dialogues represent a change in Plato's opinions about
goodness, and if so, in which direction? Do they instead
represent a change from Socrates' views to Plato's? Is there
even a genuine opposition of views between the Protagoras and
Gorgias at all?
Over the past hundred years or so, several studies have
attempted to answer such questions . Perhaps the most remarkable
feature of the group of studies as a whole is the wide divergence
4of solutions they offer
. The broadest difference comes out over
whether the Protagoras and Goraias represent a change in Plato’s
own views
.
^The various solutions fall roughly into two categories;
1. There is no genuine difference in the views of the two
dialogues, either because, contrary to first appearances, there
is no hedonism formulated in the Protagoras
. or because it is not
put forth there in any serious way. vmen the Protagoras was
written Plato did not accept a hedonistic view, but instead used
it to defeat the arguments of the sophists. In the Gorgias we
get Plato’s true views on the matter. There is no overall change
in Plato’s notion of goodness.
2 . There is a genuine difference in the views of the two
dialogues. When Plato wrote the earlier Protagoras . he accepted
a hedonistic account of the nature of goodness. Sometime after
the writing of that dialogue, however, he became displeased with
hedonism and, consequently, attacks it in the Gorgias .
So, to pick an example in the first category, Gregory
Vlastos wrote in an introduction to the Protagoras [NOTE 3]
that the claims of the dialogue are best understood if they are
taken to express a doctrine rather weaker than hedonism, neimely
that while pleasure is a good, it is not necessarily the only
one. Also in the first category, commentators such as Paul
5Shorey in Ihg IlDity af £latp ’ g Thought [NOTE 4] and
F. M. Cornford in the Cambridge Ancient History [NOTE 5] argue
that while there is a genuine hedonism in the dialogue, "the real
purpose [of the CrotftqorftS] is to lead the Sophists to confess
that their philosophy is the same as the ordinary man's who
believes that "good" means "pleasant" or that pleasure is the
only good... thus the professional teachers of goodness are
revealed as willing to fall in with the popular hedonism."
(Cornford, p. 113) Thus when Socrates asks Protagoras at 35le2-4
and elsewhere whether pleasure itself is good, he is doing
nothing more than attempting to draw Protagoras into admitting
that his ethical theory is basically hedonistic.
A third view in the first category is suggested by
A. E. Taylor in his Plato; Ihs Man and HiS Work . [NOTE 6] He
argues there that the main thrust of the Protagoras is to show
that various claims of Socrates' that relate goodness and virtue
to knowledge would be correct even if hedonism were true . So if
goodness and pleasure are identical, then virtue consists in
discovering what is best by measuring pleasures and pains. This
ability to measure qualities is a branch of knowledge, Socrates
argues at 357a4-b6. Thus even if pleasure were identical to
goodness Socrates would be right in thinking that true virtue
depends on knowledge
.
Most of the commentators who hold views in the first
category concentrate on trying to offer a satisfactory
6interpretation of the Protagoras
. There is a fairly simple
reason for this. it is the Protagoras that represents the
greatest problem for this sort of view. it is the position
apparently taken in the Protagoras that these commentators
attempt to explain away
. The Gorgias is relatively unproblematic
for them; they consider it relatively straightforward in its
presentation of Plato's genuine opinion.
More common views concerning the Protagoras and Gorgias fall
into the second of the two general views outlined above. In
their simplest versions put forward, for instance, by Grote in
Elatfi and ilie other companions Socrates [NOTE 7] the
Protagoras is merely Plato's report of Socrates’ views. The
Gorgias . then, according to majiy of these commentators (for
example Hackforth in "Hedonism in Plato's Protagoras " [NOTE 8] )
represents an early and independent philosophical inquiry by
Plato. This dialogue, though it is later than the philosophical
reporting of the Protagoras still precedes the fully mature
Platonic theories found in the Republic and other later works.
The Gorgias is, according to these interpretations, essentially a
negative work in which Plato rejects the hedonistic theory of the
Protagoras but puts nothing in its place.
One of the most interesting and well-worked-out version of
this second sort of interpretation was originally put forth by
Hackforth and recently revived by Terence Irwin in Plato's Mopal
Theory
.
[NOTE 9] According to both Hackforth and Irwin, the
7represent Plato's continuing effort to
understand and incorporate the positions of the historical
Socrates
. So in the £x<?t^qQrftg Plato makes an attempt to
formulate precisely the Socratic equation of knowledge and
goodness, an attempt which, Irwin supposes, leads him to the
hedonism of the dialogue. In the Gorgias . however, which both
Hackforth and Irwin place after the Protaanraa but before the
EfiPUbliC, Plato rejects the identification of pleasure and
goodness, and, with it, much of the Socratic theory that led him
to that identification.
In the following chapters, I will look at the plausibility
of these various reconstructions of Plato’s intentions. More
importantly, however, I want to examine the actual arguments
about hedonism Plato uses in the Protagoras and Goraias . So, in
the second chapter, I look closely at the hedonistic view that is
formulated in the Protagoras . I argue that there is such a
doctrine in the dialogue and defend that claim against those
commentators (e.g., Vlastos and Goodell) who claim that there is
no hedonism there. I shall also argue that the hedonism of the
Protagoras is ethical and that contrary to some claims by Irwin,
there is no reason to interpret the hedonism as psychological.
In the third chapter, I begin to address the question of
interpretation. I argue there that while there are passages in
the Protagoras which unambiguously show that "the many" are
supposed to hold a hedonistic view of ethics, and that Protagoras
8eventually admits tht he does accept such a view, there is no
passage which incontrovertibly shows that Socrates holds the
view.
In the fourth chapter, I turn to an examination of the
arguments in the Pxg'tagoras . I argue there against many of the
standard reconstructions of the role of hedonism. i argue
against Irwin's view that the hedonism in the dialogue is implied
by the earlier Socratic ethical claims. I try to show that once
we examine the logical structure of the dialogue, we can see that
hedonism plays no important role in the overall argument at all.
Instead, the argument against Protagoras rests on a different
identification, one between praiseworthiness^x o tcnAnv 's and
goodness
.
In the fifth chapter, I turn to the Goraias . There the
problems of interpretation at first seem insignificant; it seems
clear from even a cursory reading that Socrates is arguing
against hedonism. Again, however, once we examine the argument
closely, we find that things are different. The main thrust of
Socrates' argument is not against hedonism at all, but against a
related view concerning moral appraisal of persons.
Nonetheless, Socrates seems to suppose that this argument
fares equally well against genuine hedonism, and in the sixth
chapter, I reconstruct an argument from the Goraias with which
Socrates tries to justify that conclusion.
In the final chapter I return to the problem of
9understanding the £x<?tag<?ra.g and Goroias as a pair of dialogues,
and argue that there is no compelling reason to see these two
dialogues as representing opposite sides of Plato’s ethical
theory. Once we understand the arguments of the dialogue, we are
free to see the two dialogues as being entirely consistent with
one another. There is no need to explain away Socrates’
anomolous allegiance to hedonism in the Protagoras because there
is no evidence that he does hold it there. In the Goroias on the
other hand, we do get Socrates’ view that goodness cannot be
analyzed in terms of pleasure
.
CHAPTER II
Introduction
Hedonism is roughly the doctrine that pleasure and only
pleasure is intrinsically good (and pain and only pain is
intrinsically evil), although it comes in a number of different
versions. In what follows we will have an opportunity to discuss
some of them and ask whether Plato had any of them in mind in the
Protagoras and, if so, how he understood them.
In the Protagoras Plato is clearly concerned with some
putative relation between pleasure ajid goodness. It is not
clear, however, what this relation is supposed to be, nor is it
clear whether this relation is being put forth seriously. At
least two fundamental difficulties stand in the way of ferreting
out the details of this discussion.
In the first place, Socrates uses a number of different
terms when expressing the relation. He most often speaks of the
relation between pleasure I n6 ovn ) and goodness (i^ nvaBov ^
( 351b6 , 351el-2 , etc.), but he also occassionally speaks of the
\ X
relation between enjoyment (iu vaioei
v
) and goodness (353d5,
354C6-7, etc). There are also some passages where he speaks of
the relation between living pleasantly and living well
Pf pi ) . Any thorough examination of this discussion will
10
11
involve deciding whether the words "pleasure" and "enjoyment" and
the words "good" and "well" are being used synonomously or are
being used to construct a number of subtly different relations.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear what Socrates is
supposed to mean by "pleasure" and "goodness". Do these refer to
sensations, forms, collections of things, properties?
In the second place, much of the discussion of hedonism is
imbedded not only in a series of questions directed at
Protagoras, but from 353-357, Socrates and Protagoras carry on ein
imaginary conversation about hedonism with "the many" ( ot
jIoAXoi). So, for instance, Socrates and Protagoras have the
following exchange at 353e5-354al:
So it seems to you, as Protagoras and I say, that
these things are evil for no other reason than that
they result in evils and deprive us of pleasures.
Would they agree?
We thought they ["the many"] would. (my
translation
)
Whatever doctrines are suggested by Socrates’ questions are not
clearly ascribable to Socrates, but neither are they clearly
ascribable to either Protagoras or "the many"
.
In this chapter, I would like simply to ask whether there is
some doctrine of hedonism being discussed in the Protagoras and.
if so, how it should be formulated. In this discussion, I will
12
treat all Socratic questions as assertions as if they represented
the actual views of Socrates, in later chapters we will need to
ask whether these views can be fairly attributed to Socrates, but
for now let us see if we can discern exactly what topic is being
discussed in the latter section of the Protagoras .
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goodness
It is important in discussing hedonism to distinguish
between intrinsic and extrinsic goodness. A thing is
intrinsically good just in case, roughly speaking, it is good in
itself or by its very nature. A thing is extrinsically good just
in case it results in certain intrinsically good things. This
distinction is characterized, for instance, by G. E. Moore in
Principia Ethica in the following way:
whenever we judge that a thing is "good as a means”
we are making a judgement wth regard to its causal
relations: we judge both that it will have a
particular kind of effect, and that the effect will
be good in itself. . .on the other hand, there are
judgements which state that certain kinds of things
are themselves good:... we shall be judging that the
13
thing itself has the property which, in the first
case, we asserted only to belong to its effects.
[NOTE 10]
It is quite clear that Plato was also aware of the
distinction, as this passage from Book II of the Republic shows:
Do you agree that there is a kind of good which we
would choose to possess, not from desire for its
aftereffects, but welcoming it for its own
sake?... and can you discern a... form of good under
which fall exercise and being healed and the making
of money generally? For of them we would say that
they are laborious and painful yet beneficial, and
for their own sake we would not accept them, but
only for the rewards and other benefits that accrue
from them. (Shorey 357b-d)
The language in the Protagoras suggests that the distinction
may not have been quite as clear to him when he wrote that
dialogue as it was in the Republic . Nonetheless, I think we can
see Socrates working on bringing to light these different senses
of "good"
.
At 354a7-b2 Socrates asks with regard to surgery and
starvation diets, "And axe these things good for any other reason
14
than that they result in pleasures and the relief from and
avoidance of pains” (i.gUTpc ^ gyaeg eaxi 6^ gUo t_i n Iti eis
.
a’^OTgA.gUTg jcgi gTrgXXgygs tc <gi giroTOOTTg's
• ) [NOTE
11] The goodness that Socrates seems to be discussing here is
extrinsic goodness. The ascription of goodness to surgery is not
based upon some feature of surgery itself, but rather on some
feature of what results from it (i.e., pleasure and the avoidance
of pain).
On the other hand, at 351c4, Socrates says, "What I say is,
in so far as things are pleasant, are they not to that extent
good, leaving their other consequences out of the account." (il“
X fY'H « ^ ili£a SgTlV. mil Kgtg TQUTO nnkr nYnBn . I_L
^ g^ g7To3nVTgi ^^Xo, ) [NOTE 12] Socrates seems here to be
attempting to show how, in at least one sense, goodness is
independent of consequences. In this sense, a thing’s goodness
is dependent only on some feature of the thing itself, namely its
pleasantness
.
That Socrates, in this passage, has in mind intrinsic
goodness is pretty clearly suggested by his clarification of his
first question to Protagoras, which comes at 351el-2: "in so far
as they are pleasant are they not good? I’m asking whether
pleasure itself is not good?" eox iv c i quk
J /-NiC V ^ ^ * P ^ X ^
gygSg, xnv n^ovriv gOTnv £P(jotu)V e i quk gygBov eaxi v
There are also passages which suggest that Socrates saw that
a thing might be intrinsically good, on the one hand, and
15
extrinsically evil, on the other, and that, for instance, the
thing’s intrinsic goodness could be outweighed by its extrinsic
evil. At 354c6-dl, Socrates says, "you even call enjoyment
itself bad when it deprives you of greater pleasures than it has
in itself, or leads to pains which are greater than its own
pleasures." What Socrates is suggesting here is that, in this
particular case, the enjoyment is pleasant in itself (and, hence,
intrinsically good) but has overall painful consequences (and,
hence, is extrinsically evil), and, since the painful
consequences outweigh its own pleasure, we judge this episode of
enjoyment to be evil.
While it is clear that Plato was aware of the distinction
between the goodness of a thing itself and the goodness of its
consequences, we should be aware that the distinction is never
drawn explicitly in the dialogue. Plato uses a single word,
"good" I throughout. Sometimes it is most plausibly
understood as meaning extrinsically good (e.g., 354b), sometimes
it is best understood as meaning intrinsically good (e.g., 351c),
and sometimes it seems to mean overall good, or good all things
considered (e.g., 354d). Nonetheless, it is consistently clear
from the context what sort of goodness Socrates is ( or should be
)
talking about. Furthermore, it also seems clear that the
emphasis in the discussion in the Protagoras is on the intrinsic
goodness of pleasure.
We have not so far, however, asked how Plato understands
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pleasure or goodness, m the next section I would like to turn
to some attemtps to show that, in fact, there is no doctrine of
hedonism discussed in the dialogue, in the course of arguing
that there is such a view there, I will try to draw out Plato's
understanding of pleasure and goodness
.
Ifi There a. Doctrine Hedonism in the Exfitaaoraa?
In a 1921 paper in the American Journal af PhiloTofiv .
entitled "Plato's Hedonism" (hereafter PH), T.D. Goodell
claimed, "In fact, [Plato] never held any doctrine that we
nowadays call hedonism. Only a superficial reader can find it in
the Protagoras . where alone any hint of it is found." Goodell
suggests that we distinguish between bodily pleasure auid
spiritual pleasure. While the former might rightly be called
pleasure, the latter is more appropriately called joy or delight.
Loosely, bodily pleasure seems to be pleasure in some sensual
experience, while spiritual pleasure is to be understood as
pleasure taken in some state of affairs which does not involve
bodily pleasure. This is, of course, a slippery distinction
which might not withstand close scrutiny. It docs, however, have
some intuitive appeal. We recognize some difference between the
pleasure we experience while eating a well-prepared meal and the
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joy or delight we take in, say, an unselfish act of charity. On
Goodell's view, it is only the association of goodness with
bodily pleasure that has any right to be called hedonism.
W.K.C. Guthrie seems to present a similar, although less
detailed, view. He claims in the Introduction to his translation
of the PrQtaqoras and Meno that "the doctrine to which Socrates
gains Protagoras* consent toward the end of the dialogue may be
labelled hedonism, but it is something utterly different from
this and is indeed consistent with a morality as high as most
people would aspire to." [NOTE 13] The doctrine that Plato
discusses allows for ["demands" says Guthrie] a temperate life
and enduring pain to protect one's country. "This is hardly
hedonism in any accepted sense." (Guthrie page 22)
Goode11 goes further, however, and supposes that this
distinction enables us to gain a proper understanding of the
doctrines being discussed in the Protagoras
. we should
understand and as near synonyms meaning "pleasure
[in] the widest possible application, expressly including the
highest kind of pleasure." (PH, page 26) While n<Sovn is the
common word for both bodily and spiritual pleasure, 1£ Xo^t-P^T-^ .
claims Goodell, suggests, "an emotional or mental state, not one
of the body." (PH, page 27) Thus, although the two words are
being used synonomously, we should understand the use of Poovn
\ ^
to be restricted so as to match xa^pe^v . and, hence.
understand the discussion in the Protagoras as being directed at
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the relation between goodness and spiritual pleasure. of this
relation, Goodell says, "...it is a fine declaration, in the
peculiar manner of the Platonic Sokrates
—
probably of the
historic Sokrates as well—of Plato's faith in the high origin
and high destiny of man." (ph, page 25 )
There is much that is wrong with Goodell 's paper, but I
think a good look at it will shed some light on Plato's notion of
pleasure in the dialogue. From the supposed distinction between
spiritual pleasure and bodily pleasure, and the central role to
XQfA P £ ^
V
plays in Plato's discusson of pleasure, Goodell infers
that Plato's notion of pleasure must involve spiritual delight
and have no trade with any sort of sensual bodily pleasure.
Goodell seems to base an ethical distinction on the vague
metaphysical distinction between spiritual pleasure and bodily
pleasure. He supposes that identifying goodness with the former
does not count as hedonism while identifying goodness with the
latter does. This metaphysical distinction, however, does not
entail the corresponding ethical distinction, nor is there any
reason to think that it should unless one mistakenly supposes
that one can only take spiritual pleasure in morally exemplary
acts such as doing one's duty. One can, of course, take just as
much spiritual pleasure in acts of gluttony, adultery, and murder
as in acts of charity. Thus, even if this metaphysical
distinction is to be found in the dialogue, it does not provide
us with evidence that there is not a doctrine of hedonism there
.
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[NOTE 14]
It is probably unreasonsable to suppose that the
sophistication which this metaphysical distinction represents is
to be found in the psychological theory of the Protagoras
, and
Plato certainly marks no clear difference between kinds of
pleasure. In fact, the only passage that could reasonably be
construed as evidence for Plato's awareness of kinds of pleasure
is most naturally understood as a passage in which we are told to
ignore any differences in kind. At 358a5-6, Socrates repeats the
hedonistic formula and asks Prodicus not to distinguish between
TepTTvoy and YaoTov . This could mean that Plato was aware of
such distinctions and wished to put them aside for the present,
or it could mean that Plato was aware merely that Prodicus made
these verbal distinctions and did not, himself, want to become
emeshed in them. That the latter is more likely is suggested by
the fact that Prodicus is presented throughout the dialogue as
making trifling and useless quibbles.
It is especially noteworthy that Socrates nowhere in the
Protagoras analyzes the concept of pleasure. Since he uses it
without explanation in an imaginary conversation with "the many",
it is plausible to think that is using a pre-analytic notion of
pleasure, one which may well be rich enough to count both the
delight one takes in a big meal and the enjoyment one takes in
contemplation as pleasures . Certainly the concept in the
Protagoras is broad enough to include pleasures from food, drink
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and sex ( 353c) as well as from health, wealth and safety of one's
country. Far from relying on a special and sophisticated notion,
as Goodell suggests, the notion of pleasure being discussed in
corresponds to the ordinary conception which even
"the many" share, and it is the intrinsic goodness of these
pleasures that is a topic of discussion in the dialogue. Plato's
use of a number of different words to refer to pleasure merely
constitutes another example of his tendency to introduce synonyms
or near synonyms in a discussion.
When we turn to loo)c at a second attempt to show there is no
hedonism in the Protagoras
. we will find that Plato also has in
mind a more abstract notion of pleasure. This second attempt is
by Gregory Vlastos in the introduction to a 1956 edition of the
Protagoras
.
[NOTE 15]
No matter how the view in the Protagoras is stated, if it is
to qualify as a version of hedonism, it must at least claim that
pleasure is connected in some very strong way with goodness. We
will discuss the connection further on, but for now, we can say
that any version of hedonism must entail the following:
1. Necessarily, pleasures and only pleasures
are intrinsically good. [NOTE 16]
Vlastos suggests that no doctrine in the Protagoras entails
( 1 ) . What is there instead is a somewhat weaker doctrine . He
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says this;
. . .what Socrates most likely meant to assert is the
rather different propostion, or rather two of them,
(a) that pleasure is a good (not the only one), (b)
that whatever is best will in iast be the most
pleasant. (a) and (b) do not add up to hedonism,
i . e
. , to making pleasure definiti vp of
good
. .
.
( viastos
, Introduction to Protagoras
, page
xli)
While it is not immediately clear how to interpret Viastos
'
claim, it is plausible to interpret it this way. Although (a)
pleasure necessarily implies goodness, (b) goodness only
contingently implies pleasure. The first of these statements can
be represented thus:
2.
Necessarily, pleasures are intrinsically
good
.
Pleasures are necessarily good, but perhaps not the only ones.
On the other hand, what is best is only in fact the most
pleasant, or, more generally, what is good is only in fact
pleasant. This can be represented thus:
3.
Only pleasures are intrinsically good.
22
While (2) and (3) might not be the very propositions Vlastos
has in mind, they fit his requirements nicely, vlastos* emphasis
that goodness implies pleasure only "in fact" suggests that he
intends to avoid ( 1 ) by denying the necessity of the "only if"
conditional in (l). This is reflected in ( 3 ). His formulation
of (b), however, which he gives in terms of "best" and "most
pleasant" suggests that he has in mind something even weaker than
( 3 )
,
but ( 3
)
will do
.
(2) and (3), of course, do not jointly entail (l). To do
that, we would need the conjunction of (2) and something like
3*. Necessarily, only pleasures are
intrinsically good.
Is Vlastos right about this, or are there reasons for
supposing that Socrates asserts something like (3*)? I think we
will find that there are such reasons. There are no passages in
the dialogue where Socrates makes a distinction between ( 3 ) and
(3*). On the other hand, Socrates, in three separate passages
(353d7-e2, 354b7ff, 354el-2), claims that something is called
good for nQ other reason than that it results in pleasure. So,
for instance, at 354b7ff, he asks with regard to health, safety
of the city, rule over others, and wealth, "are these things good
for any other reason than that they result in pleasures and the
relief from and avoidance of pain?" ( Tauta ^ ayaQa £Pt i aAAo
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Xi i in_L iLLi n6 .Qvas mmir
?
i n)Tn larL \unZ^^ kq^
airoTpoTrgtp; ) Socrates, here, appears to be claiming that the fact
that a thing results in pleasure, in some way provides an
fiitPlanatign and the finly explanation of that thing’s being (in
this case, extrinsically) good. If something other than pleasure
were also intrinsically good, then we could point to it as well
when we explain why an object is good, it seems reasonable,
then, to suppose that Plato viewed pleasure as more than a merely
contingent condition for goodness. So, it may well be that a
thing's being pleasant provides the explanation for that thing's
being good because of the truth of some very strong claim such as
( 1 ) . This evidence that ( 1 ) is present in the dialogue is also
evidence that Vlastos is wrong.
There is
,
however
,
a more general and more important worry
about Vlastos' claim. Vlastos characterizes the second half of
the Socratic formula as a relation between good things and
pleasant things
. As such, it is easy to view this as a
contingent statement; it is just a matter of fact that good
things (i^ ^a9a ) are also pleasant things Th®
discussion in the dialogue, however, is not carried on solely in
terms of good and pleasant things. Often the relata are,
instead, goodness ^yaSov) and pleasure (jl n6ovn ). These
locutions are often used by Plato in later dialogues to signify
the Forms. While there is no evidence that Plato had developed
the theory of Forms when he wrote the Protagoras . he does seem to
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be aware of the distinction between F things and F-ness. [NOTE
17]
These locutions should make it clear that we are not being
given merely a relation between good things and pleasant things.
Plato seems here to be talking about goodness itself and pleasure
itself.
Until the theory of Forms is formulated there is no real
discussion of the metaphysical relations between abstract objects
like goodness and pleasure. Later, of course, in dialogues such
TheaetetUS and Scphiigt, Plato came to worry whether the
relations into which abstract objects entered are changeless.
[NOTE 18] He there asked if the abstract Forms could gain or
lose relational properties over time. In those dialogues, Plato
wonders whether one can make contingent statements about the
Forms
.
There is evidence that earlier than those dialogues, Plato
supposed these abstract objects to be immutable. So, in the
Phaedo . for instance, he says at 78d,
"Does that relation which we define in our
discussion remain always constant and invariable,
\ \ //
or not? Does equality I auxo t o iqov ^ or
[praiseworthiness] (oarro X2 KaAov or any other
independent entity which really exists, ever admit
change of any kind? Or does each of these uniform
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and independent entities remain always constant and
invariable, never admitting any alteration in any
respect or in any sense?" ( Trenndennick
)
Without evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to
suppose that Plato at the time of the Protagoras took goodness
and pleasure to be immutable and the relations that held among
them necessary and invariant. Vlastos has ignored this when he
suggests that we find in the dialogue no stronger claim than ( 3 )
.
So, Vlastos and others are unsuccessful in arguing that
there is no hedonism expressed in the Protagoras . showing that
they are unsuccessful, however, does not show that there ia such
a doctrine found there, and it is to that problem that I would
now like to turn.
Hedonistic Passages
The passages in the Protagoras directly relevant to hedonism
may be thought of as falling into three categories: those
suggesting that pleasure is sufficient for goodness, those
suggesting that pleasure is necessary for goodness, and, finally,
those suggesting that pleasure and goodness are identical.
[NOTE 19 ]
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Most numerous are those suggesting that pleasure is
sufficient for goodness, or that pleasure is a good. So, for
xnstance, at 351c5, Socrates asks, "in so far as something is
%
pleasant, is it not also good?" ( <a9' o' n6Ea eaiiv. qpg Kaia
At 358a5, Socrates concludes, "then you
agree that pleasure is good but that pain is evil." ^ byoXove^xe
AqXU.
-1-2 V nil! ilYflQov c l va^ i£. ravfi nn n\) )
We have already mentioned a number of passages in which
Socrates suggests that pleasure is both a necessary and a
sufficient condition for goodness, since we cite as the only
reason for a thing's goodness the fact that it results in
pleasure (e.g., 354b5, 354cl, 354d7). There are, however, two
other passages in which Socrates either states or relies on some
principle such as (1) above. At 360a2, Socrates asks Protagoras
and the other sophists if "whatever is praiseworthy and good is
also pleasant." ( oukouv. fiv 6 eiTrep koXov Kg\ ayaBov, icg\
jlAilL) ”We certainly agree." is the reply. Finally, Socrates, in
his discussion at 355—6 in which he attempts to demonstrate that
nobody does evil willingly, makes the move from
4. A man does what is evil knowingly.
to
5. A man does what is painful knowingly.
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Socrates supposes that it is legitimate to infer (5) from
(4). He says a 355e 3, »now let us give back the names pleasant
and painful to to these same things [which we called good and
evil] and say that a man does — before we said "evil”, but now
let us say — "painful" actions..." ( peTaAaBcouev 6^ xa ovouctTrY
—SLLLV _T_g
_T£ IflPQV iJli XOjLs HUT nT S Tnnrm c. irrv ^ XeY(jJUf: \J
-OTi_ HVQpmTQ
,
^* JTOaTTF; 1 T nrr ilLu r^ryniirM TK Ka<g. vuv AOMiSLV
T g gviapa
.
.
.
)
If Socrates feels confident that he can infer (5) from ( 4 )
by substitutng "painful" or "evil", it must be because he
supposes that pain is a necessary condition for evil
. Given that
the relation between goodness and pleasure is exactly analogous
to the relation between evil and pain, Socrates must also suppose
that pleasure is a necessary condition for goodness
. These two
sets of passages should make it clear that the doctrine being
discussed in the Protagoras implies that pleasure is both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for goodness
.
The third set of passages extends the doctrine even further
by indicating that there is an identity relation between pleasure
and goodness. Protagoras indicates at 351e3ff that he takes this
to be Socrates’ view. Protagoras, when asked if pleasure itself
is not good, responds, "just as you often say, Socrates, let us
investigate this, and if the question should seem reasonable and
pleasure and goodness should apear to be the same (t_o guxo
(|)gi vexai nou xe <gi aradov ). then we will agree." (351e3-5)
28
Socrates responds by asking who should lead the
investigation; the formulation of the qestion is accepted without
protest. Protagoras, then, understands Socrates to be asserting
an Identity relation between pleasure and goodness, and Socrates
seems content with that understanding
.
At 355b 5, Socrates proposes that we give up the use of all
four words, "pleasant", "painful", "good", and "evil", since
there appear to be only two things designated by them. ( , , , £TT£i5 n
jSjid £
<
i>flvn J gVT fti T- V Kcti ovouao i v ttq oogy oo eUMuev auxct) Socrates
again shows at 357d4-6 his willingness to accept as
intersubstitutible "good" and "pleasure", and "evil" and "pain".
He says there, "for you have agreed that those who go wrong in
their choice of pleasures and pains—which is to say, of good,
and bad things go wrong from lack of knowledge." ( . . . ttep'i trjv
Tf in ) JXQ,QV(iiv gi nrm Y) kqi AUTrojV t ous cgaugoiavovTas— Tauxa 6e eox i
v
f / ^ y
gyring _L£ jou .KaKa- .
. ) These passages clearly suggest a claim
that pleasure is at least co—extensive with goodness, and
necessarily so.
I have claimed here and in the previous section that the
discussion in the Protagoras is not restricted to good and
pleasant things, but extends to goodness and pleasure itself.
Plato's willingness to view "good" and "pleasure" as
intersubstitutible suggests that underlying this passage is the
doctrine that goodness and pleasure are identical.
In the next couple of sections I want examine a few of the
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important details of the hedonism in the dialogue. By this
point, however, some of the gross outlines of the doctrine should
be clear. The doctrine discussed in the dialogue holds, at
least
,
that pleasures ( i . e
. ,
pleasant sensations ) are the only
intrinsically good things. There are passages in the dialogue
which look as though he is also calling objects or activities
pleasant and painful. So, at 354dl-2, we are told that food, sex
and drink are pleasant and at 354e2 that physical training and
amputation are painful. Are these, then, candidates for
intrinsic goods and evils? Presumably not. While Plato is not
as careful as he might be about the notion of pleasant things, we
can interpret him here to mean that, for instance, drinking a
glass of wine is pleasant because it causes in me pleasure. My
pleasure is intrinsically good; if ray drinking the wine causes no
pain then it is extrinsically good. Drinking wine is strictly
speaking, pleasant only in some derivative sense. It is my
sensation that is pleasant in a strict sense
. One version of
hedonism, then, that is being discussed is the view that pleasant
sensations are intrinsically good and nothing else is (and
painful sensations are intrinsically evil and nothing else is )
.
In addition, there is a stronger version of hedonism
expressed by such claims as, "Goodness and pleasure are
identical." Here Plato seems to mean that the properties (or
forms ) goodness and pleasure are the same . How much Plato means
by such a claim is difficult to tell. The discussion of weakness
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of the will at 355a-356b seems to rely on the synonymity of
"good” and "pleasant". On the other hand, passages suggesting
this version may merely represent an attempt to say that there is
some necessary connection between these properties. it is not
clear that Plato would have recognized the difference. Nowhere,
either in the gjgtaqorftg or the Sgrqiftg, except perhaps in the
argument against weakness of the will, does Plato’s discussion of
hedonism rest on the synonymity of 'good' and ’pleasant*.
Now let us turn to some of the details of the hedonism in
the Protagoras .
Ethical aiui Psychological Hedonism
A theory of ethical hedonism claims that pleasure and only
pleasure is intrinsically good. It gives a relation between
pleasure and goodness
. Plato ’ s version has as its basis some
principle like
6 . Gtoodness and Pleasure are the same
.
It is not a theory of human action or motivation.
A theory of psychological hedonism, on the other hand, is a
doctrine about human action and motivation. Such a theory may
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Claim that all human action is motivated by the desire for
pleasure. Bentham, for instance, champions such a view. He says,
•Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and plaaSMie. . . they govern us in all we do, in all
we say, in all we think." [NOTE 20] Rather than (6), a
doctrine of psychological hedonism might have at its base a
principle like
7. For any person, p, and thing, x, p desires
X only if p believes x is pleasant.
When we come in Chapter IV to the discussion of Socrates
'
arguments against weakness of the will, i will claim, contrary to
a number of commentators, that they do not rely on a doctrine of
psychological hedonism. It is useful to see now that there is no
textual evidence for such a doctrine in this dialogue. This is
by no means an uncontroversial claim.
Terence Irwin, in Plato ' s Moral Theory , for instance, claims
that the passage from 353c9 to 354e2, "is a fairly clear
statement of hedonism, both psychological and ethical." [NOTE
21] The passage that Ijrwin cites is longer than an entire
Stephanus page, and includes a number of sections which one might
suppose state a theory of psychological hedonism. Irwin suggests
with respect to the first section of this passage from 353c9 to
354c5 that. "Socrates’ examples persuade "the many" that they
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wall always reject actions which promise present pleasure
outweighed by future pain, and accept actions which promise
present pain outweighed by future pleasure." ( Plato's Moral
ThsOJCi, hereafter PMT, page 104) The principle Irwin is here
attributing to "the many" is this:
8. For any person, p, and action, a, if p
believes a will result in more pleasure
than pain, then p accepts a. [NOTE 22]
What does Irwin mean by "accept"? it is unclear what it is
to accept (or reject) an action. Since much of Irwin's
subsequent discussion concerns choice, we may suppose that we are
to understand that a person accepts an action when he chooses to
perform that action. (8), then, should be understood this way:
8’. For any person, p, and action, a, if p
believes a will result in more pleasure
than pain, then p chooses to perform a.
Irwin supposes that this principle captures what Socrates says at
353e-354a:
. . .The only reason that [the pleasures of drink and
sex] are evil is that they result in pains and
deprive one of other pleasures .. .and when you say
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that some painful things are good... do you call
them good because at the time they cause the most
extreme suffering or anguish, or because later
on... they result in pleasures and the relief and
avoidance of pains?
Irwin is mistaken about this passage for two reasons. in
the first place, there is no mention here of choosing actons.
Rather, the discussion is framed entirely in terms of reasons for
calling things, perhaps actions, good. This passage
claims that "the many" ceill or judge something to be good when
that thing produces more pleasure than pain. It is more natural
to read this passage as one about ethical hedonism; it tells us
under what conditions something is judged to be good. In the
second place, given the obvious defect of (8'), [NOTE 23] when
Irwin comes to state his principle formally, he does not claim
that we will choose any act that we think will yield more
pleasure than pain, but rather, that between any two acts, we
will choose the one which we suppose will yield the greatest
difference in pleasure and pain. Thus, he states on page 105,
9. "When a, chooses x over y, he chooses x
because he believes x will yield a greater
over-all pleasure than y.
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While (9) is not defective in the way (S’) is., there is a
problem with it
.
It introduces a notion of the comparative
pleasures of actions, and nowhere in this passage does Socrates
compare pleasures of actions. He says only that anything which
produces over-all pleasure is good. Thus, to interpret this
section as maJcing a claim about choice of action, one must either
no textual evidence.
The second section of the passage from 354c3 to 354e2
suggests, according to Irwin, that "maximum pleasure is the goal
of all ["the many’s"] actions", and that, "the many agree that we
choose something as good for its pleasure, and that we choose
pleasure as the good." (PMT, page 104) Again, it is important to
note that there is nothing about choice in this section of the
passage. What we do find, however, is two more instances of
Socrates challenging "the many" to name some other standard than
pleasure and pain by which they call something good or evil.
This is most naturally understood as a challange to "the many" to
attempt to show that they do not accept ethical hedonism.
At 354C3-5, we get the only statement in this passage which
seems to concern action. In his imaginary discussion with "the
many", after suggesting that they are unable to name any other
standard of the good than pleasure, Socrates concludes, "so you
pursue pleasure as a good and avoid pain as an evil . " ^ouicoux;
understand it as the defective (8’) or as (9) for which there is
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joiioiuj.) While this sentence does have someting to do with action,
it does not mention anything about choice. Moreover, since
ethical and psychological hedonism are logically independent,
[NOTE 24] the fact that this sentence is inferred from
the observation that "the many" seem to accept ethical heonism
seems to suggest that we should understand it as merely a more
explicit statement of ethical hedonism, having the same force as
so you pleasure to be good and pain to be evil." [NOTE
25] Indeed, that this non-literal understanding of the passage
is correct is born out by the line immediately following in which
Socrates draws another conclusion, "so it is pain you regard as
®vil and pleasure as good ..." ( t out * ^oa nveiaB * e ivai KaKov .
^mrnv. ml aygOov xnv nfiounv) again a statement about
judging which things are good and evil, if the cleiim at 354c3-5
were taken as a claim about choosing, it would neither follow
from, nor imply the claims flanking it, that "the many" make
judgements about goodness and evil solely on the basis of
pleasure and pain. That is
10 . "The many" accept ( 6
)
does not imply (9) without the addition of other principles, and
this implication fails to hold when ( 9 ) is understood as a
psychologiCcQ law. "The many" may well accept ethical hedonism
and yet fail to choose those acts which they believe will be most
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pleasant, because they choose which acts to perform on some other
basis, perhaps ease of performance or prejudice. More obviously,
(9) does not imply (lo ) . Any psychological disposition of "the
many" to choose to do those acts which they regard as most
pleasant provides no evidence as to the content of their beliefs
about the nature of good and evil.
Contrary to Irwin, then, there is no suggestion of
psychological hedonism in the passage from 353c-354e. All we
find there are numerous statements about judgement which conform
to and rely on a doctrine of ethical hedonism.
There is a second passage which Irwin does not discuss but
which might be thought to suggest psychological hedonism. It
occurs at 356b3-c3. There Socrates says to Protagoras:
For if you weigh pleasant things against pleasant,
you always have to take the larger and the more (J_a
jieT^ ^ TTAei co AjTjrrea), and if you weigh
painful against painful, [you always have to take]
the less and the smaller. And if you weigh
pleasant against painful, if the painful are
outweighed by the pleasant, no matter which are
nearer and which more distant, you have to do
whatever brings the pleasant about ( Tauinv xnv
TTpagi V TTpaKieov ev n ctv xaux' evri'j. and if thp
• i
pleasant are outweighed by the painful, you have to
^
/
avoid doing it (oil irp nticxF.a. ’>
.
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If we understand the verbs irpaKTe^g implying
psychological necessity, then we may well find in this passage a
doctrine of psychological hedonism, consisting of something like
the following principles:
11. For any person, p, and actions s, and
if p believes (i) a yields more pleasure
than pain and (ii) a* yields more pleasure
than pain, and (iii) ^ yields a greater
preponderance of pleasure over pain than
A ' / then if p's choice is between a and a '
,
p will ( and is unable not to ) choose a
12. For any person, p, and actions, a and ,
if p believes ( 1 ) a yields more pain than
pleasure, and (ii) a' yields more pain than
pleasure, and (iii) ^ yields a greater
preponderance of pain over pleasure than
then if p's choice is between a and a'/
p will choose a'
.
13. For any person, p, and actions, a and a’,
if p believes (i) a yields more pleasure
than pain and (ii) a' yields more pain than
pleasure, then if p's choice is between a
and a ’ / p will choose a
.
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C.C.W. Taylor, in his commentary on the Protagoras
. has
suggested that it is a mistake to understand these instances of
verbal adjectives ending in as implying psycological
necessity. AerTTsa and ^e claims, "generally have the
force of 'should'. While the verbal adjectives ending in -T£os
can also indicate what has to be done, this is in the sense of
what one is obliged to do, either to achieve some purpose... or in
obedience to some rule..." (Taylor, Plato's Protagoras
, page
190) As Taylor points out, there seem to be no clear cases where
a verbal ending in some variation of -xeos signifies
psychological compulsion. [NOTE 26] What sort of obligation
these verbal adjectives imply is, of course, unclear. The
examples suggest some sort of moral obligation, as opposesd to,
for instance, prudential obligation.
It would be a misteike, then, to rely on this passage at 356b
to support a doctrine of psychological hedonism. The principles
advanced in this section should rather be interpreted as
;
11'. For any person, p, and actions a and ^',
if p believes ( i ) A yields more pleasure
than pain and (ii) yields more pleasure
than pain and ( iii ) a yields a greater
preponderance of pleasure over pain than
A'/ then if p's choice is between a and a'.
p should choose a.
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12’. For any person, p, and actions, a and a’,
if p believes ( i ) ^ yields more pain than
pleasure, and (ii) a' yields more pain than
pleasure, and (iii) ^ yields a greater
preponderance of pain over pleasure than
S’, then if p’s choice is between ^ and
,
p should choose a'
.
13’. For any person, p, and actions, ^ and s’,
if p believes (i) s yields more pleasure
than pain and ( ii ) s' yields more pain than
pleasure, then if p’s choice is between s
and s'# p should choose s .
These principles suggest a normative view based on ethical
hedonism, although, of course, they are not incompatible with
psychological hedonism. I claim, then, that there is no clear
evidence of the doctrine of psychological hedonism in the
Protagoras « The statements about pleasure and goodness are,
rather, most naturally interpreted as implying ethical hedonism.
Quantity an^l Quality of Pleasure
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we have already noted in the first section of this chapter
that in the ££otaqQta?
, Plato makes no metaphysical distinction
among types of pleasure. This, however, does not preclude him
from supposing that some pleasures are of higher quality than
others, one of the best known sources of such a distinction is
ntllitariarusm . in the second chapter of that work. Mill
says
:
If one of [two pleasures] is, by those who are
completely acquainted with both, placed so far
above the other that they prefer it, even though,
knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of
discontent and would not resign it for any quantity
of the other pleasure which their nature is capable
of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred
enjoyment a superiority in quality so far
outweighing quantity as to render it, in
compeirison, of small account, (page 12)
Thus, in Mill's hedonic calculus, a greater weight would be
placed on the relatively meager pleasures to be gained from
intellectual pursuits than from a flood of "beasts" pleasures.
( ibid.
)
Do we find ay such distinction coming into play in the
hedonism of the Protagoras ? In later works, Plato seems to have
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been aware of it. The £M3.9bV9
'
discussion of pure and impure
pleasure (52c-d), pleasures mixed with pain and pleasures
unmixed, seems to be aimed toward the distinction. m the
gQXqias , Callias expresses disgust that Socrates would discuss
such low pleasures as those derived from scratching an itch
( 49e )
.
Goodell, in "Plato's Hedonism", claims not only that Plato
recognized the distinction between quantity and quality of
pleasure, but that in the Protagoras he makes central use of it.
In discussing the conclusons drawn toward the end of the dialogue
(360ff), Goodell says this:
It has been agreed that what is praiseworthy
( KaAov) is also good, that KaXai Trpggei sare all
good. It is now further agreed that whatever is
praiseworthy and good is also pleasant ( n6u ^
. That
is a seemingly easy step in the argument, but one
which carries with it an assertion of profound
significance.
. .the brave man going into war, when
that is an honorable and good acton, knows that he
is going to what is fairer and better and also
pleasanter. The pleasure involved can be only of
the highest and finest moral kind . . . whatever
Plato's hedonism might be, it does not involve any
low conception of hedone. ( "Plato ' s Hedonism"
,
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page 29)
The Idea seems to be that pleasure of good things is
pleasure of the highest sort. The pleasure we receive from
...Icnowing that one's efforts and deprivations have contributed
to [one's country's] safety", claims Goodell, "is recognized as
one of the purest." We do not experience low pleasure from truly
good actions. The whole point of the hedonic calculus, on
Goodell 's scheme, is to allow us to differentiate between high,
fine pleasure (the mark of goodness) and low pleasure.
So, Goodell states.
The brave man knows that the moral satisfaction of
fighting for one's country in a righteous cause is
a pleasure that fax outweighs the pain of war,
including wounds and death, and even defeat of the
righteous cause for which he dies... [the soul's]
greatest pleasure is in choosing the best, in
likening itself to god, so far as it can, by
becoming dikaion kai hosion phroneseos I Theaetetus
176b). That 'art of measurement' consists in
recognizing constantly, in never forgetting, this
fact of the soul's nature, and in living most fully
in accordance therewith." ("Plato's Hedonism",
pages 35-36
)
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on the surface, this is a difficult interpretation to
swallow, both for philosophical and for textual reasons, if one
plans to assert an identity between pleasure and intrinsic
goodness, then one should not try to distinguish between high and
low pleasure by looking to the goodness of the objects of
pleasure. Such a project is hopelessly circular, it is to
Mill’s credit that he was careful to distinguish between high and
low pleasure solely in terms of the preferences of those who have
experienced a wide range of pleasures. [NOTE 27] it is perhaps
some such worry that leads Socrates to reject Protagoras' attempt
at 351C1-2 to restrict good (or high quality) pleasures to those
the objects of which are fine things.
There are textual reasons, as well, for rejecting any
quality-quantity distinction in the Protagoras
. Unless we are to
suppose that the imaginary dialogue with "the many" fails due to
gross equivocation, we must assume that "the many" understand
Socrates when he uses the words and 11 XllPeil, and that
they understand these words in the same way Socrates does
.
"Themany" are asked a number of times if they call things good
for any other reason than that they result in more pleasure than
pain. If Goodell is right, Socrates is asking, in effect, if
"the many" call things good for any other reason than they result
in delightful mental states of the highest quality. But, surely,
this question would not be so troublesome to "the many" as the
question actually in the dialogue. The failure of "the many" to
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answer Socrates' challenge should not be taken to indicate, as
Goodell's interpretation seems to demand, that they subscribe to
an unusually laudible and commendable meta-ethical view.
Whatever Socrates' purpose is in questioning "the many", it is
not to demonstrate how ethically enlightened they are.
Goodell, then, seems to be mistaken. Plato, in the
dialogue, makes no mention or use of any distinction between
pleasures on the basis of their quality. The pleasures of the
safety of the city (354b) and the pleasures of food, drink, and
sex (353c) receive exactly the same treatment. The hedonic
calculus is noticably devoid of any consideration of the
qualities of pleasure. [NOTE 28]
Summary
We find, then, in the Protagoras not only a doctrine of
hedonism, but a very extreme and unqualified sort. I have tried
to show that the doctrine involves the claim that pleasure and
only pleasure is intrinsically good, and, in fact, even that
pleasure and goodness are the same. Actions and pleasures and
pains are extrinsically good just in case they produce more
pleasure than they do pain. We have seen that there is
absolutely no distinction made in the quality of these pleasres.
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They are ranked simply according to of their quantity.
We began this discussion of the formulation of the
Pr<?-taq<?ra3
'
hedonism by acknowledging that we would put off until
later questions about the purpose this doctrine has in the
dialogue, its justification, and the seriousness with which it is
put forth. In the next couple of chapters, I shall attempt to
shed some light on these questions.
CHAPTER III
Introduction
we saw in the last chapter that there is discussed in the
Prgtaqoras a very extreme sort of hedonism. Some commentators
regard the hedonism as a significant step in Socrates' developing
moral theory, and so are committed to ascribing the hedonism in
this dialogue to Socrates himself. Irwin, for instance, claims,
"I shall argue that the hedonism is Socrates’ own view intended
like the rest of the Protagoras
. to support positions assumed
without defense in the socratic dialogues." (PUT, page 103)
This suggests two related ways we could go about
investigating how the hedonism figures in the Protaaorafl
. on the
one hand, we could look closely at the way it functions in the
argument of the dialogue, and in the general scheme of early
Socratic moral theory. This we will do in the fourth chapter.
On the other hand, we could look closely at the text of the
dialogue itself, and see if from such an investigation we can
discover who actually espouses the hedonism there . This
information, of course, would help us in our analysis of the role
hedonism plays in Socrates ' arguments
.
It is this latter investigation I want to undertake in this
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Chapter. This may seem like a trivial exercise, but it is not.
One of the things that makes the Erotaaoras at the same time so
provocative and so frustrating is the difficulty of deciding on
purely textual grounds who holds what doctrine in the dialogue.
Of course, all of Plato's dialogues leave the reader with some
amount of homework, as if the dialogue were designed to provide
only the first step in the reader's continuing dialectic. The
gXPtagQras
, however, is even more difficult in this respect than
most. Not only does it leave the details of the argument below
the surface to be dug out, but it does so with many of the gross
features as well, so, even the careful reader of the Protaaorag
may wonder, at its conclusion, who is arguing for what. In this
section, I want to examine the text closely for any indication of
an answer to the first question above
.
Passages Suggesting "The Many" Accept Hedonism
There is, I think, fairly clear evidence that 'the many' in
the dialogue do accept hedonism, or more precisely, that their
judgements about goodness involve a hedonistic principle. On
three occasions 'the many' are asked if they call things good for
any other reason than that they are pleasant. Each time they are
unable to give any other criterion by which they judge the
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goodness Of things, while this fact does not show that they have
in mind any well-worked out formulations of hedonism, it does
Show that they accept the doctrine.
Tgytual concerning Protagoras and Hedonism
The textual evidence for Protagoras' acceptance of hedonism
is a bit more difficult. At the begining of the discussion of
hedonism at 351c, Protagoras shows that he is reluctant to accept
pleasure as the sole criterion of goodness. When asked by
Socrates if a pleasant life is good, Protagoras there responds
that it is so only if one takes pleasure in praiseworthy things
loTs. _<aAo'is jr,' lln,, Cjjin n^oyevos ^. it seems, then, that
instead of the hedonistic identification of pleasure and
goodness, Protagoras accepts rather,
1. goodness = pleasure in praiseworthy things
\
Protagoras does not define 'good' solely in hedonic terms, but in
terms of both pleasure and praiseworthiness
.
When Socrates explains exactly what he means by the
identification of goodness and pleasure (351c-e), Protagoras
begins to waver, and at 351e5 agrees to undertake an
investigation of this identification. In part, this
investigation consists of Protagoras, acting as spokesman for
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"the many", being questioned by Socrates about the nature of
goodness and weakness of the will, when this questioning is over
( 358 ), Protagoras ends his role as spokesman and is asked, along
with Hippras and Prodicus, his opinion of various details of the
preceding discussion. In this series of questions Protagoras and
the other sophists reveal that they now accept the identification
of goodness and pleasure. So Socrates asks them at 358alff:
. . . and I ask you — Hippias and Prodicus as
well as Protagoras, (for let this discussion be
shared by you ) — whether what I say seems to you
to be true or false... You agree then, I said, that
pleasure is good and that pain is bad? (my
translation) [NOTE 29]
and further on at 360a3ff, "'And if it is praiseworthy and good,
is it also pleasant?' 'We certainly agreed with that.'
Protagoras replied .
"
is Exataqoras Committed tst tha Hedonistic Poctrrine?
The text, then, indeed suggests
hedonism. Did he have any reason to?
that Protagoras accepts
That is not clear. There
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IS in the dialogue no serious or sustained attempt to persuade
Protagoras of the truth of hedonism. in fact it comes as
something of a shock to find Protagoras at 358b in complete
agreement with the hedonistic doctrine. As the spokesman for
•the many in the preceding discussion, he seemed to commit 'the
many* to hedonism, but he never indicated that he was so
committed. Yet Socrates says, "You agree then, that pleasure is
good," and Protagoras and the rest agree. The presence of the
word translated "then", ^pa, might be thought to suggest that
this agreement is established by an investigation or inquiry.
Socrates, however, gives us only one premise of an argument, and
that is in the immediately prior passage where Protagoras admits
that what Socrates has said (to 'the many) is true.
This admission could be taken as the premise to a number of
different arguments, none of which should be sufficient to
convert Protagoras to hedonism. Protagoras admits at 352c-d that
"...[knowledge] is something fine which can rule a man, and that
if someone knows what is good and bad, he would never be
conquered by anything so as to do other than what knowledge bids
him." 'The many', of course, disagree with this, supposing that,
on occasion, we can be overcome by pleasure so as to do exactly
the opposite of what we know we should do. However one
understands the subsequent discussion of weakness of the will,
one conclusion must be that, if hedonism is true, someone with
knowledge of good and evil will never permit the commands of
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)uiowledge to be defeated by the prospects of immediate pleasure.
Thus, if hedonism is true, Socrates and Protagoras are right
about the supremacy of knowledge, and ‘the many are wrong.
If, however, this is what was said to 'the many’ which
convinced Protagoras, he seems to have been convinced by this
obviously fallacious argument;
A 1. If hedonism is true, then no one with
knowledge of good and bad is overcome by
plearure to go against the dictates of that
knowledge
.
2. No one with knowledge of good and bad is
overcome by pleasure to go against the
dictates of that knowledge.
3 . Hedonism is true
.
Premise (l), of course, restates the main thrust of the
discussion of weakness of the will, and premise (2) has been
agreed to by Socrates and Protagoras at 352 c-d.
There is another argument very similar to (A), resulting
from the strengthening of the first premise, which, if accepted
by Protagoras, would also commit him to hedonism.
B 1. Hedonism is true if and only if no one with
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knowledge of good and bad is overcome by
pleasure to go against the dictates of that
knowledge
.
2. No one with knowledge of good and bad is
overcome by pleasure to go against the
dictates of that knowledge.
3 . Hedonism is true
.
(B) differs from (A) by saying, in the first premise, not only
that hedonism is sufficient for the impossibility of weakness of
the will, but that it is necessary as well. According to it, one
will be committed to the truth of hedonism from having shown that
weakness of the will is impossible.
It is some such argument as (B) which Irwin, for insteince,
feels justified in attributing to Socrates. He says on page 106
of glato • S Theory , "the argument implies that hedonism is
Yital for Socrates' case; for the argument shows only that
hedonists cannot be incontinent, and will apply to everyone only
if psychological hedonism is correct." (emphasis mine) It is
clear that he supposes Socrates will be able to show weakness of
the will impossible only if he accepts the truth of hedonism ( in
fact, psychological hedonismi).
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There is, however, no evidence that Socrates puts forward
the first premise of (B), let alone argues for it. we will have
to ask in the next chapter if Socrates is committed to the first
premise, but, for the present, let us note that in the dialogue
only the first premise of (A) is discussed. it is, then,
unreasonable to suppose that Protagoras finds himself pursuaded
to accept hedonism by ( B )
.
Alexander Sesonske, in a provocative article called,
"Hedonism in the Protagoras". [NOTE 30] argues that Protagoras
is committed to hedonism because his views are tightly connected
with those of 'the many*
. Thus, when Protagoras agrees with
Socrates, at 358ff, on the relationship between goodness and
pleasure, he does so not because he is deeply impressed with
Socrates' use of hedonism in explaining weakness of the will, but
because 'the many have already been forced to admit the truth of
hedonism.
According to Sesonske, among the criteria for truth that
Protagoras uses is universal acceptance. In his long speech
(320c - 328d), Protagoras attempts to prove that virtue is
teachable by appealing to the universal opinion that it can be
taught. So, Sesonske says, "While the Great Speech is rich in
suggestions, there is only one sort of reason or proof put forth
in it. This consists in showing that it is the opinion of all
mankind that virtue is a thing which is taught." (page 75) Thus
at 324b7ff, Protagoras says
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[Each person's tendency to correct behavior by
punishment] shows his belief that excellence can be
produced by education; at least his aim in
punishing is to deter. Now this opinion is shared
by everyone who administers chastisement either in
a private or in a public capacity: And everyone
chastises and punishes those whom they think guilty
of wrongdoing, not least your fellow citizens, the
Athenians; so according to this argument the
Athenians are among those who think that excellence
can be handed on and taught. It seems to me,
Socrates, that I have now adequately shown that
your fellow citizens are right to accept the advice
of smiths and cobblers on political matters, and
also that they regaxd excellence as something which
can be taught and handed on.
The second criterion of truth Protagoras accepts is
consistency. This criterion states simply that contradictory
beliefs cannot both be true. According to Sesonske, "These two
criteria, whether a belief is the opinion of all mankind and
whether it is consistent with other beliefs, are the only two
modes of 'proof that Protagoras suggests." (HP page 75)
On Sesonske 's view, once Socrates shows that 'the many'
accept the identification of goodness and pleasure and.
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furthermore, that this identification is consistent with
Protagoras' own views concerning the supremacy of knowledge and
the teachability of virtue, Protagoras is forced by his own
criteria of truth to accept the truth of hedonism, which he does
does at 358a-b.
Is there any evidence, other than Sesonske's claims, that
Protagoras in the dialogue accepted consensus and consistency as
his sole criteria of truth? It is no great surprise, of course,
to find Protagoras holding the principle he relies on at 339b-d
that contradictory beliefs are not both true.
There Protagoras observes that Simonides has first claimed,
"it is hard to become a truly good man" and later claimed just
the opposite. Protagoras concludes from this observation, "so
either the earlier or the later statement must be wrong .
"
( 339d8-9)
That Protagoras supposes consensus of mankind is a criterion
for truth, on the other hand, is much harder to establish.
Sesonske's evidence, remember, was that a number of times during
his so-called Great Speech, Protagoras asserts that it is the
opinion of 'the many' that virtue can be taught (e.g., 324cl-2).
This, Sesonske claims, is Protagoras' prime form of proof.
In an article responding to Sesonske's piece, Henry Wolz
[NOTE 31] correctly notes that far from appealing to the
consensus of 'the many' as a criterion for truth, Protagoras
offers the consensus of 'the many' as a counterexample to a claim
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of Socrates. After reminding us that the Greeks when seeking
advice on, say, ship-building, will only listen to experts, but
when state policy is being discussed, they listen to anyone
without distinguishing between expert and non-expert Socrates
concludes.
So it is clear that they don’t regard that as
something that can be taught. And not only is this
so in public affairs, but in private life our
wisest citizens are unable to hand on to others the
excellence ( apern ), they possess. So when I
consider these facts, Protagoras, I don't think
excellence can be taught. (319d-e, 320b4-5 )
It is in attempting to answer Socrates' challenge that
Protagoras offers his own interpretation of the behavior of the
Athenians, and concludes at 324c3-dl,
so according to this argument the Athenians are
among those who think that excellence can be handed
on and taught. It seems to me, Socrates, that I
have now adequately shown that your fellow citizens
are right to accept the advice of smiths and
cobblers on political matters, and also that they
regard excellence as something that can be taught
and handed on.
Wolz is correct; Protagoras is not attempting to prove the
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truth of his claim by appeal to a peculiarly Protagorean alethic
principle to the effect that 'Consensus on P entails P*. Rather,
he IS merely attempting to refute Socrates' claim that the
consensus of Athenians is that virtue cannot be taught; in so far
as he appeals to a consensus theory of truth, it is only to the
extent that it has already been appealed to by Socrates.
Furthermore, however, at a number of points in the dialogue,
Protagoras derides the opinions of 'the many'
. So, for instance,
at 353a7-8, Protagoras asks, "But why, Socrates, must we examine
the opinions of the mass of people, who say whatever comes into
their heads?" [NOTE 32] This is surely strange talk from a man
who is supposed to regard consensus of 'the many' as a criterion
of truth.
Sesonske is mistaken, then, in supposing that Protagoras'
understanding of the truth is guided by considerations of
consensus and consistency. His reliance on the Great Speech to
find evidence of Protagoras' acceptance of a theory of truth
rests on a misunderstanding of Protagoras' project in that
section. In addition, Sesonske has failed to consider those
passages where Protagoras makes clear that he has little or no
regard for either the statements or opinions of 'the memy'
.
One might suppose, of course, that Protagoras was simply
fooled into accepting some argument like (A). Cornford, for
instance, in The Cambridge Ancient History , suggests something
like this. [NOTE 33] There he sayss
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All errors of conduct must, then, be errors of
judgment in the use of the hedonic calculus.
Socrates ingeniously claims this as a confirmation
of his own doctrine; All wrong-doing is due to
ignorance. This ignorance, he blatently suggests,
the Sophists would cure, if only the public would
send their sons to be taught. Charmed with this
conclusion, all the Sophists accept the whole
argument; 'the pleasant is good, the painful evil';
right action can be defined as action that secures
a pleasant and painless life.
So, if this is right, much of the reasoning in the dialogue is
designed to trick Protagoras into accepting hedonism.
This view is unsatisfactory for a couple of reasons. In the
fi^st place, it suggests a motive for Socrates' participation in
the dialogue that is entirely uncharacteristic. Throughout the
dialogues Socrates emphasises that he is not arguing against a
person to win a battle, but in order to examine himself and his
interlocutor and to discover the truth about a matter. In this
dialogue, too, Socrates makes his intentions clear at 333c7-9;
"It is chiefly the thesis I am testing, but all the same it
perhaps turns out to be a test for me too, as I ask the
questions, and for whoever is answering." Again, at 360e6-8, he
says, "Indeed I have no other object in asking all these
questions than to try to find out the truth about excellence, and
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especially what it is itself."
Secondly, Protagoras is portrayed in this dialogue as being
quite sophisticated logically. It is well known that during the
course of the dialogue he gives penetrating analyses of what he
takes to be Socrates' mistakes. So, at 350c6ff, for instance, he
points out what he takes to be an illicit inference Socrates
makes in concluding that all daring men are courageous from the
claim that all courageous men are daring. it would be
remarkable, then, if we should find Protagoras persuaded by a
simple argument which rests on the fallacy of affirming the
consequent of a conditional.
It is possible, of course, that in writing this dialogue,
Plato did not intend to reproduce accurately a conversation
between Socrates and Protagoras. It is probably true that these
dialogues were meant, in part, to serve as teaching aids. If so,
perhaps Plato wrote the dialogue as he did with the expectation
that students would search for and discover the fallacy.
This is not an altogether satisfactory explanation, however.
First, the suggestion is far too speculative, requiring that we
suppose we know much more about the circumstances surrounding
Plato's writing of the dialogues than we actually do. Second,
even supposing that Plato includes lacunae and fallacious
reasoning in some or all of his dialogues as exercises for the
reader, it is difficult to see how we can so interpret the
Protagoras if we take it as anything more than a logical
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exercise. What appears to be the fallacious argument in this
dialogue seems not merely to be an inconsequential or superfluous
point, but rather the crux of the whole progression of arguments
involved in demonstrating that Protagoras is mistaken about
virtue. If we are to understand the Protagoras in this way, it
would render suspect any attempt to glean actual Platonic
<3octrine from the dialogues
.
So, It as not clear why Protagoras comes to embrace hedonism
in the latter part of the dialogue (358ff), but he does. We will
examine, in the next chapter, a suggestion that much of the force
of Socrates
' arguments is to show Protagoras that his views
commit him to hedonism.
Xeartual Evidence concerning Socrates and Hedonism
Let us, then, turn to an examination of the text regarding
Socrates' acceptance of hedonism. We have seen, so far, a large
number of passages in which Socrates asks Protagoras or 'the
many' if they accept the identification of goodness and pleasure.
I have suggested above that it is difficult to know what to make
of these passages. They certainly do not show Socrates directly
endorsing hedonism, and yet he asks the questions in such a way
that he seems to expect an affirmative answer.
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Are there any passages in which Socrates reveals his own
attitude toward hedonism? There are some which can reasonably be
construed as evidence that Socrates endorses hedonism. At 352e5,
Socrates says to Protagoras, "Come with me and attempt to
persuade and teach men what this experience is that they call
being overcome by pleasure and for that reason failing to do what
is best when one knows what it is." This persuasion and
teaching, of course, is the analysis at 355-358 which involves
the hedonic calculus. Again, at 354e5ff, after Socrates has
repeatedly elicited responses committing 'the many* to hedonism,
he says, "...if they asked us, 'but why are you going to such
length and elaboration about this?' i should say, 'I beg your
pardon. First of all, it isn't easy to show the real nature of
what you call being weaker than pleasures; secondly, the whole
argument depends on this." So, here Socrates is out to explain
the "real nature" of what "the many" call being overcome by
pleasure. His view is that hedonism plays a role in that
explanation. Socrates goes on at 377b-c to argue that what "the
many" call being overcome by pleasure is no more than an error in
the calculation of what is most pleasant.
This, by itself, however, does not demonstrate that Socrates
accepts hedonism. His remarks can be understood as making either
of these two claims:
2 . The best explanation of what "the many
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call being overcome by pleasure can be
given by appealing to the truth of
hedonism.
3. The best explanation of what "the many"
call being overcome by pleasure can be
given by appealing to the fact that "the
many" accept hedonism.
If, indeed, Socrates* project is to explain the phenomenon
of being overcome by pleasure, then ( 2 ) is the more plausible
interpretation of Socrates* remarks, yet it is not clear how
hedonism, itself, can explain why being overcome by pleasure is,
in fact, an error in calculation. Even if pleasure .is identical
to goodness, and if, as Socrates supposes, I desire what is best,
it does not follow that my choices of action are based on some
calculation of what is most pleasant. [NOTE 34] But if my
choices of action are not based on some calculation, the Socratic
analysis certainly does not entail that my incorrect choices are
based on some miscalculation.
On the other hand, if I accept that pleasure is identical to
goodness and if I desire what is best, then one might expect my
choices of action to be based on some calculation of what is most
pleasant. When I choose what is less than best, believing the
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best to be the most pleasant, I will have mlsoaloulated about
what is most pleasant. The explanation of my being overcome by
pleasure involves my belief that what is best is most pleasant,
not the identity itself.
So, If Socrates is attempting to explain the phenomenon ’the
many call being overcome by pleasure, there is some presumption
in favor of understanding his remarks at 352e and 354e along the
lines of (3). Socrates' acceptance of (3), however, in no way
provides evidence that Socrates, himself, accepts the
identification of goodness and pleasure.
There is another passage, discussed by Taylor, which might
be thought to provide evidence that Socrates accepts a hedonistic
doctrine. He translates it this way: "Don't you think that, as
Protagoras and I maintain, the only reason that these things,
(i.e., poverty and diseases) are bad is that they result in pain
and deprive one of other pleasures?" As Taylor notes, when
translated this way, the passage suggests that it is both
Protagoras ' and Socrates ' opinion that painfulness is the sole
bad—making property. As Taylor also notes, however, this
sentence can be translated a second way, namely: "Don't you
think, as Protagoras and I maintain (sc. that you think), that
the only reason [that these things (i.e., poverty and diseases)
are bad is that they result in pain and deprive one of other
pleasures.]" (Taylor p. 176) Taylor supposes that while this
latter understanding is not impossible, it is less attractive
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than the first. [NOTE 35] He presents two arguments for this
conclusion. He says, first, "...in his presentation of the
imaginary dialogue with the many Socrates has so far represented
himself as concerned to elicit their views by questions, and not
by eliciting their views in such a direct fashion." (ibid.)
Thus, in the latter passage, but not in the former, Socrates is,
in some way, leading 'the many' to some conclusion. But surely,
this is no reason to reject the translation, for this is
Socrates’ accustomed manner, at least in this dialogue. So, for
instance, at 354dl-3, Socrates says to 'the many', "For if you
call enjoyment itself evil for any other reason and by reference
to any other result, you would be able to tell us what it is.
But you can’t." This formulation is essentially repeated at
354d8-e2. Taylor is simply wrong about Socrates' method of
questioning
. Socrates almost always asks leading questions
,
although he is careful to give his interlocutors opportunity to
dissent. The passage under discussion is no exception.
Taylor also suggests that a defect of this translation is
that "it asserts a unanimity between Socrates and Protagoras
which is not justified by anything said previously," (ibid.)
although he acknowledges that it is also a defect of other
readings as well. Again, Taylor is mistaken. There is a
difficulty in the reading Taylor adopts because his reading
suggests that Protagoras and Socrates are in agreement on a
criterion of evil (or goodness), for which there is no evidence.
65
Protagoras and Socrates, however, do have reason to be in
agreement about the criterion
-the many use. m a slightly
earlier passage, they have the following exchange:
'Do you suppose, Protagoras, that they would
give any other answer than that they are bad not
because they produce immediate pleasure, but
because of what comes later, diseases and the
like?
'
'For my part,' said Protagoras, 'I think that
is what most people would say.
'
'And surely in causing diseases they cause
a.nd in causing poverty they cause pains.
They would agree I think.
'
Protagoras agreed.
It is clear that Protagoras is here agreeing with Socrates
that the following are true:
4. 'The many can give no other reason for
things being evil than that that they
produce bad results.
and
5. 'The many' believe these results are bad
because they result in pain.
The passage at 353a5-354al, then, is a direct consequence of
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Socrates’ and Protagoras' acceptance of ( 4 ) and ( 5 );
•Don't you think, as Protagoras and I maintain,
that the only reason these things are evil is that
they result in pains and deprive one of other
pleasures?' They would agree.
Thus, Socrates is claiming that he and Protagoras would agree
that
6. 'The many give no other reason for things
being evil than that they produce painful
results
.
So, far from being an agreement "which is not justified by
anything said previously", this passage, read in the way Taylor
rejects, follows exactly from Protagoras' and Socrates' agreement
in the immediately previous passage. Read this way, however, it
only shows that Socrates holds that 'the many' accept hedonism,
not that he himself accepts it.
There remain two other passages which can reasonably be
interpreted as suggesting that Socrates accepted hedonism. The
first occurs at 358aff, after Socrates has concluded his
imaginary discussion with 'the many' concerning weakness of the
will and the hedonic calculus
. He resumes his dialogue with
Protagoras and the Sophists and says, "That's what we should have
said in reply to 'the many'. And now... I ask you ... whether you
think what I am saying is true or false .
"
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This IS one of the few passages in the dialogue in which
Socrates makes an assertion in his own person, and if his reply
to *the many involved acceptance of hedonism, then it would
appear that Socrates is here embracing the doctrine.
Unfortunately, as Taylor correctly points out (page 201), it is
entirely unclear what this passage is referring to. We have the
same difficulty with this passage as we had with 354e5ff. if
Socrates' reply to 'the many’ was that weakness of the will is
analyzable as miscalculation because 'the many' accept hedonism
((3) above), then this passage does not commit him to hedonism.
If, on the other hand, his reply to 'the many' was that weakness
of the will is analyzable as miscalculation because hedonism is
true ((2) above), then in this passage Socrates is committed to
hedonism. Our reasoning about the original passage at 35 4e
suggests that we should take this passage in the first of the two
ways suggested. Read this way, Socrates remains uncommitted to
hedonism.
The final passage that might be interpreted to show Socrates
committed to this view occurs at 360a2-3. There Socrates says to
Protagoras, " 'WeLl now,' I said, 'if it's praiseworthy and good
( KaXov Kai gyaBov ’) is it also pleasant?"' "That's what was
agreed." replies Protagoras. Taylor says of this passage (p.
209):
...since Socrates is here axguing in his own person
it would be dishonest on his part to allow the
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sophists to accept his inference if he were aware
that the proposition had not been previously agreed
at all, but merely accepted by an imaginary
opponent on the basis of assumptions which he
(Socrates) rejects
.. .This passage is therefore the
strongest evidence that Socrates is represented by
Plato as sharing the assumptions of the common man
and the conclusions which he (Socrates) derives
from these assumptions rather than merely forcing
the common man to accept the implications of
assumptions which he (Socrates) rejects. Socrates
then assents in his own person that all and only
pleasant things... are good, probably because he
himself maintains the thesis that pleasure is
identical with the good...
Again, Taylor here is going a little quickly. He presents
two possible interpretations, (a) that Socrates is trying to
persuade Protagoras of some conclusion using hedonistic premises
that he (Socrates) accepts, and (b) that Socrates is trying to
persuade Protagoras of some conclusion using hedonistic premises
that he (Socrates) rejects. The latter, Taylor characterizes as
' dishonest ' and concludes that Socrates must accept these
premises
.
There is, however, a third possibility which Taylor
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considers earlier with regard to other passages (e.g. 358a), but
neglects to consider here, namely that while Socrates rejects the
premises, they are accepted by his interlocutors (in this case,
Protagoras) and, hence, are available for use without dishonesty.
We will have more to say about this passage in the next chapter.
Let us merely note here that to use this passage to show that
Socrates is committed to hedonism presupposes a certain view of
what Socrates' purpose is in the dialogue.
In the next chapter, I will try to discover just what part
Socrates plays in the Protagorag . For now, however, it is enough
to note that there are no passages which clearly attribute to
Socrates an acceptance of any form of hedonism. [NOTE 36]
Are there, on the other hand, any passages which suggest
that Socrates does not accept the hedonistic doctrine? There are
two; they are, however, by no means indisputable. At 333c6,
Socrates says that he will let Protagoras answer for 'the many',
"provided that you answer the questions whether you believe the
answers or not. it is chiefly the thesis I am testing, but all
the same, it perhaps turns out to be a test for me too, as I ask
the qestions, and for whoever is answering."
This passage is uncharacteristic of Socrates who usually
rejects answers that do not reflect the opinions of his
interlocutors. This may suggest that we should be leary about
ascribing any of the views in the discussion with 'the many' to
Socrates.
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The second passage occurs at the end of this same section
(after he ‘iemonstrates that weakness of the will is nothing but
miscalculation about pleasant and painful consequences). There
Socrates says at 357e4-e9;
So this is what being weaker than pleasure is, the
greatest of all errors, for which Protagoras here
and Hippias and Prodicus claim to have the cure.
But because you [
' the many • ] think that it is
something other than error you neither consult
these sophists yourselves nor send your sons to
them to have them taught this
. . . and as a result you
do badly both as private individuals and in public
affairs
.
Whatever doubts we have about Socrates ' other views in this
dialogue, surely this passage is ironical. Socrates does not
believe the sophists have the cure for much of anything, let
alone for aJu:asia. If, on the analysis of akrasia Socrates has
just presented, it turns out that one's best course is to consult
a sophist, we have good reason to conclude that Socrates is not
taking his analysis altogether seriously.
We have seen, then, that there is clear textual evidence
that 'the many', or at least Socrates' and Protagoras' version of
'the many', accept hedonism. We have seen that there is textual
evidence, although somewhat less clear, that Protagoras is
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persuaflea to accept hedonism. we found, however, that a
preliminary analysis of the dialogue yielded no clear reason why
he needed to do so. Finally, we found the text offers no
compelling evidence that Socrates, himself, accepts hedonism.
But this fact does not directly help us with the problem of what
role the hedonism does play in the logical structure of the
dialogue
.
In the next chapter, I want to examine this question by
looking at the standard answers that are produced in the
literature. In so doing, I will pay special attention to those
pieces suggesting that the best understanding of the arguments in
the Ejotaqqras is one in which Socrates is committed to hedonism.
I shall argue that such a view is mistaken.
CHAPTER IV
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall, at last, turn to the arguments in
the Prgtaqoras that concern hedonism, in doing so, i have two
goals in mind. The first is to discover the role the doctrine of
hedonism plays in the arguments themselves. The second is to
discover Socrates' part in this dialogue, it is the pursuit of
this latter goal which will lead us to consider the
interpretations of various commentators concerning Plato's
purpose in writing the Protagoras
.
QYerview Ol i]ae Dialogue
The discussion of hedonism is one part of a much larger
discussion of what virtue is and whether it is teachable. The
dialogue begins with Protagoras and Socrates disagreeing about
the teachability of virtue; Protagoras maintains that it is
teachable, Socrates denies it (319-329). After listening to a
long speech by Protagoras, Socrates claims to be convinced that
virtue is the sort of thing that can be taught, but admits to
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having one remaining worry.
At 329c-d, Socrates asks if the virtues (viz., holiness,
courage, justice, wisdom, and temperance) are distinct parts of
virtue Itself or if they are identical. Protagoras answers that
they are distinct parts and suggests as evidence the fact that
one sees people who have some of the virtues but lack others, if
the virtues were really identical, this situation would be
impossible. The rest of the dialogue consists of a series of
arguments against Protagoras' position.
The first of these arguments occurs at 330c-33ic. There
Socrates argues that if, for instance, justice and holiness are
things, as Protagoras supposes, then it follows that
holiness is not just, and, hence, unjust, which is absurd.
[NOTE 37] Protagoras has worries about the argument but does not
articulate any specific objection. He is nonetheless represented
at 333b6 as having conceded that justice and holiness are nearly
the same ( cnc£66'v xi Tctumv ov )
.
The second argument occurs at 332a-333b. There Socrates and
Protagoras agree that each virtue has exactly one opposite vice,
and vice versa (332c5-dl). Protagoras then admits that folly is
the opposite of wisdom ( 332a5 ) and that folly is also the
opposite of temperance (332e5). From this, Socrates presents
Protagoras with a dilemma: "Which of our theses shall we give up,
then, Protagoras? The thesis that each thing has only one
opposite, or the one that said that wisdom is distinct from
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t temperance]?" (333aa-3) since the uniquenese of opposites claim
is unquestioned, Socrates concludes at 333b4-5, "So [temperance]
and wisdom would be one?" [note 38] Presumably, Protagoras’
Silence signifies his assent.
Protagoras admits without argument at 333al-2 that nobody is
both unjust and temperate. The argroment supporting that view is
interrupted by a dispute over the method of discussion and by a
digression into the topic of poetry.
When the discussion gets back on track at 349d, Protagoras
agrees that four of the virtues resemble one another fairly
closely (£TLl£I<^ST^aTTWaia (349d3-4), but claims that
courage is altogether different. This is true he says because,
"you will find many men who are totally unjust, and irreligious,
and intemperate, and ignorant, but most outstandingly
courageous." ( 349d6-8 ) In response to this claim, Socrates
presents his fourth argument against Protagoras, in which he
argues that courage and wisdom are the same.
While there has been a large amount of literature over the
years discussing the details of this argument, the broad outline
is clear enough. Protagoras here agrees that those who are
courageous (av6p s \ are daring ( 6 an n aX f n s:) and that those who are
most daring are those who have knowledge or wisdom. Furthermore,
he admits that anybody who is daring but ignorant is not
courageous. From this, Socrates concludes at 350cl-5,
So... these people who are wisest are also most daring, and being
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most daring are most courageous? And according to this argument
wisdom would be the same as courage?"
Protagoras does object vigorously to this argument; from his
admission that whoever is courageous is daring, Socrates has
Illegitimately inferred that whoever is daring is courageous.
Rather than pursue their disagreement, Socrates moves on to
a new argument for the identification of wisdom and courage.
( 350b6-360c6 ) It is in the course of this new argument that the
topic of hedonism is introduced. After eliciting Protagoras'
assent that pleasure and goodness are the same, Socrates
persuades Protagoras that the courageous person is successful in
calculating which things are fearful and which things are not
( i . e
. , which things are painful and which things axe pleasant )
,
the coward unsuccesful. (360a-d) This act of calculation,
however, is a sort of wisdom; wisdom of which things to fear.
The courageous person has this wisdom; the coward does not.
Courage, then, turns out to be "wisdom about what is to be feared
and what is not." ( 360d5 ) Hence, as Protagoras reluctantly
admits at 360e, it is impossible for someone to be both
courageous and altogether ignorant
.
This point settled to their satisfaction, Socrates returns
to the point he left at 329, namely, the teachability of virtue.
Since, Socrates concludes, this same sort of analysis could be
given for each of the other virtues (361bl-3), virtue itself
"consists wholly in wisdom" ( 361b5-6 ) and, hence, must be
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teachable
.
It 13 important to note that the discussion of hedonism
occurs as a step in an argument for the unity of the virtues,
which IS, Itself, a step in an argument for the teachability of
virtue; for our immediate purpose, however, we can ignore those
other discussions. We will have occasion to return to fill out
this brief sketch of the logical structure of the dialogue at the
end of the chapter. Let us now, however, turn to the discussion
of hedonism.
Summary o£ iiis Discussion Involving Hedonisin
Hedonism makes its first appearance in the well-known
discussion of akrasia or weakness of the will. (353b-357e)
Socrates and Protagoras have agreed at 352b-c that nobody will
ever voluntarily act contrary to what he knows to be right. This
they make clear differs from the opinion of 'the many';
Do you [Protagoras] agree with 'the many' there too
or do you think otherwise? The opinion of 'the
many' about knowledge is that it is not anything
strong, which can control and rule a man; they
don't look at it that way at all, but think that
often a man who possesses knowledge is ruled not by
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It but by something else, in one case passion, in
another pleasure, in another pain, sometimes lust,
very often fear; they just look at knowledge as a
slave who gets dragged about by all the rest. Now
are you of a similar opinion about knowledge, or do
you think it something fine which can rule a man,
and that if someone knows what is good and bad, he
would never be conquered by anything so as to do
other than what knowledge ( ETTiainun ^ bids him? in
fact, that intelligence (.cbQovnm \; is a sufficient
safeguard for a man?
My opinion is indeed as you say, Socrates.
Socrates aiid Protagoras, then, agree on:
1. No person who knows what is good
voluntarily acts contrary to that
knowledge
.
'The many, of course, reject the truth of (l), because they
accept the truth of:
2. People often know what is good and do
otherwise because they are weaker than
( riTTu) ) . or overcome by ( £<iTAnTTou£vos ^
.
pleasures. (353c2, 355bl,3 etc.)
and at 353c, Socrates and Protagoras set out to explain why (2)
is impossible.
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Socrates easily convinces them, in this imaginary dialogue,
that things are plain-good because they produce a preponderance
of pleasure over pain for the person experiencing them. Socrates
shows, at 353d-354e that 'the many' accept:
3. Pleasure and goodness are identical,
and, presumably,
4. X is better (worse) than y iff x is more
pleasant (painful) than y. [NOTE 39 ]
But at 355b, Socrates claims that it follows from (3) that "good"
and "pleasant" are intersubstitutable
. Substituting "good
things" for "pleasures" in (2) we get;
5 . Some people know what is good and do
otherwise because they are overcome by
goods things.
(5) is absurd, according to Socrates (355d). In the literature
that are a number of attempts to discover what Socrates takes to
be absurd about (5). Gerasimos Santas in his 1966 article,
"Plato's Protagoras and Explanations of Weakness", [NOTE 40]
suggests that what is absurd bout ( 5 ) is that it contradicts
psychological hedonism, which is accepted at 356c.
What Socrates has shown is that on the
assumption of hedonism ( ethical and psychological )
,
one explanation of the weakness commonly given by
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the masses, "overcome by pleasure", reduces to
absurdity in the sense that... it contradicts the
very principle of psychological hedonism which is
universally employed by hedonists in the
®^Pl^^ation of behavior, (page 283)
There are a couple of fairly obvious difficulties with this
view. In the first place, it implies that there is a doctrine of
psychological hedonism in the dialogue, for which we have seen no
compellxng evidence, in the second place, the alleged statement
of psychological hedonism at 356c does not occur until nearly a
full Stephanus page after the occurance of ( 5 )
.
Gregory Vlastos, in his 1956 introduction to the Ostwald
translation of the Erotagoras maintained that (5) itself is a
contradictory statement. But surely, (5) itself is not
inconsistent, at least it is not presented by Plato as being so.
At 355b406, Socrates claims that (5) will be seen to be absurd if
we consider certain other propositions which result from the
intersubstitutability of "good" and "pleasure"
.
I think Vlastos in his 1969 paper, "Socrates on Akrasia",
[NOTE 41] correctly points out what strikes Socrates as absurd
about (5). Suppose S is faced with a choice between two acts, ^
and b . Suppose a is a good act ( involving much good and little
evil ) while b is evil ( involving little good and much evil )
.
Suppose, further, that while S knows that this is the case, he is
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overcome by the goods of b so that he chooses to do fe rather than
^ ^3 really overcome by the goods of fc, then it is the
consideration of those goods that leads him to chose to do b
rather than But, b involves less good than To suppose
that S chooses b is to suppose that S chooses to take, "greater
evils against lesser goods" (355e3) knowing that he is so
choosing. Thus, ( 5 ) on Socrates' view entails
6
. Some people know what is good and do
otherwise because they choose a situation
involving lesser good and greater evil.
Socrates considers this proposition, which is entailed by
( 5 )
,
absurd because it entails that some people choose the lesser
good knowing it to be the lesser good, which Socrates regards as
an impossibility.
This is a position that Socrates maintains in many of the
early dialogues. it is a position, in fact, that is never
abandoned in the entire Platonic corpus. In its most general
form, it is the claim that if a person knows what is best he will
never desire or choose to do anything less. So, for instance,
Socrates and Meno have this exchange at Meno 78a-b.
Soc: Does anybody want to be unhappy and unfortunate?
Men: I suppose not.
Soc: Then if not, nobody desires what is evil, for what
else is unhappiness besides desiring evil things
and getting them?
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Men: It looks as if you are right and nobody desires
what is evil
.
Thus, (5) is impossibile, and nobody can be overcome by
goods to choose a course of action which he knows to be evil.
But since (5) follows from (2), (2) is impossible as well.
[NOTE 42]
With this argument completed, Socrates moves on to present a
second argument against (2). Instead of substituting "good" for
"pleasure" in (2), he substitutes "pleasure" for "good" in (2)
and gets,
7. Some people know what is most pleasant and
do otherwise because they are overcome by
plecLsures
.
Suppose that S knows some action ^ to result in a
P^^®ponderance of pain over pleasure and knows some alternative
action t to result in a preponderance of pleasure over pain.
(7), then, asks us to imagine that S, who knows that b will
result in more pleasure (and less pain) than a, is overcome by
the small amount of pleasure that a does result in and, therfore,
chooses to do a. By consideration of these pleasures, S is led
to choose the smaller package of pleasures and reject the larger.
So, (7) amounts to.
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8. Some people know what is most pleasant and
do otherwise because they choose a
situation involving less pleasure and
greater pain.
According to 'the many* pleasure is the only good. if pleasure
IS the only good, the the situation in which one is led to choose
less pleasure knowing that there is more available to him is
impossible.
Socrates' argument, then, amounts to showing that (2)
together with the doctrine of hedonism yields, on the one hand,
(6), and, on the other, (8), both of which he takes to be
unacceptable. His arguments against (2) complete, Socrates goes
on to draw a moral about knowledge, to which we will return
later
.
It is, according to Socrates, the science of measurement and
only the science of measurement which will allow one to calculate
correctly which course of action will produce the most pleasure.
So Socrates says at 357a6-b3, "well then, gentlemen, since we
have seen that the preservation of our life depends on a correct
choice of pleasure and pain, be it more or less, larger or
smaller, or further or nearer, doesn't it seem that the thing
that saves our lives is some technique of measurement, to
determine which are more, or less, or equal to one another?"
Since pleasure and goodness are identical, it is the science
of measurement that encibles one at any time to know what is best.
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Furthermore, Socrates states, but without an argument, this
knowledge can come from no other source than the science of
measurement: •••in the face of this would they agree that it is
the art of measurement that would save us, aans ntberv
• Measurement •, he agreed. •• if one fails on some occasion to
choose what is best, he has made an error in measurement.
[NOTE 43]
This argument is far too complex and problematic for us to
give anything more than a cursory summary of it here, nor is it
important that we do so. The important thing to note is that by
the assumed intersubstitutability of "good” and "pleasant",
Socrates supposes that he has shown that 'the many' were wrong to
believe ( 2 )
,
since anyone who is ' overcome by pleasure ' has
failed to apply correctly the science of measurement and thus
does not really what is good. His doing otherwise is simply
a result of his ignorance (i.e., error). So, at 357dl-d7,
Socrates concludes
:
For you have agreed that those who go wrong in the
choice of pleasures and pains - which is to say, of
good and evil things - go wrong from lack of
knowledge, and not merely of knowledge, but, as you
have already further conceded, of measurement. And
you surely Jcnow yourselves that wrong action done
without knowledge is done in error.
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Following the discussion of weakness of the will, hedonism
reappears in the discussion between Socrates and Protagoras
beginning at 358a. Protagoras agrees that
3. Pleasure and goodness are identical,
and agrees that the following are true
;
9. For any act, a, if ^ contributes to a
painless and pleasant life, then s, is
praiseworthy
.
10. For any act, a, if a, is praiseworthy, then
d is good.
Socrates points out that he and Protagoras have already agreed
upon the following claims;
C. No person who knows what is good
voluntarily acts contrary to that
knowledge
.
( l
)
C • . One voluntarily fails to do what is best
if and only if he is ignorant of what is
best.
Now Socrates turns the argument toward the relation between
courage and wisdom and suggests at 358d5-el:
11.
S fears x =df S expects x and S believes
that X is evil.
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But, ( 1 ) entails12.
Nobody who knows what is evil voluntarily
acts so as to acquire it. (358d)
Hence,
13. Nobody who knows what is fearful acts so
as to acquire it. (359e3-6)
At 359d5, Socrates infers
14. If anyone acts so as to acquire what is
fearful, he acts in ignorance and error.
Cowards avoid praiseworthy acts while courageous men perform
them. Since everything praiseworthy is good, (10), and all good
things are pleasant, if a coward avoids praiseworthy acts, he
avoids those acts which are most pleasant. The only reason he
would avoid these praiseworthy acts is that he mistakenly thinks
they are fearful
,
i . e
. , that they are not good and
,
hence
,
unpleasant. Thus, the coward acts as he does because he has made
an error in calculation. Socrates says at 360c2-4, "...they are
cowards as a result of their error about what is to be
feared ... so it is in consequence of that error that they are
cowards?" One who fails to make such errors, however, correctly
chooses what is praiseworthy and, hence, not to be feared. This
person is the one with courage. Socrates concludes at 360d5, "So
wisdom about what is to be feared and what is not is courage
since it is the opposite of error about that." [NOTE 44]
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With this, Socrates finally concludes his refutation of
Protagoras' claim that one could be courageous and altogether
ignorant, courage and wisdom (about what is to be feared) turn
out to be one and the same thing.
Hedonism?
Vlastos in "Socrates on Akrasia" makes two claims regarding
the presence of hedonism in the dialogue. The first is that
Socrates puts forth the hedonism merely to preclude irrelevant
objections to his claim that virtue is knowledge; the second is
that one of the arguments against weakness of the will is
independent of the hedonistic doctrine.
Concerning the first point, Vlastos notes that there is
absolutely no attempt made to differentiate between higher goods,
such as goods of the soul (presumably wisdom or, even, happiness)
and lower goods, physical pleasure, health, comfort etc. In
fact, the higher goods are completely ignored in the discussion
(Vlastos, page 74). Vlastos suggests that Socrates wants to
prove to 'the many' that if a man knows what is good, he will
never voluntarily act contrary to that knowledge. Recognizing
that 'the many' do not count the higher goods as goods, he is
willing to assume, temporarily, that 'the many' are correct about
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what things are good and what things are not. That is, he is
willing to assume that only pleasure, safety, wealth and the like
are goods. He needs to do this, viastos claims, in order to
avoid Side-tracking the debate onto a discussion of what things
actually are good, it is not Socrates* purpose here to put forth
an argument defending the higher-goods. Viastos suggests:
How then, in default of such an argument, could he
have hoped to block counterexamples which he
himself would have considered spurious, - cases in
which our supposed knowledge of the good we betray
has no grounding in our own unconstrained,
sincerely felt, convictions about good and evil?
Only by resorting to some manoeuvre that would keep
the argument on terrain which represents common
ground between himself and his present adversaries.
To execute this manoeuvre he needs some sort of
theoretical cover. He finds this in the hedonistic
premise he foists on "the multitude" in this
discussion. (Viastos page 75)
Socrates, then, does not actually siibscribe to the
hedonistic doctrine, but only presents it in the knowledge that
'the many' will accept it. Viastos does not explicitly say how
he understands Socrates' position in all this. The passage cited
above reads as though Viastos (i) has Socrates carefully put
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aside a minor point so that he can get on to his main objective,
namely showing aJsrasia impossible, and (ii) understands the
correctness of this proof to be unaffected by this move. The
passage, however, can also be read as though viastos supposes
that Socrates' purpose was to win an argument with 'the many' and
the "foist[ing] on the multitude" of the hedonistic doctrine is
simply one of the debater's tricks Socrates employs. That this
latter interpretation represents the correct understanding of
Viastos' position is born out by a claim on page 86 in which
Viastos says "... Socrates has good reason to think that the
doctrine of his thesis about aXrasia will be specially effective
against his adversaries if offered them under a hedonistic
umbrella .
"
There are, however, a number of difficulties with this
interpretation. 'The most obvious is this: Socrates is not
debating 'the many'
. He is talking with Protagoras, who is
answering for 'the many'. Thus, there is no need to worry about
'the many' side-tracking the discussion with questions about the
nature of the good. Perhaps Socrates is worried that Protagoras,
who already agrees with Socrates about the worth of the higher
goods (356c8-d3), will take so seriously his part as spokesman
for 'the many' that he will raise these questions so as to
side-track the dabate. if this were a transcript of an actual
discussion, this might be a plausible explanation for Socrates'
move here, but the Protagoras is, presumably, not a transcript.
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but a piece of dramatic fiction, however closely it represents
the characters' or author's actual views. The debate will not
get side-tracked unless Plato wants it to.
Even supposing that Socrates does deliberately limit the
scope of the discussion, how does this help him philosophically?
Vlastos has claimed that Socrates is trying to show that nobody
ever voluntarily acts contrary to his knowledge of what is good.
With the discussion restricted in the way Vlastos suggests, all
Socrates can hope to get from an argument which depends on the
hedonistic premise is that nobody ever voluntarily acts contrary
to his knowledge of what is good, when that knowledge tells him
that what is good happens to be what is pleasant. This is a much
weaker conclusion than the one Socrates sets out to establish.
Vlastos bridges this gap by saying, "if Socrates' thesis
about the power of knoweledge is true, it should work in these
cases [where the good and the pleasant coincide]. And if it does
work here
, it will not follow that it will only work here
.
”
(Vlastos page 78) This is not much of a bridge. Without some
more convincing understanding of how Socrates can get from his
limited proof about hedonistic akrasia to one about akrasia
generally, Vlastos has done nothing to elucidate the workings of
this dialogue.
While Vlastos does not make any further attempts to show how
an argument against akrasia which presupposes hedonism can be
shown to work without presupposing hedonism, he does attempt to
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Show that one of Socrates' arguments
independent of the hedonistic doctrine. The
against akrasia is
argument in which
(2) is rejected because it entails (5) involves substituting
"goods" for "Pleasures". For this substitution to be legitimate,
we do not need the full hedonistic claim as expressed by (3), but
rather only a much weaker claim such as
3
'
. All pleasant things are good things
.
Vlastos says on page 86, "For this master dialectician it
would have been child's play to see that if he got me to grant
him [ ( 3
•
) ] , I could not fail to concede [ ( 5 ) ] , since ' all
pleasure is good' entails that ’defeated by pleasures' entails
• defeated by goods
' , and hence warrants the substitution of
'goods' for 'pleasures'." since (3') can hardly be considered
hedonistic one version of the’ refutation of ( 2 ) proceeds without
presupposing hedonism. Of course, showing that one argument can
be understood so as not to rely on hedonism does not in any way
render more plausible his overall interpretation of this section
of the dialogue, which we discussed above. But, has he even
shown that this argument is independent of hedonism?
Vlastos realizes that to state the hedonism that Socrates is
discussing here, involves saying not only that pleasure and only
pleasure is good, but also that the more pleasure the better and
vice versa. While the first argument against (2) involves only
the substitution of "goods" for "pleasures", the doctrine that
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allows this substitution must also include this comparative
Claim, in fact, vlastos indicates that he understands this
argument to involve, in addition to the substitution of "good"
for "Pleasure", the substitution of "better" for "more
pleasurable
. (Vlastos, page 83n) This comparative claim,
however, does not allow for the neat separation that vlastos
requires
.
Assuming that the relations better than and more pleasant
than order [NOTE 45] the sets of goods and pleasures,
respectively, then,
15. If X is more pleasant than y then x is
better than y.
entails
16. If X is better than y then x is at least
as pleasajit as y. [NOTE 46]
While (16) is not exactly a statement of hedonism, anybody
who objected to hedonism would, no doubt, object to (16) as well.
The theory
,
then, that allows one to make the substitution of
"goods" for "pleasures" is not as innocent as Vlastos supposes;
it has (16) as a consequence. Thus, even the first version of
the refutation of (2) is not completely independent of hedonism.
Vlastos* understanding of the dialogue is, in the end,
inadequate. He has neither provided good reason for the
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introduction of hedonism in the Elalasfiraa nor demonstrated that
any part of the argument can get along without the hedonistic
doctrine
, or something very close to it
.
Hackforth ani3 irwin
In an article in the 1928 Classical Quarterly
, [note 47] r.
Hackforth suggests that the Erotaqcras represents an attempt by
Plato to work out the details and implications of the Socratic
View that courage (and virtue in general) is knowledge.
Hackforth says there:
My conclusion is that Plato in the Protaaoraa is
making a serious attempt to understand for himself,
and explain to his readers, what the Socratic
equation really meant
. I do not see how we are to
understand the Protagoras unless we assume that
Socrates had left the meaning and implications of
his equation unexplained, or, rather, inadequately
explained. (Hackforth, page 42)
Hackforth goes no further than to say that Socrates never fully
makes specific the notion of goodness. He does not ex5)lain just
what details Plato felt he needed to fill in nor why Plato
resorted to hedonism to do it.
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Recently, this view hes been revived and expanded by Terence
Irwin in Plate's Hgtal Uisaiy. Irwin argues that it was Plato's
worries about the so-called Craft Analogy that led Plato to look
to hedonsim as an explanation for why Socrates supposes virtue is
knowledge. Before looking at Irwin's account, let us look
3-t the craft analogy, itself.
/
Crafts (tex^) represented for Socrates one of the
paradigms of human rational behavior. There are a number of
reasons for this. According to Socrates, a craft proceeds in
some way which is subject to an account. So medicine is a craft
because,
-it has investigated the nature of that which it treats
and the reasons, and is able to give a rational account of each."
( gorgias SOlalf) This account guides the craftsman’s actions in
practicing that craft. Thus, in the Apology (22d4ff) Socrates
says that craftsmen are full of "impressive knowledge", at least
about their crafts, and in the Charmides (I65d3) that
architecture is the knowledge rcTTiaTnun ^ of building. Finally,
crafts can be taught. So, in the Meno (94b) Socrates relates
that Pericles had his two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus, "taught
horsemanship and music and athletics ... and educated in all other
crafts so as to be second to none .
"
Given the rationality of crafts, it is reasonable that
Socrates looked to them for enlightenment about virtue, which he
took to be the most rational of all human activities
. It is
clear from the dialogues that he saw some similarity or analogy
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between crafts and virtue. He may have even have supposed that
Virtue is a craft. Irwin assumes that he did.
Anything that is a craft, according to Irwin, must have a
product that can be recognized and evaluated apart from the
process that produced it. He claims that:
to explain and justify a productive process we must
Identify the product apart from the process; we
]cnow someone is doing the right thing to make a
table if we can identify a table without knowing
how it is produced. (Irwin, page 76, section 11.2)
A product IS identifiable independently of the process that
created it if and only if the definition of the product does not
include or make reference to the process. Irwin calls these
independently identifiable products ’ determinate products '
.
If the definition of "a shoe” is, say, "a rigid protective
covering for the foot", then it is possible for someone to know
and use this definition without knowing anything about the craft
or process of cobbling. Since shoes are, therefore,
idenitifiable independently of cobbling, they are determinate
products of that craft. On the other hand, some works of art,
instance, may be identifiable as such only when we know how
they were produced. Without knowing this, perhaps we would not
be able to tell them from natural objects or accidents. So, such
works do not count as determinate products, and, on Irwin's
analysis, the process that produced them does not count as a
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craft
.
According to Irwin. Socrates' search for the determinate
product of the craft of virtue leads him to accept hedonism in
the Eiotaqoraa . Irwin suggests (pmt, page 82 section 12.2) that
Socrates supposes the product of virtue to be happiness
( eudoiMouia), which, if it is the product, must be determinate.
Hapiness also turns out on Irwin's scheme to be the final good,
it 13 that which everybody desires and that for the sake of which
everything is desired (PUT, page 79
, section 12.3). These two
claims entail that virtue is the craft which produces happiness,
the final good and a determinate product.
If Irwin is right about this, then when Socrates finally
gets around to specifying the details of the final good he should
show it to be something which is identifiable independently of
any process which produces it. These are the very details Irwin
supposes Socrates supplies for us in the Protagoras , irwin says
of the hedonism discussed there by Socrates, "I shall argue that
the hedonism is Socrates' own view.
. .Hedonism explains the rather
indefinite talk of the final good [and] provides a clear subject
matter for the craft of virtue..." (PMT, page 103
, section 1.3)
[NOTE 48 ]
Irwin takes it for granted that pleasure is a determinate
product and suggests that it may well be the only available
candidate for a product of virtue that qualifies it as the final
good
.
Thus, Irwin claims, "Happiness is maximum overall
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pleasure; virtue is the craft of measuring pleasures and pains so
as to find the action which yields the largest surplus of
pleasures over pains." (pmt, page 109, section 3.3) According to
him, the view that happiness is an independently identifiable
product requires happiness to be a determinate end..." (pmt,
page lio, section 3.4)
Irwin supposes, then, that Socrates is very serious about
hedonism in the ExQtaqoras . It provides the determinate product
Irwin insists Socrates needs to fill out the craft analogy. The
Protagoras, therefore, should be viewed not as an anomoly to be
explained away, but as the culmination of the early dialogues'
search for an understanding of virtue
.
Irwin's view thus rests on his interpreting the craft
analogy to require that virtue, like other crafts, have a
determinate product. I think Irwin is wrong about this. There
is overwhelming evidence that Socrates in the dialogues did not
think was that either virtue, in particular, or crafts, in
general, must have determinate products. So, the need to find a
determinate product for virtue is not what motivates Plato '
s
interest in hedonism in the Protaaoraa
.
Perhaps the most striking passage regarding crafts and
determinate products is found in the Charmidps at I65f3ff.
There, Critias scolds Socrates for looking for a product of each
craft. He says;
. . . for wisdom is not like the other sciences
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(STLiairfyais ), any than they are like one another;
but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell
me, he said, what result (^ypy) is there of the
craft of calculation or geometry as ( qTou
;> a house
IS of building or a garment of weaving, or other
results which one can show of many other crafts.
Can you show me any such result of these? You
cannot. [NOTE 49 ]
If we understand "result" in this passage to mean
"determinate ends (products)", then Socrates is suggesting a
contrast between those crafts with determinate products, such as
building, and those without, such as calculation, if, on the
other hand, we understand by "result" something rather vague,
such as simply "end" or "product", then Socrates is suggesting a
contrast between those crafts with products of some sort, such as
building, and those without any products at all, such as
calculation. Either reading directly contradicts Irwin's claim
about the Socratic view of crafts and products.
In his brief discussion of this passage, Irwin points out
that as the passage continues, Socrates does attempt to show that
each craft has a subject matter, that it is 'of something, and
that this subject matter is distinct from the craft itself (PMT,
page 75, section 11.1 and page 298, footnote 44) He then suggests
that, in fact, Socrates does mention a determinate product of
98
calculation: Socrates’ claim at 166a5 ff that calculation is of
the odd and even, how numbers relate to themselves and to each
other, •suggests the product - the right answer is a product of
the calculation distinct from the steps of the calculations
themselves .
"
Irwin’s claim here is confused. m the first place, he
fails to notice that in the passage quoted above, Socrates has
already conceded that there is nothing that is the product of
calculation in the way that a house is the product of building.
Secondly, although Socrates does indeed say that the odd and even
and their relations are the subject of calculation, i.e., that
calculation is of numbers, this certainly does not commit him to
the supposition that numbers and their relations are the
products, let alone, the determinate products, of calculation.
"Right answer" could also mean whatever results from the correct
application of the craft of calculation, in this case, however,
the right answer would fail to be a determinate product since
such an answer can be recognized to be right only by reference to
a procedure that produced it. Even if an understanding of "right
answer" could be specified which allows it to be a determinate
product, Socrates gives no indication that he so understands it
in this passage.
It should really come as no surprise that Socrates does not
require that all craft have products, given the range of things
he considers to be crafts. In the Phaedo . for instance, Socrates
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refers to the craft of calculation ( xns Ioyous tEyvnS Y
Which he suggests can be usea to decide whether arguments are
good or bad (90b7). in the HiEEiaa Minai, Socrates refers to
both the craft of astronomy (_cot aaTpovouov ou ou teyuns eti
-tiZ oy eriainumu) and the craft of geometry (j{ YemUEip i<ns \
(367e9). In the saraiaa, all of these crafts are referred to
again, as well as that of arithmetic (jJ ap leyexiKn jcaj ApyiaTiKn
-mi
. Y£^U£TPlKn-
. ) (450d4). Finally, in the lan
(532C8, 532e4), Socrates refers to andynnn,..^
.
Which, given the context, might best be understood as "poetic and
artistic criticism.
"
While Socrates calls all of these xr^vDni. there is no clear
product of any of them amd, a fortiori, no determinate product.
The crafts of calculation, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy
certainly do not produce equations, numbers, figures, and
celestial bodies respectively. Nor do they serve to improve
these things.
The only candidate for a product of these crafts, and this
is entirely without textual support, is knowledge in those who
practice these crafts. Yet, it is doubtful that even this
product could reasonably considered to be determinate.
Astronomical knowledge is based on whatever conclusions are
reached by a careful application of the techniques of astronomy;
logical knowledge is based on whatever conclusions are reached by
application of logical techniques, and so forth. It appears.
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then, that in many passages Socrates presents sciences as crafts
and places no restriction on them that they must have either a
determinate product or any product at all.
In the passages discussed so far, Socrates has not
emphasized at all the notion of a product. are there any
passages in which he is concerned to show that crafts have
products? Irwin points out (PUT, pages 75-76) that Socrates does
occasionally search for products of various crafts. This is not
enough for Irwin's argument, however. What Irwin needs is a
passage where Socrates either says or suggests that having a
determinate product is a necessary condition for any process to
qualify as a craft. He produces no such passage.
There appears to be only one passage in which Socrates even
suggests that products are in some way identifiable independently
of their crafts. At 128e4-l of Alcibiades i, Socrates and
Alcibiades have the following exchange
;
Soc; But how could we have known what craft makes a shoe
better without knowing shoes?
Ale : Impossible
.
Soc: Nor, indeed, what craft makes a ring better without
knowing rings?
Ale : True
.
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Soc: Well then, could we have known what craft makes us
better being ignorant of what we are ourselves?
Alc: Impossible.
Even here, Socrates* point is only that in order to know
which craft benefits a certain thing, we must know what that
thing is. He does not say that we must know this thing
independently of knowing or experiencing the craft that benefits
it. Furthermore, even if something suggestive of Irwin's claim
were said here, Alcibiades I is most likely not a dialogue that
Plato wrote, as Irwin himself indicates in his Index Locorum.
We have, then, no passage that supports Irwin's claim, that
according to Socrates, every craft must have a determinate
product, and a number of passages which suggest that it is a
mistake to suppose that Socrates thought such a thing.
It was, however, largely on the basis of this view of crafts
that Irwin made his claim about the presence of hedonism in the
Erotagoras . I have argued that Socrates does not demand, or even
discuss the need for, determinate products of either crafts in
general or virtue in particular, and in the Charmides even
suggests that such a view is misguided. While we shall look at
other features of Socrates' views that Irwin supposes leads
Socrates to hedonism, we can already conclude that Irwin is
mistaken in thinking that Socrates was so led by the need to find
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a determinate product of the craft of virtue.
There is a second characteristic of crafts which Irwin
thinks important. it is this. crafts, as we have mentioned
above, proceed in some way which is subject to an account; they
are not random activities. This account can explain why the
craftsman performs the particular step he performs when he
performs it. So the account of medicine tells why a doctor gives
a patient one medicine instead of another. Activities which fail
to proceed according to an account do not qualify as crafts. So,
Socrates says in the ABSlogy (22b-c), poets are not craftsmen,
"since... it was not wisdom that enabled them to write their
poetry, but a kind of instinct or inspiration, such as you find
in seers or prophets who deliver their sublime messages without
knowing in the least what they mean." ( Trendennick •
s
translation
)
Irwin sees a necessary feature any account must have
. An
account must not contain "disputed terms". (PMT, page 72) While
Irwin never tells us just what it means for a term to be
disputed, he seems to mean that it is vague or open to a number
of interpretations. Thus, the baker giving a strict account of
his procedure will never say, "And now I throw in a bunch of
yeast," although he might say "And now I throw in a teaspoon of
yeast." The word "bunch" is vague; the word "teaspoon" is not.
Any dispute about how much yeast to put into a loaf of bread
could be solved by appeal to the latter account but not to the
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former. What maxes the former term, "bunch", vague, or disputed,
to use Irwin'S terminology, and "teaspoon" not, is that the
latter allows for precise measurement. one could follow
precisely an account involving "teaspoon", one could not follow
an account involving "bunch"
.
Of course, if virtue is a craft, it must also be subject to
an account, indeed, one that does not include disputed or vague
terms. That is, the account of virtue must contain only terms,
disputes about which can be settled by a procedure analogous to
measurement. Such an account provides "paradigms or standards
for deciding whether actions or persons are virtuous." (pmt,
page 72) So, claims Irwin, "An account of virtue which allows the
use of measurement in reaching moral conclusions will satisfy
Socrates
' demand for a paradigm" ( ibid
.
)
This is formalized by Irwin as a principle called "ED"
:
ED: "An adequate account [of virtue] must
©liininate disputed terms and provide a
paradigm which allows measurement .
"
( ibid
. )
Prior to the Protagoras . however, there was no such account
of virtue available. Words like "good", "just", and "admirable"
are simply too vague to be included in accounts of virtue.
This gap, is filled by the theory of the Protagoras
. There
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these vague terms are discarded
subject to precise measurement,
measuring pleasures and pains
in favor of "pleasure", which is
So "virtue is the craft of
so as to find the action which
yields the largest surplus of pleasure over pain." (pmt, page
) and the Plotagoras offers exactly the measuring procedure
Which removes the disputes, by freeing us from the puzzles
created by conflicting appearances ( 356c6-e2 )
. The disputes are
removed because the final good is defined by reference to
pleasure, a determinate end; now all the virtues can be similarly
defined without disputed terms." (pmt, page lio)
It is surely true that Socrates was concerned with
attempting to be precise in giving moral definitions or accounts,
was he concerned to be precise in order that he could find some
moral analogue to measurement? That is not so clear. Irwin
apparently realizes that Socrates never actually endorses
anything like a requirement that states moral definitions must be
formulated without using 'disputed' terms. So, Irwin says on
page 72:
Socrates endorses neither ED nor NED [which states
that no correct moral account can eliminate
disputed terms ] in the Socratic dialogues
. . . though
Socrates does not explicitly accept ED, he has
reason to welcome it if it could be achieved, if
moral disputes could be settled by some analogue to
measurement
.
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Not only does Socrates not explicitly endorse anything like
(ED), but he does not as if he endorsed it. Throughout
the early dialogues, Socrates often, without hesitation, gives
partxal accounts of moral properties which involve other moral
terms. So, for instance, in the Qiaimides Socrates objects to
Crxtias- definition of temperance as the doing of good actions
because according to that definition, one could be temperate
accxdentally by doing good actions accidentally. Socrates
objects to the definition because he supposes it yields an
unacceptable result, not because it contains disputed terms.
[NOTE 50]
Even in the g^Qtaqoras , itself, where Irwin supposes he
finds Socrates using hedonism to give an account of virtue and
goodness, it is not clear that Socrates' overriding concern is to
find an account which provides an "analogue to measurement".
However we understand the discussion with 'the many', when
Socrates returns to Protagoras at 360, the discussion inlcudes
the word "praisworthy" which, barring an analysis, must
be, to Irwin's understanding, a disputed term. So, even in the
Protagoras / Socrates is not obviously interested in eliminating
moral terms, per se, from the discussion.
It may well be true that Socrates would be dissatisfied with
an account of, say, courage which did not allow us to use it to
discover the courageous act among its non-courageous
alternatives. It does not follow from this that the account of.
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again say, courage must contain only non-moral terms which allow
for measurement. it follows only that we should understand the
terms, both moral and non-moral, used in the account.
Even on the supposition that Socrates was looking for an
account of virtue which used no disputed terms, there is reason
to hope that he would not turn to an account which relied solely
on pleasure. As Irwin, himself, notes on pages 110-112,
descriptions involving pleasures may not eliminate disputed terms
in the way he supposes they must, if pleasure is not a uniform
sensation, or is differentiable in terms of quality, then it
might be impossible to settle moral disputes by simply measuring
quantities of pleasures. Prior judgements might need to be made
concerning which pleasures are worth measuring or how to compare
sorts of pleasure, in which case accounts of virtue,
even ones containing terms about pleasure, will also contain
unanalyzed moral terms. Irwin says on page 112
,
"If judgements
of pleasure sometimes depend on other judgements of value, they
will not always settle conflicts of values; and then Socrates
loses the measuring science which settles disputes about good and
evil and the virtues .
"
Socrates was certainly aware, for instance, that judgements
of pleasure may depend on other judgements of value; Protagoras
raised the suggestion at the beginning of the discussion at 351 .
Irwin says that once we consider the difficulties with hedonism.
we will see that Socrates was mistaken to reach for it to solve
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the problems he finds in the craft analogy.
in a way, Irwin has set up a straw man here. He reads the
early dialogues so that there is a gap in Socrates' theory. He
reads the Protagor^jf^ in such a way that hedonism is used to fill
that gap. Finally, he criticizes the use of hedonism, after
noting that it does not do such a good job anyway. it seems,
rather, that one might take these defects of hedonism as evidence
that Socrates never intended to use the doctrine to fill out the
craft analogy, especially when the evidence for such an intention
is very weak anyway.
Irwin's reconstruction should be rejected. Socrates never
mentions the need for undisputed terms (as Irwin appears to
understand them) in accounts of crafts, nor does he ever reject
an account because it contains disputed terms. He does, however,
produce a number of moral claims in which one moral term is
partially analyzed in terms of another or others.
Furthermore, he has no reason to reject them. His concern
with precision does not in any way suggest that he must embark on
^ to eliminate moral (and hence, disputed) terms from
accounts of moral crafts. And if Socrates thinks that moral
properties and terms are essentially irreducible to purely
non-moral terms, he will have no sympathy for this project.
Finally, the one solution Irwin proposes, namely using the
undisputed term "pleasure" at the center of moral accounts and
definitions, is no good. Terms involving "pleasure" will not be
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undisputed in the way they must be to fit Irwin’s requirements.
Irwin, then, produces a faulty analysis of Socrates'
underlying conception of crafts and their accounts. On the basis
of this analysis he claims Socrates finds himself committed to
hedonism. This, Irwin notes, is unfortunate, since hedonsim does
not appear to fit the bill, once we see that Irwin's initial
account is mistaken, there is no longer any need either to
suppose he embraced hedonism as a remedy for some defect in his
theory, or to criticize him for failing to notice that hedonism
was a wrong choice
.
Now let us turn to the third and final feature of Socrates'
early views of the craft analogy which Irwin supposes commits
Socrates to hedonism in the Protagoras
.
[NOTE 51] According to
Irwin, Socrates, in the Hippias Minor# is concerned with the fact
that the mere possession of knowledge of some craft will not
guarantee that the craft is practiced correctly and not misused
in some way. So, for instance, there is nothing in the art of
medicine which insures that someone who possesses it will always
put it to good use. If this is a common feature of all crafts,
then if virtue is a craft, we are faced with a disturbing and
very un—Socratic consequence : even somebody who possesses the
craft of virtue might misuse it, i.e., fail to do those actions
virtue tells him are best . This consequence can be headed off
only if it is shown that the product of virtue is something that
everybody wants more than anything else, and that it is incapable
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Of misuse. (PMT, page 77)
Again, hedonism, Irwin thinks, fills in the theory. if
virtue yields the greatest overall pleasure and psychological
hedonism is true, then virtue produces something which everybody
desires more than anything else. Anybody who truly possessed the
craft of virtue could not help but correctly practice it. So,
Irwin says on page 87, "...the paradox of the Hippias Minor need
not worry Socrates; since the product of virtue is a determinate
end everyone pursues, someone who knows what virtue produces and
requires will act virtuously." [NOTE 52]
So, on this view, the Erotagoras is to be seen primarily as
an attempt to solve the paradox of the Hippias Minor , with
hedonism as the key to that solution.
It is important to notice right away that the Hippias Minor
discussion is not centered on crafts. To be sure, crafts are
mentioned: astronomy and geometry (367e), medicine (375b),
smithing and weaving (368b-c), but non-crafts are discussed, too.
Thus, a voluntary eye-blinking is compared with an involuntary
eye—blinking (374d), voluntary lameness is compared with
involuntary lameness (374d), where both blinking and lameness are
taken to be defects of the eye and leg respectively. Socrates is
not worried in this dialogue solely about the misuse of a craft,
but more generally about doing shameful and evil things
voluntarily. If crafts are not the central topic of the
dialogue, then it is less plausible to see the Protagoras as
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presenting a solution to the flippjag Minor puzzle.
None the less, the misuse of crafts seems to play some role
in the aippiaa. Does the problem it raises about crafts require
the hedonism of the £jctaggras? l think not. m the first
place, if it required hedonism, of any sort, it would require
psychological hedonism. The possibility of disobeying the
dictates of the craft that results in the greatest preponderance
of pleasure over pain is ruled out only if it is a psychological
law that we act in such a way as to maximize our expected
pleasure. We have seen, however, in Chapter ll that there is no
doctrine of psychological hedonism in the Protagnraa without a
doctrine of psychological hedonism, it is always possible that a
person, even one with the relevant knowledge, will choose to take
the less pleasant of two alternative courses, and, hence, misuse
the craft of maximizing pleasure, viz., virtue.
On the other hand, hedonism is not even needed to solve, to
Socrates satisfaction, the problem in the Hiopi as Minor .
Socrates must resort to hedonism, supposing pleasure to be a
determinate end in Irwin's sense, only if as a craft virtue must
have a determinate end. we have seen above that it does not.
Even granting Irwin’s supposition that at the end of the Hiopias
Minoi we are left in the position of needing to discover a result
of virtue which will be desired more than anything else, there is
no need to turn to hedonism. Socrates supposes that virtue and
only virtue consistently results in happiness ( suoaiyovia
Ill
( Qiaxmides 176a, fiuthYdemus 2Sla) and that everybody desires
happiness more than anything else, it follows that nobody who
possesses virtue would voluntarily act counter to the dictates of
virtue. This is a result Socrates would warmly embrace,
although, Irwin supposes, happiness is not a determinate product
(PMT page 108).
It does not appear, then, that Socrates is forced in the
exotagoras to endorse hedonism in order to prevent misuse of the
craft of virtue, nor does he suppose himself to be committed to
anything which so forces him.
We have looked at a number of attempts by Irwin to show that
the early Socratic doctrines are connected in such a way that
their combined requirements force Socrates to accept hedonism in
the Pxptaqgxas . in each case Irwin is unable to show this
result. I do not mean to deny that the early Socratic doctrines
are connected to each other; I do deny that they are connected in
the way Irwin supposes. The basic problem with Irwin’s account
is that it places severe restrictions on what can count as the
products of crafts, restrictions which, as we have seen, the text
will not support. While there aire certainly doctrines in the
PXQtagoxas which share a strong connection with doctrines in
sarlier dialogues, it does not seem possible to read the dialogue
in such a way as to make it an answer to the various puzzles and
shortcomings of early Socratic ethics.
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There is a third attempt in the literature to explain the
hedonism in the £j:gtaqgras . It is presented most extensively by
A.E. Taylor in his Elato i Hi£ Man and Ilia HaxJs. [note 53 ]
although hints are also found in Grube's "The Structural Unity of
the £xotaqoras .” [note 54] According to this view, Socrates
assumes the truth of the strong hedonistic thesis of 'the many*
and the sophists. He then proceeds to show that even on the
supposition that hedonism is true, two central Socratic theses
also turn out be true, weakness of the will proves to be some
sort of error, and courage and the other virtues show themselves
to be nothing more than knowledge of good and evil.
Support for this view is supposed to come from Socrates'
qualifications on the scope of his investigation. So, for
instance, Socrates says to 'the many':
Now, if you are content with that, and aren't able
to call anything good or bad except what results in
that, listen to what follows. I maintain that, if
is your position, it is absurd for you to say
that a man often does bad things though he knows
they are bad and could refrain from them. (my
emphasis, 355a4-bl)
and at 357d2-7:
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. . .but now If you laugh at us you will be laughing
at yourselves. For you have agreed that those who
go wrong in their choices of pleasures and pains ~
which IS to say, of good and bad things — go wrong
from lack of knowledge
. .
.
The whole argument, then, is designed to show
-the many' and the
sophists that even given the particular understanding of the good
they have, they are committed to, at least, these Socratic
conclusions. it is not only important to this view that we find
these qualifications popping up in Socrates' statement of his
arguments, but it is also crucial that we not find any passages
in which Socrates unequivocally commits himself to hedonism. The
investigation in the last chapter in which we found that there
are no such passages yields just the results expected by this
reading
.
Irwin levels two charges against this reconstruction
( ElatQ's Moral Theory, pages 308-309, n. 13 ). The first is that
this reading is defective because Socrates, "does nat represent
hedonism as the position which the many advocate; he ha^ to
CLOnvince them that in their own choices they accept it . " It is
not at all clear why this is a criticism. Socrates is careful
not to appear to persuade them to accept hedonism. If he did
this, it would, indeed, seem odd to say that Socrates is trying
only to draw out the conclusions of the beliefs of 'the many'
.
So, Socrates does not persuade 'the many' to accept
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heaonisn, he only persuades them that they already accept
hedonism. From this, it is perfectly legitimate for Socrates to
show that they must also accept the Socratic views which result
from that and other premises
.
Irwin'S second criticism is that if this view is right, then
Socrates has not gone one whit toward arguing either for the
impossihility of aJuaaia or for the unity of the virtues. All he
has produced is an argument that commits 'the many, and perhaps
the sophists as well, to these views. Irwin is probably right
here, at least if we understand his criticism in the following
way. If every important argument in the Protagoras is an ad
hominem against those who accept hedonism, then either a view
such as Taylor'S is wrong, or the Protagoras „as not meant to
establish anything more than that hedonists are committed to
certain views
.
While not a crushing objection, if it is correct, it shows
that the Protagoras is something of a disappointment, given its
extremely limited scope. Beyond noting that, however, let us put
off a discussion of this point until the next section.
Interpreting the Protagoras
I have outlined above the general structure of the argument
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against the possiiility of akiaaia. Secretes spends e greet deei
Of tine pointing out thet 'the neny elreedy eccept hedonism.
Almost the entire section from 353d to 355e is devoted to this
tesh. Whet is involved here is herdly persuesion. There ere no
arguments; there ere only observetions shout the hsbits of 'the
meny concerning vslue judgements.
once this is deer. Secretes moves on to s demonstretion
designed to show that
-the many cannot accept the possibility of
being overcome by pleasure so as to do what is wrong, since they
also accept the identification of goodness and pleasure. There
is no reason to suppose that Socrates, himself, accepts the
hedonistic doctrine of
-the many. Furthermore, on a
straightforward reading of the passage Socrates is merely showing
that 'the many must concede that weakness of the will is
impossible.
If this were the whole purpose of the dialogue, then Irwin's
criticism would apply to this interpretation as well. The
dialogue, however, is far from over. Those who suppose that the
demonstration of the impossibility of akrasia is partly aimed at
Protagoras are wrong. This proof would be wasted on him. He has
^9^®®d from the start that it is impossible to act contrary to
the dictates of our ethical knowledge ( 352c-e ) . What Protagoras
does not agree with is the identification of pleasure and and
goodness. [NOTE 55]
None the less, the discussion with Protagoras resumes at
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358. By this Protagoras appears convinced of the truth of
hedonism, and Socrates appears to be arguing in his own person.
we should expect here, then, that Socrates’
standard Socratio thesis as its conclusion
argument will have a
and premises which
Socrates accepts
.
Let’s look first at the argument for the unity of courage
end wisdom. at the beginning of this chapter, we outlined the
argument as follows
;
17. Pleasure and goodness are identical. [ 3 ]
18
. For any act, a, if a leads to the most
overall pleasant life, then a is
praiseworthy
.
[ 9
]
19. For any act, a, if ^ ±3 praiseworthy, then
a is good. [10]
20. For any person, x, if x knows what is
good, X will not act contrary to that
knowledge, [c]
21. For any person, x, x voluntarily fails to
do what is good if and only if x is
ignorant of what is good. [C]
22. S fears x =df S expects x and S believes
that X is evil. [ii]
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23. There is no person, x, such that x knows
what IS evil and voluntarily acts so as to
acquire it. [14] [From the supposition
that if a person knows what is good, then
that person knows what is evil
.
]
24. There is no person, x, such that x knows
what is fearful and acts so as to acquire
it. [From (22) and (23)]
25.
There is no person, x, such that x acts so
as to acquire what is fearful.
This argument is found from 358b to 359d5, and the
conclusion is stated at 359d5s "So, if that demonstration was
correct, no one goes for things that he regards as fearful, since
giving in to oneself turned out to be error."
The important thing to notice about this argument is that
the crucial premises (19) and (20) are already accepted by
Protagoras at the beginning of the hedonism discussion. At
351C1-2, Protagoras makes it clear that it is not mere pleasure
that is sufficient for goodness, but pleasure in praiseworthy
things ( xols <aAo'i s )
.
Praiseworthiness is the good-making
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property Protagoras subscribes to at 351 and agrees to again at
358, When he accepts (19). „e have already discussed Protagoras'
acceptance Of (10). He is especially eager at 351c-d to join
Socrates in clawing that no one will ever act contrary to the
dictates of knowledge
.
once Protagoras accepts the definition of fear, at 358d, the
conclusion comes straightaway that anyone who acts so as to
acquire what is fearful acts in ignorance. The first two
premises, (17) and (18), are not needed. The hedonism introduced
here is superfluous, Protagoras has accepted enough to commit him
to the conclusion, apart from accepting any doctrines about
pleasure
.
After Protagoras concedes that no one goes for what he
regards as fearful, Socrates moves on to his final conclusion
that cowardice is ignorance and courage is wisdom.
Socrates claims at 359e that if no one goes for what he
regards as fearful, then everyone must go for what he is
confident about. Socrates and Protagoras both agree that those
who are courageous go for praiseworthy things, that praiseworthy
things are good, and that good things are pleasant. (360a)
Socrates and Protagoras also agree, however, that cowards refrain
from going for praiseworthy things, and, instead, prefer
disgraceful things. So, it follows, cowards do not go for what
is good and pleasant.
But, if one refrains from going for what is good and
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pleasant, then one must fear those
pleasant. Cowards, then, fear good and
fears a thing only if one regards it
that are good and
pleasant things
. One
as evil. Hence, cowards
regard things that are good as evil.
This is simply a mistake on their part. Cowards are cowards
because they are fearful and confident about the wrong things.
Socrates says at 360a6, "Cowardice proves to be error about what
is to be feared and what is not." But, claims Socrates, since
courage is the opposite of cowardice and wisdom is the opposite
of ignorance, it follows that courage is wisdom of what is
fearful. At this point, we are told, Protagoras reluctantly
concedes that his initial claim was false and that it is
impossible to be courageous and altogether ignorant.
The actual argument proceeds thus s
26.
Everybody goes for what he is confident
about
.
27
. Those who are courageous go for
praiseworthy things
.
19. All praiseworthy things are good.
28. Those who are courageous go for good
things. (27, 19)
29. Any good thing is a praiseworthy thing.
( 360a3
)
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30. Cowards do not go for praiseworthy things.
31. Cowards do not go for what is good and
pleasant.
( 19 , 29 , 30 )
32. Cowards fear good and pleasant things.
( 360b)
33. Cowards regard good things as evil.
34. Cowardice is ignorance of what is fearful.
35. Courage is the opposite of cowardice and
wisdom is the opposite of ignorance.
36. Courage is wisdom of what is fearful.
37
. It is impossible to be courageous and
altogether ignorant.
Again, the hedonistic claims in this argument are
superfluous. The logic of the argument remains unchanged if we
drop all references to pleasure and pleasant things. As in the
previous argument, this argument depends on the notion of
praiseworthiness, the definition of fear, and the claim that
nobody goes for what is evil (and, hence, fearful). All of these
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Protagoras accepts, and none relies on ^ 4- -i x any doctrine about
pleasure. The argument is valid and contains no essential
hedonistic premise. The general outline, then, of the last third
of this discussion is this. Socrates shows 'the many that if
they accept hedonism they cannot consistently accept the
possibility of atoaia. on the basis of this discussion,
Protagoras admits that he, too, is persuaded as to the truth of
hedonism. Socrates then shows Protagoras via a proof that does
not rely on hedonism, that cowardice is ignorance of what is
fearful and courage is wisdom about that same thing.
Why does the hedonistic language remain in this section? it
does not remain for its contribution to the workings of the
dialogue. As we have seen, it plays no part in the argument
foriowing the discussion with 'the many-
. It is possible, of
course, that it is there either to prove to anybody reading the
dialogue that a hedonist is further committed to the identity of
courage and wisdom, or to dramatize the fact that the Sophists
are sympathetic to hedonism without making the argument depend on
the truth of hedonism.
In the end, there is no clear reason why hedonism remains a
part of the discussion. What is important is that Socrates has
provided what he takes to be a proof of the unity of courage and
wisdom which relies only on concepts and principles that
Protagoras and, presumably, Socrates already accept.
What we are left with however is a proof that is not, in
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itself, very helpful. it is nearly impossihle to evaluate
Socrates' argument without a developed understanding of
praiseworthiness
( ) . Furthermore
, Socrates • proof rests
on the peculiar view that nobody deliberately goes for, or acts
so as to acquire, what he fears, i.e., what he regards as evil.
This view, at least on the surface, seems false. Even if a
necessary conditxon of fear is an expectation of evil, it does
not seem to be a sufficient conditon, unless we suppose that no
one can eagerly await an approaching evil, it is, however, this
latter claim which Socrates must also adopt as part of this
•peculiar' view. Without these claims, the fact that cowards go
for disgraceful (evil) things would not count as evidence that
they act in ignorance of what is praiseworthy and good.
Plato may see the Symposium and the Hiopias Major as
attempts to come to understand praiseworthiness (or "beauty" as
_rp j<a^ IS translated in those dialogues). So, for instance, in
SYIRPOSium* S story of Diotima, we are given characterizations
of praiseworthiness (although no definitions) and, of course,
much of the gippias Major is devoted to an attempt to discover
the nature of praiseworthiness. The Meno
. on te other hand,
Plato may see as an attempt to show that nobody goes for what he
regards as evil (77b-78b). But that would be another story.
In the third chapter, we saw that there is strong textual
evidence that 'the many' accept hedonism. The evidence regarding
Protagoras ' acceptance of it is far more ambiguous
. While he
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eventually admits that he accepts it, there is reason to be
sceptical about that acceptance, since it seems to come without
reason. Regarding Socrates, there is absolutely no compelling
textual evidence that he accepts the doctrine.
in this chapter, i have claimed that the argument against
the position Of 'the many is entirely ad hominem . The argument
against altraaia depends on 'the many's' acceptance of hedonism.
It is not a general argument against akrasia
. Perhaps that is
not needed since both Socrates and Protagoras already deny its
possibility.
The final argument for the identity of courage and wisdom
maJces no essential use of a hedonistic doctrine. While hedonism
appears in the argument, it plays no part there. That argument,
rather, relies on a notion of praiseworthiness, and the claim
that nobody goes for what he is fearful about — claims which
Plato is concerned to discuss or defend in other dialogues such
as the Mana, ^ympasiuin , and Sippias Major. I claim, then, that
the most natural reading of the Protagoras is one which does not
involve Socrates' or Plato's adopting a doctrine of hedonism.
In the next two chapters, I shall turn to the Gorgias
. That
dialogue contains Plato's strongest attack on hedonism. The
purpose of the dialogue is far more apparent than the purpose of
'the Protagoras . unlike the arguments in the Protagoras
. those in
the Gorgias are presented in complete earnest, almost with
farvor. We shall, therfore, be able to spend more time examining
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the arguments themselves.
CHAPTER V
Introdun-h-jr^n
The gaxqias , like the totaqgrfls but unlike earlier
dialogues, such as the attempts to defend central
Socratic ethical views. Those earlier dialogues, as has often
been pointed out, were solely, or primarily, elenctic; in them
Socrates sought only to draw out and refute the view of his
opponents. We have seen in the fxotagoras that there Socrates
was not content with mere refutation, but wanted also to persuade
his interlocutors of the truth of his own views such as the
impossibility of akrasia and the and other doctrines. To be
sure, the gJlStagoras , like the elenctic dialogues, ends in
puzzlement. Socrates suggests in the final lines of the dialogue
that he has some doubts about the truth of what he has said. By
contrast, the gorqias ends in no such uncertainty. in this
dialogue Socrates sets out to prove two doctrines of whose truth
he appears to have no doubt. The first is that the just man is
always happier than the unjust man, and the second is that it is
better to suffer injustice than to commit it. In attempting to
demonstrate these claims, Socrates bitterly attacks both the view
that happiness consists in unrestrained pursuit of pleasure and
the hedonism on which he supposes the view that advocates such
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pursuit rests.
The iS2laiaa consists Of three separate discussions involving
Socrates, each with a more radical and extreme interlocutor than
its predecessor, (i) The first discussion (448d-461a) is between
Socrates and Gorgias, whom Socrates quickly leads into a
contradiction. Polus, a follower of Gorgias. comes to his
master’s rescue. ( 2 ) This second part of the dialogue
(461b-481b) centers on the question of whether it is better to
commit injustice than to suffer it. Polus maintains that it is
worse to suffer it, and in so doing, praises the life of the
tyrant, who can commit injustice with impunity. Socrates, of
course, maintains that the life of the just man is better.
The disagreement as characterized by both Polus and Socrates
IS whether the just man is happier than the unjust man
(470d,472d). Polus agrees that to commit injustice is more
shameful ( 2il£XPov ) than suffering injustice (474c). After a long
and torturous argument, Socrates convinces Polus that what is
more shameful is also worse (475dl-3). Finally, at the
conclusion of an equally protracted argviment, Polus is led by
Socrates to agree that the worse a person is, the less happy he
is. Thus, Polus agrees (479e8-9) that the unjust man is more
unhappy than the just man.
( 3 ) Finally Callicles enters the discussion at 48lb and
attacks Socrates for refuting Polus by taking advantage of his
willingness to call commiting injustice shameful. Callicles
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rejects entirely the constraints of conventional justice, that
Gorgias and Poles recognize, and so, he supposes, rejects the
Views by Which they are caught in contradiction. Callicles
claims that it is more shameful to suffer Injustice than to
oo^it it and even that ti is a praiseworthy thing to co„»it it.
Callicles' praise of the unrestrained satisfaction of
desires and the accumulation of power by the absolutely unjust
man represents the most extreme contrast to Socrates' own views,
and, indeed, fully half of the dialogue is taken up by the
discussion with Callicles (482c-527e). m this and the
subsequent chapter, i want to examine the treatment of hedonism
in this dialogue. In this examination I will concentrate on
Socrates' discussion with Callicles. it is there that hedonism
is formulated most clearly and argued against most strenuously.
We will find that while the arguments are put forth seriously,
they are defective in rather fundamental ways.
Let us turn to the doctrine of hedonism as it is formulated
in the Goraias .
fledonism in the coraias
Hedonism may first seem to enter the dialogue in Socrates'
discussion with Polus. At 475a4-5 Polus congratulates Socrates
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for "defining praiseworthiness in terms
goodness." a close analysis of Socrates'
section, however, shows that when this rather
is sharpened up to meet the requirements of
is really no hedonism involved.
Polus maintains that.
of pleasure and
reasoning in this
vague formulation
the argument
, there
1.
Doing injustice is more shameful (oiojorni)
than suffering it, but it is not worse
( KaKlov ^ (474C5-7).
and so denies at 474dl-2 that
2.
X is praiseworthy =df x is good,
where "praiseworthy" and "good" are the contradictories of
shameful" and "evil"
. Socrates gets Polus to agree at 474a5-b2
that
3. A thing, x, is more praiseworthy them
another thing, y, iff x is either more
pleasant or more beneficial than y.
and conversely,
4. A thing, x, is more shameful than another
thing, y, iff x is either less pleasant or
less beneficial than y.
Polus has already agreed that doing injustice is more shameful
than suffering it, so, from (3), is forced to admit that
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5. Doing injustice is either less pleasant or
less beneficial than suffering injustice.
Both Socrates and Polus recognize that
6. Doing injustice is not less pleasant than
suffering injustice.
So, it follows that
7. Doing injustice is less beneficial than
suffering injustice.
While Socrates never states
8. For any things, x and y, x is better than y
X is more beneficial than y,
he surely relies on it when he concludes at 475c that
9. Doing injustice is worse than suffering it,
( from ( 7 ) and ( 8 )
)
thus contradicting Polus' claim in (1) that it is not worse, and
refuting his insistence on the non-identity of praiseworthiness
and goodness.
Vlastos has pointed out in a 1967 article called "Was Polus
Refuted" [NOTE 56] that this argument is ultimately
unsuccessful because Polus should never have accepted Socrates'
questions as they were cast. For instance, Socrates asks whether
doing injustice is less pleasant than suffering it, with the
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implicit qualification "for those suffering it". Put this way
the answer is obvious, but the question is irrelevant. Had
Socrates asked instead whether doing injustice is less pleasant
than suffering it fai sy.^rYbedy concerned
. the answer is less
obvious. Had Polus insisted on the latter formulation, he could
have avoided Socrates' conclusion.
The important point to note here, however, is that even if
Socrates' argument were successful, it nowhere relies on a
doctrine of hedonism. At most it makes use of an alleged
identity between goodness and benefit, and a fortiori the
identity between goodness and either benefit or pleasure at 477a.
It is not until the final discussion with Callicles that a
serious doctrine of hedonism makes an appearance. At 495a,
Socrates asks Callicles whether pleasure is the same as goodness
(TO^ ^ ^ aja^. ) or whether something is pleasant which
IS not good. Callicles admits that his praise of intemperance
commits him to the former alternative. This position is brought
out a second time at 495 when Socrates again formulates
' position, this time stating unequivocally that he
disagrees with it.
Soc: ...Let's remember this, that Callicles of Acharnae
said that pleasure is the same as goodness ( n<Su koi
j \ ) \ y
flYQtvOV T auT ov £ 1 vai ) , but knowledge and courage are
different from each other and from the good.
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cal: And Socrates, here, of Alopece doesn’t agree with
this, or does he?
Soc: No he doesn't. [NOTE 57 ]
Taken literally, this shows that Callioles commits himself
to a straightforward identification of pleasure and goodness. Ho
subtleties are added to the doctrine. Any pleasure is good,
even, we are told at 494d-e, the pleasure of scratching an itch,
we will return to the formulation of hedonism in the dialogue;
but let us for now understand it as the same sort of extreme
doctrine we found in the Protagny^ c,
There seems, initially, to be some reluctance on Callicles'
part to assent to the truth of hedonism in this form. When he is
first asked by Socrates if he thinks pleasure and goodness are
identical, he answers, "Well, so that I don't leave my argument
inconsistent if i say they are different, i say they are the
same." ( 495a5 ) This suggests that Callicles' inclination is to
deny the complete identification of goodness and pleasure,
especially when the range of pleasures is unrestricted. He finds
himself, however, forced into the admission by his arguments
in the discussion. Let us turn briefly to Callicles'
earlier claims.
Callicles • commitment tQ Hedonism
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Callicles disdains conventional justice which he
Characterizes as
-channs, incantations [and] ... rules contrary to
nature.” (484a) He rejects Socrates- praise for the just man,
who lives temperately according to rules, in favor of the man who
lives justly according to nature. This man, if he is to live
rightly,
should let his appetites grow as large as possible
and not restrain them, and when these are as large
as possible, he must have the power to serve them
with whatever he has an appetite for at any time.
(491e7 - 492a3) But in truth, Socrates
... it is this
way; luxury, intemperance, and freedom, if it is
well supplied, this is virtue and happiness; and
those other things, those ornaments, those
agreements of men contrary to nature, those are
rubbish, worth nothing. ( 492C5-8
)
Callicles, then, believes that the truly good man is the one
with extraordinarily large appetites who is able to satisfy the
demands of those appetites. One gets better, on this view, as a
function of the size of one's appetites and the ability to
satisfy them.
But satisfying desires, according to Callicles, is just the
cause of pleasure. Pleasure is simply the feeling that comes
from the satisfying of desires. The appetite is a precondition
of that satisfaction.
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This understanding of the phenomenon of pleasure seems to
appear for the first time in the certainly nothing like
it made an appearance in the The fact that Plato has
Socrates resort to analogies about jars ( 493a - 494b ) might
suggest that Plato had not yet fully worked out this analysis.
If he had, we might expect something more along the lines of an
account. According to the analogy presented, appetites are like
jars with holes in them, and pleasure is like liquid flowing into
them. What we call a large appetite is analogous to a jar in
which the holes are very large. The quantity of pleasure is
represented by the quantity of liquid flowing into the jar.
This comparison, whatever its merits, points up two
consequences of the view analyzing pleasure as desire
satisfaction: (i) as jars with holes do not remain filled, so
appetites do not remain satisfied, (ii) as one's appetites grow
larger, so does one's capacity to receive pleasure. Appetites
are a precondition for experiencing pleasure and their size
limits the quantity of pleasure one can take in.
This understanding of pleasure, which Callicles accepts,
makes no qualitative distinction among kinds of appetites or
corresponding pleasures
. Even the endless scratching of a
constant itch counts as pleasant, since it is the satisfaction of
a desire. [NO'TE 58]
Since being a good person, for Callicles, consists in
satisfying one's well-developed appetites, and this satisfaction
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always results in pleasure, being a good person consists in
erperiencing great amounts of pleasure. The sole criterion,
then, for the goodness of a person is the amount of pleasure
experienced by that person, [note 59 ] Socrates suggests, and
Callicles agrees, that this view depends on the identification of
goodness and pleasure. so, at 495a, callicles admits that his
praise of the completely intemperate man rests on that
identification
.
Jussi Tenkku [NOTE 60] has argued, in his "Evaluation of
Pleasure in Plato's Ethics", that Socrates unfairly forces
Callicles to accept hedonism, by forcing him to admit that any
pleasure is good, even the pleasure of scratching. TenJcku writes
on page 75:
As a reckless aristocrat, Callicles does not care
if he is called unjust; he may even be proud of it
but to be put on the level of an itcher and
scratcher or of a catamite, is extremely repugnant
to him.
Actually Socrates acts unfairly towards
Callicles in introducing such ignoble examples.
From his own point of view, Callicles might have
been able to admit that pleasure in scratching and
itching is evil, for in his defense of the
pleasures as conditioned by the passions, he hardly
meant bodily pleasures, as Socrates refers to. He
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meant only such pleasures of the soul as may be
obtained from the struggle for power in social
life. Such pleasures would be noble from his point
of view because injustice, intemperance, luxury,
and license are honorable according to nature.
Tenkku-s charge, then, seems to amount to this: Socrates
presents Callicles with a case which involves a sort of pleasure
different from the pleasures Callicles praises. This, in some
way, forces Callicles to concede that experiencing "ignoble"
pleasures constitutes a good life. According to Tenkku, however,
the sort of pleasure Callicles has in mind is the tyrant's
enjoyment of his power and authority, or his feeling of security
in his position. He is not, on this view, lauding mere bodily
pleasures such as that gotten from eating and drinking, let
aJLone
, scratching I
Nonetheless, when Socrates asks Callicles what pleasures he
has in mind, it is just this latter sort of pleasure Callicles
agrees to:
Soc: ...Tell me now, are you talking about something
being hungry and eating when you are hungry?
Cal: I am.
Soc : And being thirsty and drinking when you are
thirsty?
Cal : That ' s what I am talking about — and about having
136
the power to fill them and enjoy it and, so, live
happily. (494b7-c3)
callicles, himself, agrees that he is referring at least to
bodily pleasures. Given this response, Socrates has good reason
to ask if the appetite to scratch and its satisfaction are things
which callicles would also be willing to praise. it appears,
then, that Socrates is not being unfair in asking Callicles to
consider the Ufe of a scratcher, especially when he gives
Callicles the chance to dissent. By his question, Socrates has
shown that callicles praises ani life of pleasure, however that
pleasure is obtained.
There is a second point, claims TenWcu, at which Socrates is
unfair to Callicles. He says on page 76, "Socrates ignores
Callicles real position and forces him to equate good and
pleasure." it is difficult to see just what this charge amounts
to. While it is true that Socrates brings Callicles around to
accept hedonism at 495a, this position is closely related to his
earlier praise of pleasure. At this point in the dialogue,
Socrates is merely trying to ferret out the consequences of
Callicles’ stated position.
While Callicles could maintain his praise of the pleasant
life without endorsing hedonism, hedonism provides one
theoretical foundation for that claim, it turns out to be the
one Callicles admits to. That he does might reveal the fact that
Plato was primarily interested in discussing hedonism in the
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Sfilaiaa, or it might reveal that Plato misunderstood the logical
relation between Callioles’ views and pure hedonism. (More will
be said about this in the next chapter. ) To follow TenWcu and
say that Socrates unfairly forces Callicles to accept hedonism
seems only to maXe things less clear. [NOTE 61] Let us now
turn to the arguments Socrates offers against Callicles’
position.
^aerates ’ Earst argument Against Hedom ani
Socrates presents two arguments against hedonism in the'
section of the fiorgias from 495d - 499b. The first denies the
identity of goodness and pleasure on the basis of a divergence in
their properties; the second denies their identification on the
basis of its unacceptable ethical consequences.
We can take as a preliminary formulation of the first
argument the one given by Irwin ( Plato ' s Moral Theory
, page 311
note 13 ) which runs as follows
:
A 1. Doing well and doing badly are opposites.
(495e3-4)
2. Opposites cannot both be present to the
same person (or part of him) at the same
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time. ( 495C6 - 496C5
)
3. Pleasure and pain can both be present to
the same thing at the same time
4. The presence of pleasure is not identical
with doing well, nor the presence of pain
with doing badly. ( 497c3-4 )
5.
Pleasure is not identical with goodness.
(497a4-5) [NOTE 62]
That (4) follows from premises ( 1 ) - ( 3 ) is pretty clear and
Socrates just supposes that (4) implies ( 5 ). He says at 497a3-5 :
"Thus, enjoyment is not doing well, nor is being in pain doing
badly; and so (warx) pleasure turns out to be different from
goodness." "Enjoyment" and "pleasure", here, are synonyms.
[NOTE 63] This inference relies on the principle:
A4.5 Doing well is good; doing badly is evil.
[NOTE 64]
Even if valid, much of this argviment is fairly obscure. We
need to ask just how Socrates views doing well and badly as
genuine opposites, which cannot both be present to the same
person at the same time.
To be clear about the argument in the Goraias . one needs to
pay special attention to a number of different terms. In
addition to talk of "doing" or "living well", Socrates sometimes
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introduces considerations having to do with a person's happiness
(_Eu4,oiuouta) and, of course, sometimes worries about the goodness
Of a person. «hile it is difficult to say with certainty that
Socrates views these three notions, living well, happiness, and
goodness as identical, he surely sees them as very closely
related to each other. so at 496b 5 in this argument, when
Socrates has finished with the preliminaries and is ready to turn
to the main point, he says, "Regarding goods and happiness..."
(_n J<ctT. igyaBa xnv euiaiunij^r/i) \^ ~ ^ ^^oviav
,
,
,
). Goodness and happiness
are also clearly related at 470e and 494a-b.
At 478e, Socrates agrees that the person with evil in his
soul lives badly. Moreover, he claims at 477d7-9, in the
discussion with Polus, that the person with no evil in his soul
IS happiest. Socrates does not bother to connect in any way
these two claims so as to conclude that the person with evil in
his soul lives badly or that the person with evil in his soul is
wretched and unhappy. He does not bother, I suggest, because he
takes it as obvious that a person lives well if and only if he is
happy. Indeed, at 507c4-6, Socrates claims, "...and the man who
does well must be blessed and happy, and the base man who does
badly is wretched ..."
We will have occasion to examine more closely the relation
between these notions in the next chapter. Yet even this brief
look should be sufficient to warrant rewriting our initial
argument ( A )
.
Given the supposed obviousnes of the step from
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premise (4) to (5), we can replace phrases
doing badly" with "goodness" and "evil",
this argument in which the conclusion clearly
The result, then, is
follows from the
doing well" and
premises
Goodness and evil are opposites.
2
. Goodness and pleasure cannot both be
present in the same thing at the same time.
3. Pleasure and pain can both be present in
the same thing at the same time.
4.
Pleasure is not identical with goodness.
By saying that goodness and evil are opposites, it is
reasonable to understand Plato as claiming that they are least
contraries. When he elaborates this relation, it is clear that
he views them as contradictory properties, with regard to health
and sickness, he says, "a man isn’t at the same time healthy and
sick, nor does he get rid of health and sickness at the same
time." Health and sickness, then, turn out to be contradictory
properties according to Plato since one cannot have both or lack
both at the same time. So too, regarding goodness and evil
Socrates says at 496b6-c3,
And goods and happiness and the opposites of these,
evils and wretchedness — doesn't a man also gain
each of these in turn
. .
.
[and]
. . . if we find some
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things that a man gets xia of at the same time and
has at the same time, it's cieax these won't be the
good and evil
.
we can, then, taXe Plato here to be claiming:
•10. X is good iff x is not evil.
range of x is unrestricted, (lo) is unacceptable. There
are presumably any number of things in the world which are so
insignificant as to be neither good nor evil, or which are in
themselves simply evaluatively neutral. (lo), rather, is
apparently meant only to apply to non-neutral morally significant
things, and specifically, Socrates tells us, persons. The whole
discussion of opposites from 495e to 496c is framed in terms of
opposites belonging to persons: Socrates must be relying on the
View that persons are so morally significant that they cannot be
neutral, neither good nor evil, suitably restricted, i.e., to
persons, (lo) seems plausible. We might suppose that a person is
good if and only if he is not evil. [NOTE 65]
From the fact that goodness and evil are opposites in the
way specified, it follows that it is not possible for a person to
be both good and evil at the same time. So, Socrates claims at
496b5-7, "And goods and happiness, and the opposite of these,
evils and wretchedness, — doesn't a person also gain each of
these and lose each in turn?"
The third premise requires a more thorough discussion. Both
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callicle3 and Socrates appear to be in agreement about the notion
of bodily Pleasure. Bodily pleasure comes about, on this view.
When a particular appetite is satisfied. The appetite consists
in a want or lack of something, for example, food. As such, it
13 painful, so my being thirsty or hungry is painful.
Soc:
. . .do you agree that every lack and appetite is
painful?
Cal: I agree. ( 495 (33-5 )
one receives pleasure from filling this want only until it is
filled, whereupon both the pleasure and the pain cease, when we
have eaten enough to satisfy our appetite fully, we no longer
experience hunger pains, but neither do we derive any further
pleasure from eating.
Soc: And don't we cease from hunger and all other
appetites and from pleasures at the same time?
Cal: That's right. ( 497c8-dl
)
The only support actually given in the dialogue for the
third premise of (A' ) is this psychology of pleasure. If that
view is right, the third premise is beyond reproach. Tenkku
(page 82-86) points out some of the deficiencies of this
psychological view. He notes, rightly, that not all wants or
lacks are painful. Some are so slight that they are not painful,
or are, on some occasions, even pleasant, as when one savors his
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Wetite for impeoding well-prep«ed meal. There may be no
pain but only pleasure in eating such a meal, further, he points
out, one may continue to have a pleasant feeling from a meal long
after the original appetite is satisfied.
From this, he concludes that the third premise is false, and
hence, that Plato’s proof is defective. Tenhku has succeeded in
pointing out that the psychological theory of pleasure found in
the Sacaiaa is unsatisfactory, but does it follow that Plato’s
argument fails?
It should be clear that the argument Socrates presents here
depends on finding some property that the pair goodness-evil has
(or fails to have) that the pair pleasure-pain fails to have (or
has). That this should be clear is shown by the following
passage. After Socrates and Callicles agree that a person cannot
be both good and evil (or neither good nor evil) at the same
time, Socrates says,
-then, if we find some things that a man
gets rad of at the same time and has at the same time, it is
clear that these won't be the good and the evil." (496cl-3) The
property that, according to Socrates, goodnes-evil has and
pleasure-pain fails to have is the property of mutual
exclusivity.
The pair goodness-evil has that property because good and
evil cannot both belong to the same object at the same time.
That is.
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11.
It is impossible for a person to be both
good and evil simultaneously.
Socrates goes to some length to show that pleasure and
not exclusive in this way, that.
pain are12.
It is possible for a person to feel
pleasure and pain simultaneously.
What Socrates does not establish, but Tenteu apparantly feels he
needs to, is.
13.
Pleasure and pain, if felt at all, are
always felt simultaneously.
TenJcku's criticism clearly shows the falsity of (13). so, he
concludes (pages 85-6),
-...it is quite reasonable to agree with
Plato that one may have both pleasure and pain at the same time,
though Plato goes too far when he states that pleasure and pain
when conditioned by desire are always simultaneous."
What Tenkku has not seen is that Socrates' argument does not
rely on showing the truth of (ii) and (13), but rather, on
showing the truth of (ii) and (12). For this, he need only show
that pleasure and pain be experienced simultaneously. To
show the truth of (12), Socrates does not need to show the
constant conjunction of pleasure and pain, but only an example to
demonstrate their occasional or even possible conjunction. This
project is entirely independent of the exposition of a
'*^®ii~'^orked—out psychological theory. The examples in the
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dialogue. I suggest, should be understood independently of the
defective psychological theory in whose context they are
presented. Tenhhu-s criticism, then, is irrevelant to Socrates.
actual project, and the examples Socrates constructs to show that
pleasure and pain can be had simultaneously may well be right.
[NOTE 66]
It is unclear whether Plato actually recognized that he
needed only ( 12 ) and not (13). His statement at 496C1-3 is in
the indicative: "Some things that a man gets rid of or has...”
( auaWanerai <ai 'Kua ^ypi\
^ ^ ^ ^ which gives no evidence whether or
not it should be read as a modal statement.
Let us now turn to a closer look at this argument. The
property that Socrates supposes distinguishes goodness from
pleasure is that the latter but not the former can be had and
gotten rid of by a person at the same time as its opposite.
Socrates is not at all careful to explain what he means by these
terms. if the relationship he is getting at here is one of
acquiring and shedding properties, then the argument he has in
mind is this
:
B 1. Good and evil are opposites.
2. There is no person, x, such that goodness
belongs to x at some time, t, and evil
belongs to x at t.
3. There is some thing, x, such that pleasure
belongs to x at
belongs to x at t.
some time, t and
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pain
4. Pleasure is not identical with goodness.
Let us suppose with Socrates that premises (1) and ( 2 ) are
true. What about premise ( 3 )? "Pleasure belongs to x" is
ambiguous in a number of ways. it might mean that x is an
instance of pleasure, or that x is a pleasant experience (or
object), or that x experiences pleasure. Premise ( 3 ) of this
argument is ambiguous in just the ways the above phrase is
ambiguous
.
If we understand (B3) so that "pleasure belongs to x" is
taken in the first way suggested, then (B3) reads,
B3a. There is some thing, x, such that x is an
instance of pleasure at some time, t, and x
is an instance of pain at t.
I think (B3a) is clearly false, and, hence, the resulting version
of (B) is unsound. Instances, or sensations, of pleasure are
just that; they cannot also be instances, or sensations, of pain.
[NOTE 67] If this is what Socrates meant, then he has failed to
show that pleasure and goodness are not identical.
(B3) can also be understood so that "pleasure belongs to x"
is read in the second way suggested. So to say, for instance.
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pleasure belongs to my receiving a giff means "my receiving a
gift is pleasant." it is not to the pleasant sensation that the
property belongs, but to the object (or experience or state of
affairs) which generates that sensation. if „e understand
pleasure belongs to x" along these lines, then (B3) reads.
B3b. There is some thing, x, such that x is
pleasant at some time, t, and x is painful
at t.
It is quite unclear whether or not (B3b) is true. Many
things are not pleasant or painful in themselves, but are,
instead, what might be called the objects of pleasure, the thing
at which a person's pleasure is directed. "My receiving a gift
was pleasant" really amounts to "I was pleased at receiving a
gift." In so far as my reception of the gift (or the gift
itself) is the object of my pleasure, it can be said to be
pleasant
.
Other
-things, such as my hunger or thirst, might be
themselves pleasant or painful, but it is not clear that they can
be both. Certainly Socrates does not think so. He says at
496c-d:
Soc: In speaking of hunger, were you saying that it is
pleasant or painful? I'm talking about hunger
itself.
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cal= I say ifs painful. But l say that eating when
you’re hungry is pleasant.
soc: I understand. But at any rate, being hungry itself
is painful.
If this is the case generally with pleasant and painful
things, then there nay be no clear instance where something is
simultaneously pleasant and painful. [note 68] what about
cases where my hunger is pleasant, say, when it returns after a
long nines, and so, signals my recovery? In such a case it may
not be the hunger, itself, that is pleasant, but rather my
experiencing hunger, which is something very different. it is
unclear whether or not (B3b) is true, and, hence, it is unclear
whether or not the argument using it is sound.
At any rate, this does not seem to be the understanding of
(B3) that Socrates wants, when the third premise is stated, it
is stated this way (496c5-c6, 497a2);
soc:
...you say someone is distressed and enjoying at
the same time... you are agreed that it is possible
to be in pain and enjoyment at the same time.
This suggests that Socrates intends "pleasure belongs to x" to be
understood as "x experiences pleasure", which is the third of the
alternatives mentioned above. This not only fits the text better
than either of the first two possibilities, but is consistent
with the limitations that were earlier placed on the second
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premise. Clearly the range
third premises must be limited
then, should be read as:
of "X" in both the second and the
to persons. The third premise,
B3c. There is some person, x, such that x feels
pleasure (is pleased) at some time, t, and
X feels pain ( is pained ) at t
.
The resulting argument runs as follows:
C 1. Goodness and evil are opposites.
2. There is no person, x, such that x is good
at some time, t, and x is evil at t.
3. There is some person, x, such that x is
pleased at some time, t, and x is pained at
t.
4.
Pleasure is not identical with goodness.
But surely, this argument as it is stated is no good. Even
if the premises are true, it does not follow that pleasure and
goodness are different. Suppose they are identical. This is
consistent with each of the premises. Suppose, further, that a
person, p, is simultaneously pleased and pained. If pleasure is
good and pain evil, then it is good that p is pleased and at the
same time it is bad that p is pained. But from the fact that p's
being pleased is good it does not follow that p himself is good.
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and from the fact that p. 3 being pained is evil, it does not
follow that p himself is evil.
The goodness of persons might depend on quite different
factors Which preclude the possibility of p-s being
Simultaneously good and evil, m this case the premises are true
even though goodness and pleasure are identical, i.e., the
conclusion is false 4-Vi-; aSo, this argument fails to show that
goodness and pleasure are distinct.
It is to Plato’s credit that he devised an argument which is
Of the proper sort to refute hedonism, it appears to attempt to
find a property of goodness that is not a property of pleasure,
and is fairly sophisticated in its attempt. Even Dodds in his
commentary on the fiaxaUa (page 310) supposes that the argument
is successful as far as it goes. "All he seems to do in the
SSflisiaa is to establish the non-identity of two concepts
(Pleasure and Good) by the non-identity of their marks (capacity
in one case, incapacity in the other, for co-existence with its
contrary ) .
”
For the reasons given above, however, the argument is
defective as a proof of the non-identity of goodness and
pleasure. The conclusion that does seem validly to follow from
the premises is one that says being a good person is not the same
as being a pleased person. This does not say anything about the
properties of goodness and pleasure simpliciter, but only about
the goodness and pleasurable experiences of persons
.
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Is this defect disasterous
think so. Callicles, after
for Socrates' argument? i do not
all, is arguing that being a good
person really (by nature) amounts to being a pleased person. As
a criticism of Callicles'
show the non-identity of
axgument that Socrates needs
position, Socrates does not need to
goodness and pleasure. the only
against Callicles is the following;
D 1
. Goodness and evil are opposites.
2. There is no person, x, such that x is good
at some time, t, and x is evil at t.
3. There is some person, x, such that x is
pleased at some time, t, and x is pained at
t.
4.
Being a good person is not the same as
being a pleased person.
Both Callicles and Socrates accept the premises of this
argument, and, hence, are both committed to its conclusion. This
argument, then, constitutes a refutation of Callicles' position
(given the agreed upon assumptions). it does this not by
refuting the hedonism which Callicles has also agreed to;
Socrates' argument has failed to do that. It does, however,
attack Callicles' identification of the good person with the
pleased person (call this doctrine "Hedonism^"). [NOTE 69 ]
Irwin, on pages 120-1 of Elato ' S Moral Theory suggests some
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criticise Of this argvsnent on callicles' hshalf. He says there,
"[Socrates] shows that enjoying sams Pleasure is not the sahe as
^oing well on the whole [i.e., being a gooa person], hut he Hoes
not show that doing well on the whole ri o vrn [ .e., being a good person]
is not Simply having more pleasure than pain on the whole."
so, while Socrates has shown it to be false that x is a good
person at some time if and only if x is a pleased person at that
time. Where "is a pleased person" means
"experiences ^
pleasure”, he has not refuted the claim that x is good person at
some time if and only if x is an over all pleased person at that
time
. than pain .
”
Irwin has missed both the point and the subtlety of
Socrates- argument. in fact, it is difficult to see Just what
bearing Irwin's criticism has on this argument at all. Socrates
believes he has shown that Callicles- defense of intemperance
rests on the identification of goodness and pleasure (or of being
a good person and being a pleased person). If he is successful
in proving their non-identity, he has loosened the theoretical
underpinnings of Callioles- claim. Socrates sets out to attack
these underpinnings, and Irwin criticises him for not attacking
as well an argument based on that underpinning.
Of course, Callicles or Irwin, could maintain that,
theoretical justification aside, the good person is the pleased
person. So, Callicles might hold.
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14. X is a good person at some time, t, iff *
is more pleased than pained at t,
I suspect Callicles might have some objections to ( 14 ), but they
are such that they shouid not prevent us from supposing that it
adequately represents a view Callicles might hold. it is not
Clear that Callicles would be willing to call a person good who
is pleased to a very small degree and pained to an even smaller
degree. His claims suggest that the good person must experience
enormous amounts of pleasure, if this is the case, then a person
who received only slight pleasure would not count as good.
Socrates' second argument can be seen as
refute a claim such as (14), and it is to that
should now like to turn.
an attempt to
argument that I
gQCrates
'
Argvment Against Hedonism
Socrates presents his second argument against hedonism at
497e - 499b, and summarizes it at 499a-b.
Soc : ... we say that the wise and brave man is good
,
don't we?
Cal: Yes.
Soc: And that the foolish and cowardly man is evil?
Cal: Of course.
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Soc, And that the man who has enjoyment is good?
Cal: Yes.
soc: And that the man in distress is evil?
Cal: It must be so.
[ . Don t they have distress and enjoyment, both the
foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave
men, about the same, you say, but the cowards more
than the brave men?
Cal: I agree.] 498b7-cl
soc: And that the good and evil man has pain and
enjoyment similarly, but perhaps the evil man has
it even more?
Cal: Yes.
soc: Then doesn’t the good and the evil man turn out to
be similarly good or the evil man even more good?
[NOTE 70]
Thxs argument can be fairly straightforwardly formulated as the
following reductio ad
s
E 1. X is a good person at some time, t, iff x
experiences more pleasure than pain at t.
2. If X is brave at some time, t, then x is a
good person at t.
3. If X is a coward at some time, t, then x is
an evil person at t.
1554.
It is possible that a coward enjoys as much
pleasure over pain at some time as a brave
person.
5.
It is possible that an evil person enjoys
as much pleasure over pain at some time as
a good person.
6.
It IS possible that an evil person is as
good as a good person. [NOTE 7i]
But, of course, evil persons are by definition worse than good
persons, so (E6) is false. since (E6) follows from (El) and
agreed upon assumptions, (El) is false as well, if the argument
IS good, it shows Callicles cannot consistently hold on to his
criteria for being a good person as well as his belief that
courageous persons are good persons.
Faced with this argument, Callicles maintains his conviction
that anybody who is brave is also good and gives up his view
al>out pleasure and goodness. This response is certainly not
demanded by the hedonism he holds; a hedonist ( or hedonist*
)
could instead concede that brave men are not always good (e.g.,
those that do not experience sufficient pleasure) thereby holding
on to their conviction that pleasure is part of the criterion of
the goodness of a person.
As an attack against Callicles’ particular sort of hedonism.
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thxs argument is successful. Can Callicles
•
position be modified
in any interesting way so as to avoid the thrust of this
argument. Prohahiy not. as long as the features of the position
involve two separate and independent, sufficient conditions for
the goodness of a person (in this case pleasure and bravery), so
that it is always conceivable that the two conditions are
satisfied in ways which yield contradictory results.
How would this argunent stand up against a more extreme
Calliclean position, one which a Thrasymachus might hold? Here
the pleased person is the good person, and no other criterion
applies. That is, this position denies the second and third
premises Which Claim that being brave (cowardly) is also a
sufficient condition for being a good (evil) person. Obviously,
the argument formulated as (E) would not work against such a
position. Nor, l suspect, would any reasonable varient of this
argument except this question begging version.
X is a good person at a time, t, iff x
experiences more pleasure than pain at t.
It is possible that some good person
e35>erience less pleasure over pain at some
time than an evil person.
It is possible that some evil person
experience as much pleasure over pain at
some time as a good person
.
3.
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4. It is possible that an evil
good as a good person,
for which there is no textual evidence
Socrates' argument, e, then, is
views which hold multiple criteria
earliest argument in Plato, or anywhere
show the inconcsistency involved in
person is as
anyway
.
successful only against
for goodness, it is the
else for that matter, to
employing two independent
criteria of goodness
.
Summary
We have looked at the hedonism in the Goroias and at two
arguments against it. it should be clear that the doctrine
involving pleasure which is most discussed in the dialogue is one
identifying good persons and pleased persons (which we called
"hedonism*" )
.
As presented, the two arguments of the dialogue are aimed
exclusively at Callicles' view about personal goodness. So
construed, they achieved a limited success; the first
demonstrating that "good person" and "pleased person" do not mean
the same thing, the second showing the difficulty of holding that
being pleased is one of two independent marks or criteria by
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Which we can judge the goodness of persons.
In the next chapter, i want to discuss how
fare against the stronger hedonism discussed
the relation of this stronger heodnism to the
these arguments
in the Goraias and
hedonism of the
The text of the n,akes it evident that Plato
thought these two forme of hedonism were very closely linked and
that the arguments discussed here were successful against both.
CHAPTER VT
Introduction
In the Ssiiaiaa, unlike the EiatagorrlS, Socrates is out
to attack heaonism. we saw in the previous chapter that the
saiaiaa discusses at least two doctrines which could be
appropirately labled hedonism. our interest centered on
these two
;
Hedonism: Goodness and pleasure are the same.
Hedonism*; Being a good person and being a
pleased person are the same.
Both of these doctrines are formulated in a very simple way,
ignoring worries about such things as quality of pleasure or
types of goodness.
The arguments of the as they are presented, seem
most plausibly construed as arguments against the identification
of good persons and pleased persons. Nonetheless, there appears
in the dialogue the stronger conclusion that goodness and
pleasure themselves are different from one another.
In this chapter, I would like to return to the hedonism of
the Gorgias and reexamine the evidence we had for its
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foxMuulation and its presence in tne diaio,ue. ^ere is an
argument suggested in the dialogue to the conclusion that, in
effect, a refutation of hedonism, constitutes a refutation of
hedonrsm. we will look at some formulations of that argument.
Finally we will ask whether it is plausible to construe the
saifliaa as a repudiation of the hedonism in the Protsoo...
Sfidoni SID in iiis Goraiaa Again
we have already seen that there are two sorts of doctrine
regarding pleasure discussed in the iSaiaiaa. The first is
doctrine about the nature of goodness, the second is a doctrine
about the nature of good persons.
These are not only different doctrines, they are logically
independent as well. That is, it is possible for either to be
true while the other is false. So, good and pleasure could be
the same (making hedonism true), although when it comes to the
moral status of a person, that depends on something other than
the degree to which he or she is pleased (i.e., hedonism* is
false). A person's goodness might depend on the amount of
pleasure that person produces in other people, or on the number
of right acts that person performs, or on any number of other
features. On the other hand, it could turn out that all and only
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9ood persons are pleased persons, even though pleasure, itself.
i3 not the only intrinsically good thing. maXing hedonism, true
and hedonism false.
in Chapter V we noted that the view Callicles holds concerns
the goodness of persons, rather than goodness itself, if we
examine the dialogue in its entirety, we will find that this is
also true Of the discussion as a whole. Repeatedly. Socrates
maxes it clear that he is concerned with the nature of the good
person. so. for instance, at 499al-2. he says that the wise and
brave person is a good person, at 499c4 he wonders if the person
who has enjoyment is a good person, at 527b5-6. Socrates exhorts
Callicles and the others not only to seem but to be good persons.
The most revealing passage occurs at 506d-e. Here. Socrates
Claims that it is the presence of some structure or order that
maxes a particular thing good, be it tool. body. soul, or animal.
"Then, it is some order — the proper order for each of the
things that are — which maxes the thing good by coming to be
present in it.” ( 506e2-4 )
This is most plausibly understood as a claim about what
makes a thing of a certain sort a good thing of that sort. The
claim here seems to be that x is a good F if and only if x is
structured or ordered in the way appropriate to Fs. This cup on
my desk is a good cup if and only if it is structured in the way
appropriate to cups. [NOTE 72] Immediately after this passage
when Socrates says that the temperate soul is good (because the
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temperate soul is
should be understood
good soul
.
ordered in the way appropriate to eoule), he
as Claiming that the temperate soul is a
These and similar passages provide good evidence that not
nly Callicles but Socrates, himself, is primarily concerned in
this dialogue with the notion of good persons.
Prom What was said in the previous chapter, it might
nonetheless appear that Plato simply confused Hedonism and
Hedonism*. Certainly several of his arguments are presented as
if that were the case. So, it was suggested there, while Plato
thought the iSpifliaa constituted a refutation of hedonism, at best
it only presented difficulties for hedonism*, indeed, Socrates
says a number of things which lend credence to such a suggestion.
He concludes the second argument against hedonism by saying, at
499b, "then don’t the evil man and the good man turn out to be
similarly good, or the evil man even better? Doesn’t this follow
if someone says that the same things are pleasant and good?" At
497a, Socrates says, concluding the first argument against
hedonism, "then enjoying is not doing well nor is being in pain
doing badly; and so the pleasant turns out to be different from
the good .
"
Irwin, for instance, seems to be accusing Plato of confusing
hedonism and hedonism* when he says on page 121 of Plato's Moral
Theory .
...Socrates’ objection, then, is a fair ad
hsmiaSB argument revealing an inconsistency in
callicles’ position... But Socrates goes
further, and speaks as though he had refuted
hedonism and shown that there are good and bad
Pleasures (499C6-7). He has only refuted
Callicles* version of hedonism.
fot as attractive as this supposition might be for its power to
explain the above passages, it is not clear that it is warranted,
we might be unfair to accuse Plato of being confused on this
point. we may find that he is confused on a closely related
point, but here some passages suggest an argument designed to
show a close logical connection between Hedonism and Hedonisms
At 499d2-4, Socrates displays a relation between good
persons and good things, he says, "Don’t you know that you say
good persons are good by the presence of (joamoii) goods and
evil persons evil by the presence of evils?" we are really in no
position to formulate the argument which this passage suggests
until we get a handle on what Socrates means by claims of the
sort, *x is good by the presence of goods'.
In the first place, there is a difficulty about what things
count as goods. it could mean anything that is good (a good
meal, a good work of art, a pleasure) or anything that is
intrinsically good, or even ' “goodness itself. In the second
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Place, Socrates is not altogether explicit about the meaning of
"by the presence of."
First, What are the "goods" by whose presence a person is
good? I think it is safe to say that Socrates would not allow
the range of goods here to be completely unrestricted. There are
".any good things which are good only accidentally or
axtrinsically, such as surgery or a new pair of shoes. There is
no Clear relationship between these and the goodness of a person,
certainly their possession is not sufficient for a person to be
good. Perhaps we would do better considering only a limited
range of goods, such as intrinsic goods. He suggests at 506c9-d2
that goodness itself and pleasure itself are connected in some
way with personal goodness and personal pleasure. Socrates
claims
:
And pleasure is something such that, if it has
come to be present we take pleasure, and the
good something such that if it has come to be
present we are good.
Indeed, Socrates’ own claim reveals that he sees a certain
closeness between these goods and goodness itself. At 497el-3
Socrates provides an analogy to illustrate this relation: "Don’t
you call men good by the presence of goods, just as (ujax^) you
call praiseworthy things praiseworthy by the presence of
praiseworthiness
. ( KaXov ) . " ( underlining mine
)
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If there is a relation between good
intrisically good things, what is it?
on the gorqias suggests this:
persons and goodness or
Irwin, in his coinmentary
Expressions of the form
-the F is present to
X- or 'F-ness (abstract noun) is present to x-
are standard ways of saying that x is F, that
F is predicated of x. (page 203)
Gerasijnos Santas In his recent booh on Socrates [NOTE 73 ]
suggests the almost equivalent formulation:
...the most natural way to take the notion of
presence
... is the way in which 'F thing(s) are
present to x' is equivalent, at least in truth
value, to ’X has F things' and 'x is F’
.
Both Irwin and Santas have failed to see an important aspect
of this passage. Both analyze Socrates' phrase in terms of
ordinary predication 'x is F' or 'F is predicated of x'
. This
seems to be the wrong direction to go. we need to take seriously
the presence (explicit at 506 and suggested at 498) of the
universal. it is the presence of goodness (or pleasure) itself
that makes a beautiful person good (or pleased), we see Socrates
expressing a similar claim in the Phaedo where he says, "It seems
to me whatever else is apart from absolute praiseworthiness is
166
beautiful because it psrtabes in praiseworthiness
.
<iooc)
What we have here in the passage is a clai„ that
.ight be
-cpressea in later aialogues in the language of participation.
The only language Plato has available to hi„ here is that of
presence, and what enters into the relation is a universal
(although it is not clear what ontological status this universal
ia supposed to have). it is goodness and pleasure that enter
into these relations, the same goodness and pleasure that has
been the subject of much of the dialogue. The presence of, for
instance, goodness in a thing is both a necessary and a
sufficient condition for that thing's being good, [note 74 ]
This suggests an argument by which Socrates may have
supposed that a refutation of hedonism* constituted a refutation
of hedonism.
A 1. Some pleased persons are not good persons.
2. X is a good person iff goodness is present
in X.
3. X is a pleased person iff pleasure is
present in x.
4. Some persons with pleasure present in them
are not persons with goodness present in
them.
5.
Gtoodness is not identical with pleasure.
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precise is the conclusion oi Socrates, tirst twoar„s against callicles. The second two presses co.e troe
the passages at 4S, and see. The fourth precise and conclusion
follow from the first three. There are difficulties with this
argument. we will discuss later the details of the metaphysical
relationship between goodness and good persons, and between
Pleasure and pleased persons. For now, a more serious point is
this, we noticed in chapter li that Plato is aware of the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goodness, what sort
of goodness is the goodness of good persons? we need a version
of this argument that is more specific than A.
Suppose the goodness being talked about here is intrinsic
goodness and that when we say,
-jack is a good person," we mean
"Jack is a person and Jack is intrinsically good." in this case.
Argument A reads as follows:
Some persons are such that they are pleased
but not intrinsically good.
A person, s, is intrinsically good iff
goodness is present in s.
A person, s, is pleased iff pleasure is
present in S.
Some persons with pleasure present in them
are not persons with goodness present in
them.
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Goodness is not identical with pleasure.
While A. is valid, this analysis of the phrase
..good
persons., is unacceptahle
. when we distinguish between good
persons and evil persons, we are not distinguishing between
things Which are intrinsically good and things which are
intrinsically evil. This especially so for an ethical hedonist,
against whom this argument is directed, since, for him, pleasures
not persons are the only intrinsic goods. The reading of
-good
persons., suggested above, in effect, begs the question against
the hedonist
.
Let us return to the notion of presence. At 498d2-5
,
Socrates suggests that a person becomes good by the presence of
goods and that a person becomes pleased by the presence of
pleasures. OJUS-L jii_j AYflQoO
.
s TTaonuni''^ rTimi
. . ._r^s JLafpouaiv jrapeaxiv
.
.
_n6o^'
) piato may
have in mind the following sort of ontology. Socrates sometimes
speaks of pleasures (al sometimes speaks of pleasure (n
and often of pleased persons. Furthermore, he claimed
above that persons are pleased by the presence of pleasures.
Pleasures instantiate (perhaps, perfectly) pleasure itself, we
might even go so far as to say that persons do not instantiate
pleasure, at least not in the same way, otherwise they would have
the same status as the pleasures themselves. So, it is plausible
to suppose that Plato has in mind a scheme whereby pleasures
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instantiate pleasure, and by the presence of pleasures we are
Pleased. The same story, presumably, can be told about goodness.
«e do not intantiate goodness directly, since that would make us
intrinsically good, but rather we have present in us things,
goods
, by which we are good persons
.
This suggests, then, the following further revision of
Argument A:
Some pleased persons are not good persons.
A person, S, is a good person iff goods are
present to s.
A person, s, is a pleased person iff
pleasures are present to s.
Some persons with pleasures present in them
are not persons with goods present in them.
Pleasures instantiate pleasure and goods
instantiate goodness
.
6". Goodness and pleasure are not identical.
This understanding of the relation of presence sounds plausible
with regard to pleasure. There it is easy to understand just
what the pleasures are; pleasant experiences seem to be the
obvious candidate. What, on the other hand, do we say about
goodness? What are the goods by whose presence we are good?
Plato cannot say they are pleasures; that would commit him to
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hedonism. There vseems, however, to be nothing that obviously
fills the role Of goods the way pleasant experiences fin the
role of pleasures. [NOTE 75]
^is suggests that there is not a strict parallel i„ the
explanation of pleased persons in terms of pleasures and good
persons in terms of goods, if we are going to stick with Plato's
gy, this suggests, further, that pleasure might be related
to Pleased persons in a different way than goodness is related to
good persons.
Indeed, there is reason to think that Plato made use of two
different relations in the early and middle dialogues, while we
have seen instances where Plato talks about pleasures being
present to a person, he more often expresses the relation
differently when he is talking about other properties of persons.
Plato's more usual practice is to use the singular in referring
to presence, saying not that P's are present, but that F itself
is present, so, for instance, in the Lvsis . 217b3-6,d4, he talks
about the presence in objects of evil and whiteness
(AsuknTn<i ). in the Chamides , 161a9, about the presence of
temperance ( g aiitnnnuvn ). and in the Hionias Baaflr, 294al-2, about
the presence of the appropriate (lolma). In these and other
passages, Plato talks about the presence of the universal itself,
not of evils, or whites, or appropriates
A good person, then, might be good not by the presence of
goods, but by the presence of goodness itself, just as a person
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i. temperate
.y the presence Of te.p..a„ce ftself. This ciai.
might he worrisome, of course, because we seem to lose the
distinction between persons as good persons and persons as
ihtrinsically good things, if we are to explain good persons by
the presence of goodness itself, then we might be hard pressed to
explain how a thing could ever be intrinsically good.
More importantly, however, appealing to this other notion of
presence ruins the argument. Suppose pleasure and goodness are
identical and that pleasures are the only intrinsically good
' g. We qualify as pleased persons when we are related to
pleasure (goodness) in such a way that we have pleasures present
in us. Call this relation presence(l). on the other hand, we
qualify as good persons when we are related to goodness in such a
way that it is present in us. call this relation presenoe(2).
in general, our relation to sensations, pleasure, pain,
excitement, etc., seems most plausible if we understand it as
presence(l), while our relation to properties, white, tall, good,
etc., seems most plausible when understood as presence<2). in
this case, a pleased person may not be a good person, because
while she is related to goodness (pleasure) by presence(l), she
is not related to goodness by presence( 2 )
.
More formally, Plato seems to be using two notions of
presence. The first seems most applicable to sensations and
involves the presence of things, the second seems most applicable
to other properties and involves the universal itself.
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The effect of these two notions of
argument is predictable. The first three
then, should look like this;
presence on Socrates
'
premises of argument A,
A !"•. Some pleased persons are not good persons.
2
. A person, S, is a good person iff goodness
is present(l) in S.
A person, s, is a pleased person iff
pleasure is present(z) in s.
But now, the only version of the fourth premise that follows is
4-’. some persons with goodness present(i) in
them are not persons with pleasure
present(l) in them.
and from this, it does not follow that
5. Goodness is not identical with pleasure.
Suppose goodness and pleasure are identical; (4"-) only tells us
that some people bear to goodness one relation but fail to bear
to it a different relation, once we disambiguate the phrase,
"present in", we can see that the argument is valid only by
equivocation
.
Did Plato see clearly the two notions of presence? He may
have felt uncomfortable with his univocal notion involving goods
and pleasures, since at 506dl-3 he uses the universals goodness
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-a Pleasure 1„ the presence relation, on the other hana. at
allows xn one sentence goods and praiseworthiness to
Stana in presence relations, so, it is not clear that he saw the
aifferent ways something coma be present in an object.
Even given, then, Plato's metaphysical system, a refutation
of heaonism. aoes not constitute a refutation of heaonism. At
most, Plato's argument shows that either pleasure is not
iaentical with gooaness or the gooa person is not relatea to
gooaness in the same way the pleasea person is relatea to
pleasure
.
we can explicate the defect of Plato's argument in yet
another way. suppose one becomes a pleased person by
experiencing pleasure, but becomes a good person, not by
experiencing goodness, but, for instance, by performing good acts
Which themselves result in goodness. suppose goodness is the
same as pleasure. I am pleased when l experience pleasure; I am
a good person when I perform good acts which produce pleasure.
Here again, the difference between good persons and pleased
persons is not explained by a difference in properties, but by a
dxfference in relations to a single property, in this case,
pleasure. We have, of course, seen other instances in Plato
where thxngs can stand in different relations to goodness and,
so, be good in different ways, in the Protagoras some things
were good in and of themselves while others were good because
their consequences were good in and of themselves. We can
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understand this as intrinsically good things standing in one
relation to goodness with extrinsically good things standing in a
different relation to goodness. Plato has done nothing here to
rule out the sa«e situation with regard to good and pleased
persons
.
There is, then, no successful argument in the Gornie»
against an outright identification of goodness and pleasure. The
arguments found there are either directed against a different
doctrine (hedonism*) and so do not refute hedonism, or if they
are supposed to be directed against genuine hedonism, fail for
th© rsasons outlined above
.
Ihfi of asdonism in ihs Goraia.g
It was noted in chapter V that hedonism did not play a
crucial role in the part of the discussion with Callicles in
which it appears. callicles' position there involved the
identity of good persons and pleased persons and did not rely on
actual hedonism.
Socrates, however, sets out to do more than merely refute
Callicles on this one point. Much of the Goraias is devoted to
showing that the temperate and just person is happier than the
intemperate and unjust person. Let us ask with regard to the
175
overall argument of the whether a refutation of
(rather than hedonism^ is crucial for its success.
Early on in the ggrqias , Polus and Socrates
hedonism
focus the
discussion of what turns out to be the topic for the remainder of
the dialogue. From 470d -
following exchange.
471a Polus and Socrates have the
ol:
...For these things that have happened
yesterday or the day before are enough to
refute you thoroughly and show that many
men doing injustice are happy.
Soc: What sorts of things are these?
Pol: I suppose you see this character
Archelaus, son of Perdiceas ruler of
Macedon?
Soc: Well, if i don't I hear of him.
Pol: Then do you think he is happy or wretched?
Soc : I don ' t know Polus ; I've never met the
man.
Pol: What? You could tell if you'd met him,
but otherwise you can't tell at once that
he is happy?
Soc: Indeed I can't by Zeus.
Pol: Then its clear, Socrates, that you'll say
you can't even tell that the Great King is
happy
.
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Soc: Yes, ana I'll say „haf s true. For l
don't know how he is off for education and
justice
.
Pol: What? Is the whole of happiness in that?
Soo: Yes, so I say, Polus. For I say that the
fine and 900a man and woman is happy, and
the unjust and base is wretched.
Socrates' argument in support of his view comes in the discussion
with callicles at 506e - 508b. There Socrates claims the good
person is the person who is properly ordered ( 506e2-4 ), but to be
properly ordered is to be temperate (509al-2). Furthermore, the
person who is temperate is just (507bl-4). Finally, since the
good person is happy, the just person is happy, so, Socrates
concludes at 507c9-d2, "The man who wants to be happy must pursue
and practise temperance, and flee intemperance as fast as each of
US can run." This suggests the following argument;
B 1. For any person, p, p is a good person iff p
is ordered in the way appropriate for
persons
.
2. For any person, p, p is ordered in the way
appropriate for persons iff p is temperate.
3. For any person, p, p is temperate iff p is
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just.
F any person, p, p is a good person iff p
is happy.
5. For any person,
happy
.
P' P is just iff p is
The argument as it is stated is valid. The fourth premise is an
assumption shared by all the participants in the Ooro^.,
discussion. There is disagreement over who is the good person,
but none over the fact that the good person, whoever that is, is
happy. [note 76) The third premise follows from Socrates'
general view that if a person has one of the virtues he or she
has them all. anybody who is truly temperate is also Just,
pious, and brave. The only argument offered for this claim in
the section we are considering is stated as follows:
Soc: Now the temperate man would do fitting
things ( ji£.oaj]KovT_g ) toward both gods and
men. For surely he wouldn’t be acting
temperately if he did unfitting
things... Now by doing fitting things
towards men he would do just things, and by
doing fitting things towards gods, he would
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ao pious things. And someone who does just
end pious things must be just and pious
(507a7-b4).
The crucial notion in this argument
[NOTE 77] Exactly how we are to
problematic it is) is not important here
is one of
understand
. What is
fittingness
.
it ( however
important is
that it seems to have nothing to do with the identification of
pl®9.sure and goodness
,
The second premise of Argument (b) is also difficult,
containing as it does, references to orderliness and
appropriateness, irwin understands order in the soul or person
as an ordering of desires, "so as to achieve one's overall
goals." (Commentary on page 220) While this will not do
as a general account of order, applied for instance to a trowel
or cup, it may be the sort of order Socrates has in mind with
regard to persons. The appropriateness of an ordering to a thing
no doubt is dependent on the function or purpose of that thing.
The appropriate order of each thing, Socrates says at 506d5ff,
"doesn't come to be present in the best way just at random, but
by some structure and correctness and craft.” Socrates does not
say here when an order is appropriate for a thing, we might look
forward to Republic II and suppose that an order is appropriate
for a thing just in case it best allows that thing to fulfill its
on this understanding of order andpurpose
.
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appropriateness, Socrates offers no reason why a person so
ordered must be temperate. Again, despite these defects, there
is no dependence on a doctrine of hedonism.
It is the establishment of the first premise for which Plato
seams to thinh he needs to refute hedonism. Socrates
characterizes the life callicles recommends as a life of
"disorder" (433C1-7). ^is disordered life, of course, is the
life of unrestrained desire-gratification. Thus, to show that
the orderly life is the good life (the ordered person is the good
person), Socrates needs to show that the person engaged in such
desire-satisfaction is not the good person. But, to do this does
not requrie refuting hedonism, but only hedonism*. The general
argument of the aaigiaa does not depend on a refutation of
hedonism. The plot of the dialogue does not depend on a
discussion of hedonism. Any such doctrine found there is
superfluous
.
The Protaaoraa and The Goraias
Even if the arguments of the gaxgias do not work against
genuine hedonism, is it reasonable to see the Gorgias as an
attack on the doctrines discussed in the Protagoras ? a number of
commentators have supposed so. Tenkku, for instance, says, "in
the Protagoras [Plato] defended hedonism, but he is strongly
in the Goraias
.
(Tenkku, page 60) So too, Irwin
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Emag^ accepts a hedonistic view of virtue and the good; and
I Will argue that the sp^ ,ejects it.- Evaluating such a
=lai« raises questions about the actual similarities between the
two dialogues and their Chronological order. Let us looK first
at the dating of the two dialogues.
The majority of twentieth-century scholars agree that the
sawiaa is a later work than the Elatagoras. This agreement is
by no means unanimous, with such well-known figures as
A.E. Taylor and G.M.A. Grube dissenting. A.E. Taylor (ElatP page
103) finds it Clear that the Elotagoraa is "the product of a
riper mastery of dramatic art" than the Protacors.,
. He
continues
:
... I cannot also help feeling that with all
its moral splendor, [the Goraias ] is too long:
it
-drags”. The Plato of the PrQtaaora.c
. as I
feel, would have known how to secure the same
effect with less expenditure of words; there
is a diffuseness about our dialogue which
betrays the hand of the prentice, though the
prentice in this case is a Plato. For this
reason I think it is a mistake in principle to
look, as some have done, for an ethical
advance in doctrine as we pass from the
Protagora.q to the Gorgi a.q .
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Against Taylor's ciair. that the
^3
compared to the Eislaaaas. Irwin claims in the
his conanentary on the
somewhat crude
introduction to
[The View that the saifliaa is crude and
,
hence, early] le not easily shared by anyone
who has considered the very careful
arrangement of the interlocking arguments of
the dialogue, if the complex structure counts
one way or another on the chronological
question, it suggests that the r Goraies ] is
later than the shorter and simpler dialogues,
ven the Erotaqorfla does not display the
carefully managed returns to earlier questions
when materials have been provided for
answering them.
Both of these works are so rich and complex, that the attempt to
date them by appeal to the sophistication of the drama is
probably fruitless. There are, however, features of the SsxaiiS,
both philosophical and stylistic, which suggest that the Gornie.
is the later work.
Both Irwin and Dodds point out a number of these. we have
already noted the lack of hesitancy and uncertainty in the
conclusion of the garqias , an increasingly prominent feature in
the later dialogues. The increased interest in geometry (450b-c,
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=Oaa. etc. the atsttnction between
.„owbea,e ena belief (esee -
45=a>, the bints of the theory of fort, (soae, ell surest that
the was a more advancea work than the [«oTE
’8] in aaaition, the s^iaias contains the first occurence in
Plato's works of the view tha-i- =4-V hat structure is a gooa-making or
Virtue-making property. This view, of course, is of central
importance in the
,3 33^3^^ ^
fiorqiaa
.
Ih apite Of these features of the agrgi^, ,,3^ 3^,333 ^^3^
there is a natural progression in the aiscussion of hedonism from
the figigiaa to the txgtagora a. that
-the eiatagotaa takes up the
problem exactly where the agxgiaa left it.- His understanding of
this progression is outlined as follows, the Sgigian shows that
pleasure and goodness are not identical qinr-o =j-aenri i, s ce some pleasures are
good While others are evil, m the Eii^tagorda Socrates examines
the position Of
-the many- that some pleasures are good and
others are evil. Ihgught page 59 ) Grube says on page
61
. "...in the SfiMiaa. Plato proved that hedonism in its crudest
form is untenable, in the £rotagord.5 he makes clear that it is
not enough to admit, as Protagoras did. that some pleasures are
had unless you are prepared to provide, which Protagoras was not.
another criterion than pleasure by which to judge them.-
This view is defective both as an analysis of the dialogues
and. as an understanding of their chronological order. Even
granting that Grube is right about the success of the Goroias
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arguments against the i^antification of goodness and pleasute
this View wouid he piausihle only if the
,„,ed at 43 ,d.
There callicles admits that some pleasures are good while others
are evil, if oruhe were right, it might be plausible to go on to
-T that in the
next point by arguing that we need a new criterion by which to
:udge the goodness of various pleasures, m fact, however, this
discussion is carried on in the Sa^gjas itself. At 506c-e.
Socrates claims that the pleasant must be done for the sake of
the good and that the criterion to be used in judging good and
evil Pleasures has something to do with order and disorder in the
soul.
so. Grube-s view leads to the unacceptable result that much
of the discussion in the mUggra
.s simply covers the same ground
as the last part of the Goraia.s
. [note 79 ]
Assuming, contrary to Grube. that the is a later
dialogue than the EAatagoraa. let us turn to the relation between
the two. A number of commentators have argued that the hedonism
discussed in the Ecatagoraa is identical with that in the
Sfiiaiaa. A.Z. Taylor says, "the ethical doctrine of the two
dialogues is identical." [NOTE 80]
While there are similarities in the hedonisms of the two
dialogues, the differences are far more striking. we have
already noted the interest in hedonism* in the fioxaiaa. Do we
find any such talk in the Protagnr^p ? There is ample evidence in
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that atalcue that Socrates «as interested in the nature of the
good person (as ie clear from the discussion of the poem by
Simonides 339a - 347e, the discussion of the nature of virtue at
349b, etc), but there is really no direct evidence that Socrates
wanted to discuss the identification of the ,ood person and the
Pleased person. The brief exchange at 3sib-c about living well
would perhaps have turned to this identification, if pursued, it
was not, and the work focused instead rtn 4-va on the nature of goodness
and right action, and their relation to pleasure. The
has been noted a number of times, does not pursue in depth
questions about the nature of goodness, but about the nature of
good persons
.
Another way of expressing this difference is to recognize
the emphasis in the placed on the concept of happiness.
Part of what it is for a person to be good, according to
Socrates, is for that Person to be happy ( »Por I say that the
fine and good man and woman is happy." 470el0). As one might
expect, much of the dispute with Polus and Callicles over
personal goodness is expressed as disagreement over criteria for
happiness. At 472d, Polus maintains, but Socrates denies, that a
person who is unjust can be happy. At 492c, Callicles maintains
that a person who is completely intemperate is happiest. At
494e, Socrates criticizes Callicles for saying without
qualification that those who have enjoyment are happy.
Turning to the Protagorafl, we find no discussion of
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sappiness ^ .He
- the „o^.
,,,,, ,,
personal goodness in the aaatUa, this constitutes some
evidence that the
rs not intended to contain any
analysis of the concept of a good person.
All Of this suggests that the topics Of the two dialogues
are really quite distinct, the Eratagoras about the nature of
goodness, the
^<,ut the nature of happy or good persons.
Il>ere are, however, the passages mentioned at the end of the last
Chapter and the beginning of this one, which make it clear that
Socrates in the iJaxgiaa at least approached the topic of genuine
hedonism, some of these passages are perhaps better interpreted
as referring to good persons. Callicles- concession at 499b4-c7
that some pleasures are good and some are evil can be read as
stating that some pleasures contribute to a person’s being good
and some contribute to the opposite.
Hot all of these passages can be interpreted in this way.
AS we noted early in the previous chapter, Socrates does talk in
the SScxaiaa about the identification of goodness (to
pleasure (iLAifiim). But although such identifications are
present, they do not contribute to Socrates’ arguments against
hedonism’*, and it is these arguments that are are central to
Socrates’ attempt to extol the virtuous person as the good
person
.
EfiPUblic, both topics are addressed more fully. in
186
the
.00.3 o.
,.3lo,ue. soc„tes
.n.e.eatea
..3
good man. Later on (Book vii), he becomes
concernea
..3 notion o. ,ooa„es3 at3eX.. ,.33
..333
.3 can
ao no .0.3 wat. t.3 P.O.X3. 3xc3pt to 3ay t.at ,ooan333 ta
analogoua to tha 3u„ ahaaaing light on avatything 3I33.
CHAPTER VII
Qianqea in Notion of Pleaaurp in Later Dialoqupfl
The concept of pleasure In the fiaiagaraa and soiaias is, as
have seen, a very simple and unembellished one. m the
Sarsiaa it is nothing more than a satisfaction of desires, and
what analysis there is of the notion is presented by way of
analogy with jars and liquids.
This notion changed and became somewhat more sophisticated
in the later dialogues. The most important change occurs in the
so-called middle dialogues: the group including the Republic and
£Haaaa. if commentators such as Ritter, Friedlander, and Grube
[NOTE 81) are correct the dialogues in this group were written
sometime after the Erotagoraa and JSprgiaa, but before the very
late dialogues such as the Philehi.s and Timeana
In the ninth book of the Republic, for instance, Plato
allows for different kinds of pleasure. These different kinds of
pleasure correspond to the well-known tripartate division of the
soul. There is pleasure that results from making money and the
things it buys, the pleasure that results from being honored and
esteemed, and, finally, the pleasure that results from gaining
knowledge and wisdom. (582d-e) The plesures associated with
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the Boa.. p,«. ,,,,3 3 ,333
,,„3-,.a.„ea aa.t.nction between
Pleaau.es o. t.e .oay ana pXaaau.es of the aouX Xn the aX«h
.oo.
Of the at 4S5a-e. x,,e phXXosopta., He au,peata. has
aeax.ea oonce.nea «ith the pXeaau.ea of the aouX, in itaeXf. ana
wilX he inaiffe.ent to the pXeaau.es of the boay.
in the PhasdP we get the same aistinction when soo.atea
urges the phiXoaophe. to ahanaon pXeaau.e of the boay ana aevote
himself to pleasures of the soul, which ar-ico ^n n ise from the
acquisition of knowledge.
In what must be a much later dialogue Plato has Timeaus
suggest that pleasure
\ /
of the mortal part of the soul Qx^n^n..
^ imns) is the .eauxt of the motion of particXea in the boay.
(64e-65) P.eaua.abXy, these boaiXy pXeaau.es a.e to be
contrastea with the pXeaau.ea of the imortaX souX which PXato
does not discuss in this dialogue.
It is cXea., then, without engaging in aetaiXea analysis,
that sometbne afte. the apigiaa Plato .outineXy aistinguishea at
Xeast two sorts of pXeasu.e. boaiXy, sensuaX pXeasu.e, ana
spii^itual, intellectual pleasure.
The more important question fo. ou. purposes, however, is
whether PXato ever came to iaentify pXeasu.e, of any sort, or its
possession with goodness or the good life.
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flfidQn a ffm in Later PiaioouAp
Plato's interest is divided in the later ethical dialogues
between hedonism and hedonism.. surely, the and the
are both concerned with hedonism. Book ii of the
opens with a discussion of goodness itself, and in Book
VI (505b-c) Socrates briefly discusses its relation to pleasure.
He argues there that given the obvious truth that there
and bad pleasures, one would be inconsistent to assent
the Claim that goodness is identical with pleasure. The
argument seems to be this;
are good
also to
specific
Suppose pleasure is identical with
goodness. Then, any pleasure is good. But,
of course, there are some pleasures that are
bad (or evil). Consider any evil pleasure, A.
If any pleasure is good, then A must be good.
So, A IS both good and evil. Hence, pleasure
cannot be identical with goodness.
In this section, Plato is not only concerned with rejecting
hedonism, but with rejecting other definitions of goodness as
well. All knowledge, he claims, depends on knowledge of goodness
(506a); it like the sun, he says, illuminates all other truths
and makes them accessible to the intellect. Plato refrains from
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°«ex.ng any p^cise characterization of goodness. His use of
-.ogy enicn ^es tHs inteUectuei grasp of goodness iogicaiiy
prior to any real knowledge suggestsy that he supposed goodness tobe altogether indefinable.
mifibua, far from being indefinable, goodness is,
ccording to Plato, a combination of beauty, truth, and
-asuredness
^
emphasizes in the remainder of the dialogue it is c . •* I IS certainly not
identical with pleasure.
provides strong evidence, then, that nowhere in the
latex dialogues did Plato endorse hedonism, and in at least two
Of those dialogues and EluasbuH) rejects it. Plato's
position on hedonism*, however, is otherwise, in the corn...
Socrates argues that a person is happiest who reduces his desires
minimum. since the capacity for ezperiencing pleasure,
according to the ISgjgias conception, is directly proportional to
the Size Of one's appetites, Socrates is here advocating the good
life as one free of pleasure.
once Plato has distinguished, in the dialogues following the
ElotaaPiaa, between various kinds of pleasures (pleasures of the
body and Pleasures of the soul) he returns to the topic of
hedonism, with a different attitude. Plato, of course, never
comes around to agree with Callicles that a constant and
torrential influx of bodily pleasure makes a person good, and
indeed Callicles' hero becomes the tyrant of the ReouhHc (Book
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ocrates does claim m Book vi of the E^ublic that the
.... „„
30U1. (fisiujtiig 485^.^,
JuiagqQ / in a passage we
c:Lted above (li4e), Socrates making the same claim that the
best life is one evoted to pleasures Of the soul. Pi„any, m
the Athenian, argues that the gust person is the most pleased.
82] (662dl-2) The just person is, of course, the good
person, so the good person is the most pleased person.
igsin, while there is no evidence that Plato ever accepted
hedonism, he eventually accepted a version of hedonism*
(especially in the Espgbiip), not the crude version of the
but one identifying the good person with the person who
has an abundance Of pleaures Of the soul. The resaon for this
acceptance has it roots in the is there that
Socrates is first made to claim that the goodness of a person
consists in a proper ordering of the soul, (soraias 506e) But
he goes on to argue in the EsBUlilic (585dff) that it is the
proper arrangement of the soul that results in the most overall
pleasure, so the good person is the pleased person, not because
being pleased is what our goodness consists in, but because being
good results in our being pleased. Put another way, Plato never
seems to accept the conceptual identity of the good person and
pleased person, but rather only the close ( perhaps causal
)
192
relationship between being a good person and being a pleased
person. This doctrine, however,
bea„ Xittae «se».lance to the aoctrine
.octatee attache i„
the
even l-a reae,*,„ce to the doctrine in the
Protagn^^p
SUTtmiary
in the preceding five chapters, l have argued for a nus4,er
Of points Which together suggest that it is ir*,ausihle to look et
the and „ a pair of dialogues which together
reflect a turning point in Plato’s views about the nature of
goodness, specifically, I have tried to show that it is not
Plausible to understand the £rPtago»s as a dialogue in which
Plato accepts hedonism and the ispigiaa as a dialogue in which
Plato, having changed his mind about the nature of goodness,
rejects hedonism.
in arguing for this thesis I have attempted to establish a
number of preliminary claims, in the second chapter we saw that
there is a wealth of textual evidence showing that Plato
discusses in the Erotagordd a doctrine of hedonism, m looking
at this evidence, we examined a number of attempts by vlastos,
Goodell and others to interpret the doctrine in the Protanov;.. as
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Pleasure, when examined closely, such interpretations failed.
While there is a hedonistic doctrine discussed in the
dialogue, we saw in the third chapter that it i -n pT: n I IS impossible on
purely textual grounds to determine if Socrates is esnou^^rar pousing the
view. The 'many' surely agree to it anrt dd Protagoras, himself,
finally accepts it at 358a. Aside from asking a number of
leading questions, Socrates never acttiaiitrtu lly commits himself to the
view.
some commentators have, nonetheless, argued that there is
good philosophical reason for suposing that the hedonism of the
grotagoran is Socrates' own. For the niri«4- ^most part these
co^entators either argue that the arguments Socrates presents in
the dialogue depend on hedonism or that claims which Socrates has
made in earlier dialogues depend on hedonism, and the Protsc....
represents the development of those claims.
C.C.W. Taylor is a good example of a commentator holding the
former position. More interesting, however, is the second
position which is put forward most recently by T. Irwin.
Neither of these positions is acceptable, the former, we we saw
in Chapter Hi. because it depends on a rather naive
understanding of Socrates' argument and his motivation in
presenting it. The latter positon falls, in large part because
Socrates • claims in the earlier dialogues do nat commit him to
hedonism, so there is no reason to read the Protaco.-... as a
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development of that commitment.
in at,uing against various common intenpnetatione of the
I
.eve attempted to aetail the actual tole heacnism
Pleys in the aialogue. m 30 aoing. 1 have also anguea against a
-w Of the
,,,,
by most commentators.
The standard picture seems to be that th^ - 4.ma e mam topic of the
is hedonism t anf^ •->>0 =( d the apparent endorsement of it), and
it is this topic that is again treated tuin the Sgigiaa with the
emphasis this time on its rejection.
«henwe looked closely at the arguments of these two
dialogues, we found that this was not the case. While hedonism
surely plays a central role in the argument of the Protagoras
from 351 to 358 (the section containing arguments against "the
"eny"), the primary argument against Protagoras over the unity of
the Virtues (3S8ff) does not rely on hedonism at all. The
doctrine plays no essential role in the logical structure of the
argument there. Rather. Protagoras is convinced (as are,
presumably, the other sophists) by arguments relying on the
identification of praiseworthiness (JL? <oX5y) md goodness.
Praiseworthiness is not analyzed by Socrates in terms of
/ 1 f3.Ct 3"^ Q R 1 ^tact, at 351c, It IS presented by Protagoras as
quite independent of pleasure.
The situation is similar in the fiaigiaa. We saw in chapter
V that there is some sort of hedonistic doctrine discussed in the
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9 . but in the main, the dialogue does not attack hedonism
o. uniestiained and undisciplined desiie giatitioation. as such
dialogue seems designed to letute what l called hedonism.
Which identifies, not goodness and pleasure, but the good person
and the pleased person.
Ih fact the two
•antl-hedonistic. arguments of the Saraias(one at esse-„,a. the other at 4g,e-e,gh) fail complete!, as
«9uments against the identification Of goodness and pleasure
What success these arguments achieve comes when the, are
interpreted as attacks on Callicles. endorsement of hedonism*.
TO be sure, however, some comments in the saraiaa show that
Plato supposes that a refutation of hedonism* constitutes a
refutation Of hedonism. In chapter VI we looked at a way of
formulating an argument along the lines suggested in the
aialogue. The resulting argument is defective in rather
fundamental ways
.
so, far from being a pair of dialogues involving radically
aifferent views concerning a common ethical problem, hedonism,
the PXOtaggra s and Saxgiaa only peripherally concern hedonism at
all. Furthermore, with respect to the hedonism that is found in
the erotagoraa
, we saw no compelling reason, either textual or
philosophical, to suppose Socrates (and, thus, Plato) endorsed
it. So, we are free to interpret the dialogue in such a way that
the Erotagora a represents no radical or profound change in
Plato’s notion of Goodness
.
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c. c. w.
translating
^
"praiseworthy... l do this for two reasons -
• jcg A nu is often
translated with a dlffernt word In different dialir ogues, often by
the same translator. This can be misleading. i have used
"praiseworthy., as the tranalatlon of^ „,erever It appears In
the dialogues, ihe word Is Important enough so that It deserves
to be translated consistently in^i . I addition, it is surely an
ethical term and "praiseworthy captures that -v^ , unlike some common
renderings like "beautiful" or "fine" t a. .l
. I do not mean to convey
by the use of this word that it Implies a co»unity of praisors.
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n. All translations of passages from the Eaaiagaaaa, unless
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. I have not included the other half of this or the previous
formulation which concerns, in the former case, enjoyment with
painful consequences, and, in the latter, the evil of pain.
Plato is almost always very careful to include both parts of
these claims. Bow important it is to remember this will become
appaxent in Chapter v.
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we also interpret <.oaeil as ciai^n, ttat there is nolow Benthamite conception of hedoniem to he found here, hut
rather a hedoniem which identifies goodness with some hi,h
Pleasure. This interpretation x investigate later in the
Chapter.
!=• Plates
waited, with an introduction, hy Gregory
Vlastos. Bohhs-Herrill Company, inc. Hew yorh. 1956. page xli.
la. It is doubtful Whether any contemporary version of hedonism
actually entails this. (i> 13 related to those versions of
hedonism Which Claim that intrinsic value belongs to certain
cental phenomena. We can understand this in a couple of
different ways. Bor instance, we might taXe the Protsoor..
statement that pleasures are good to mean that pleasant
e35)eraences are good and nothing else is.
The difficulty With such a view is that on this view
experiences are the prime bearers of intrinsic value. Suppose I
have a pleasant experience on an amusement park ride. it is
implausible to say that a pleasant experience of the ride is
intrinsically good. Why? whatever is intrinsically good is so
necessarily, since, as we have characterized it. intrinsic
goodness involves some feature of the good thing itself. But my
experience is only contingently connected with my pleasure. My
experience could just as easily (or even more easily) result in
dizziness and discomfort
.
So, if we were to understand certain
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expe..e„ces as p.easu.es a„a use as t.e p.a.e
.ea«.s u.
-transac goodness, then these pti„e heaters would he at hast
only contingently Inttlnslcally good, which is unacceptahle
.
We might say instead that what is to count ^ -as intrinsically
- not an e:cpetience at all. hut a pleasure, a Reeling.
This Pleasure, of course, could never he other than a pleasure.
asfies the requirement we put above on the hearers of
transic goodness, it could never fail to qualify as a pleasure
and. hence, could never fail to he intrinsically good.
It is most likely something of this sort that Plato had in
-na in the
,,,
^
have at some time a very great pleasure and a very tiny pain.
There is an Intrinsically good thing, the pleasure, and an
intrinsically had thing, the pain, a hedonist should want to say
that the compound of these two things is still intrinsically good
< Since the Pleasure is so much greater than the pain). our
present formulation does not allow that, while it says that
Pleasures are intrinsically good and pains are intrinsically had.
it says that nothing else is either intrinsically good or
intrinsically had. The compound of a pleasure and a pain,
however, is just that, a compound. It is neither a pleasure nor
a pain, so we get the undesirable result that the compound is
intrinsically worthless
.
Most modern discussions of hedonsim do not rely on mental
events ( pleasures ) as the bearers of intrinsic value, but, rather
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»
......
”“• “
.-.. ...
...
..... „ .„„„ „ „being pleased, or a cer+a-ir,rtain proposition that l am pleased.
Letting states of affairs fr^-r, or instance, be the bearers of
intrinsic value has two advantages. First it hasi: I the advantage
pi^6vious vipw 4->^a4- * ^V e , that if a state of affairs involves
Pleasure, it does so necessarily, so if it •' I I xs intrinsically
good, it is so necessarily. its second advantage is that it
seems to get around the problem with the above view. ibat
Pfoblem was that, on one band, we want to allow compounds of
intrinsic goods to be intrinsically good. but. on the other a
compound of pleasures is not itself a pleasure and cannot be
intrinsically good, compounds of states of affairs, however, are
still states of affairs, albeit complex ones.
If the problem with taking pleasures as the sole intrinsic
goods was that we could not account for the godness of compounds,
the difficulty is iust the opposite regarding states of affairs.
surely, one of the »>aior problems in formulating a version of
hedonism based on the intrinsic goodness of certain states of
affairs is trying to discover how to distinguish simple states of
affairs out of which complex states are constructed. it is
important to be able to pick out these simple states because the
intrinsic value of complex states of affairs will be a function
Of the intrinsic value of these simple states.
Detailed and valuable discussions of using states of affairs
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pjriine bGareirs nf -ii-ij.—rinsic goodness can be found in Warren
.u^n.s,
..^eories of fnfrinsic Vaiue.,
.374. and Edward oldfield.s revision of auin„.s view
-
.pproacb fo a
.aor. of infrinsic Vaiue.
137V. comprehensive and exceiient discussions can be
^ound in pred Peldma„.s manuscripf. ^ ^ ^
Earl conee.s doctoral dissertation. ^ Xntr.ns.c
gQodnp.q.^
purposes, there is a further problem with any
version of hedonism based on states of affairs. ii,ere is no
evidence that Plato ever contemplated the existence of such
thrngs. let alone ever considered assigning intrinsic value to
them. TO cast Plato's version of hedonism in terms of estates of
affairs would be gratuitous, since there is nothing in his
writings that would allow us to discuss the subtitles of such a
View.
Let us here. then, take Plato's hedonism to be a view about
trinsic value of feelings of pleasure, namely, that
pleasures and only pleasures are intrinsically good, and we will
leave aside the problems inherent in such a view.
17. So. for instance, at 330c-e. Socrates inquires whether there
is such a thing as justice-itself or holiness-itself
. satisfied
that there are both, he asks if they are themselves just and
holy, respectively, as is well known, he answers affirmatively.
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^Ut t.e
.e.e fact that
.e entettatna tne ,uesttc„ ahowa that he
- at
.eaat awaae of auch a atatfnctton.
,o alao „e a.e
told at 33ahSf that foollahneaa
^3
fooliah acta, and ia what makea them fooliah.
see Oa.ld Keyt.
-PiatCa Patadoa that the zm„ntahle fa
Uhknowahle... Jh.
volume x,. xaea. pa,ea
1-14.
W- By far the greateat number of paaaagea in the dialogue
airectly related to hedonism have to do with the claim that
Pleasure is good. Socrates begins the discussion (351b6),
however, not with the claim that pleasure and good are related,
hut With the Claim that living well and living pleasantly are
related, (jj ^ iln^£us ii c'va TeXeurnof If'., ouk ^ |u
Hill jSuksj J211I1US ^laiKCTdu ) should we take this as a second
doctrine to be discussed in the dialogue? or should we take this
to indicate that the discussion that follows is about living well
rather than about goodness itself? i think neither. This ia not
a doctrine to be discussed in the remainder of the dialogue.
After 3510, there is no mention at all of living well. There is
one passage at 356es where Socrates speaks of doing well
JlCailtLv), but it is not directly involved in the discussion of
hedonism.
In fact, we can take this passage to suggest a contrast in
the dialogue between the identification of pleasure and goodness
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the iaentittcation between a pbeaeant Itte a„a a wetl-xivea
351b4-7, Socrates asks Protagoras to accept the dais.
1- If a man lives pleasantly, he lives well.
ana Protagoras aoes. Protagoras reiects. however, the conclusion
Socrates araws from (l), namely,
2- A pleasant life is gooa.
Piotagoras rejects it claiming that only a certain sort of
pleasant life, a life involving noble (sai£) pleasures, is really
9ooa. When Protagoras rejects the inference from (l) to ( 2 ) he
must reject also
3. A well-lived life is good,
since ( i ) and ( 3 ) entail ( 2 )
:
i. A pleasant life is a well-lived life.
3. A Well-lived life is good.
2. A pleasant life is good.
By explicitly rejecting (2) ana implicitly rejecting (3),
Protagoras has introaucea the worry about gooa ana pleasure
while, at the same time, arawing a aistinction between a topic
which is not going to be aiscussea, namely, the relation between
pleasure ana living well, which might not be an ethical problem,
ana the topic which is to be aiscussea, the relation between
pleasure ana gooaness, which is certainly an ethical problem, we
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might want to draw the sa.e distinction between the non-ethical
clai. that a person- a large salary guarantees that he is living
the ethical claim that a person's large salary
guarantees that this life is a good one.
20.
Jeremy Bentham, An Introdur-M^p ta
And Legig iatian , chapter i, ”of the
Pegasus Books, NY, 1959, page 85
.
ills £xincip1ftg af Morale,
Principle of Utility",
21.
Terence Irwin,
University
Press, Oxford, 1977
, page 104.
22. I have supressed the corresponding principle shout rejecting
actions that are believed to yield more pain than pleasure.
23
. (S') i3
, of course, defective since it entails that in cases
where we know that a number of different acts are each more
Pleasant than painful, we will choose to perform all of them,
so, for instance, if i believe that sitting in my back yard
watching birds today wiu be more pleasant than painful and I
believe that staying indoors today and watching the Detroit Gran
Prix on television will be more pleasant than painful, then (9')
entails that I will choose to do both.
24
.
Mill's "proof" aside.
25
.
Gerasimos Santas, in "Plato's Protagoras and Explanations of
Weakness", reprinted in Hie Philosophy Socrates
. edited by
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Gregory
264-298,
, Doubleday &
also mistakenly thinks
Co. Inc., New York,
that the passage at
1971, pages
354C3-5 is
primarily a statement about choice anH^ n , d, hence, understands it as
a statement of psychological hedonism. He says on page 281-2,
interpretation of the hedonistic
principle... is perfectly consistent with-indeed it
is suggested by-the Psychological hedonism that
Socrates and Protagoras earlier attribute to the
masses, people "pursue pleasure as being a good and
avoid pain as being an evil" (354c). "Pursue" and
avoid- (dialtein and Bheuge i n ) must be understood
to refer to one’s seeking to obtain pleasures and
seeking to avoid pains, not to one’s actually
obtaining pleasures and successfully avoiding
pains. The principle asserted is npt that (1)
people always act in a way that maximises their
pleasures and/or minimises their pains, but that
( 2 ) people always seek to act in such a way as to
maximize pleasures and/or to minimize pain
26
. The examples given by Goodwin in his siesi Grammar .
Macmillan Education Ltd., London, 1971
, are all instances of
obligation.’ "they must go to war", "we mial bear these things",
"we muai not abandon to the Athenians
. .
.
, and so forth
.
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(ephasis „i„e, Thcpaon. in i^ ^^^
^ ^ ^222
. ^ ^
"express necessity (what should be done)...-
27. Although even with this caution, some have thought Mill.s
distinction runs aground s#»#» ±.. ee, for instance, Moore, Principle
Sthica/ pages 78-79
.
28. Gooden recognises that the hedonic calculus of the
seems to be restricted to purely guantative
measurement. His explanation is that for the moment,- and only
fox the moment, Plato is accepting the vulgar use of "pleasure-
in Which no distinction in the qualities of pleasure is
recognised. (Goodell, page 32) why Plato does this, he does not
say.
29.
C.C.W. Taylor translates the beginning of this passage,
"...And now, on behalf of Protagoras and myself i ask you,
Hippias and Prodicus (for you can answer jointly), whether you
think that what I am saying is true or false." The Greek
is
. . uuas JIpajTayop ou epgjToj
. <u)> IinTia te Kg{ 1^66 i<n
Lkqivq
.
s JCfitc jJiuv _o AoYos’t Troiepoy 6 ok(L uylv aAn9n Xeye iv
j W6£g9ai ." According to this trannslation, Socrates and
Protagoras seem already to be in agreement about the hedonism and
are merely trying to convince the others. While this is not an
i»P0S3i.Xe
,3
pMlosopMcalX, ana
te^rtually. It is difficult philosophically because it su,,ssts
that Socrates, at the end of the discussion with 'the many
already counts Protagoras in his camp, ihere is, however, no
resson to suppose that Socrates would have expected Protagoras to
have been persuaded to accept hedonism based on that discussion.
It is difficult textually because ii most naturally connects
and ^°Y°poo
, making these both the objects of
If, however, we understand na°TCYgpo» to supply a second
subject Of kstti, then ii ^ has no function in the sentence. My
reeding agrees on this point with both Guthrie's and Jowetfs.
30. sesonske, Alexander, "Hedonism in the Erotaaoras " .To„mai
Sl£ ±hs aiStglY 2f auloaophy, volume I, pages 73-79
, 1963 .
31. Wolx, Henry, "Hedonism in the Eiatagora.9". Journal ^ its
fiistoiy Ehiloaophy , volume v, pages 205-217, 1967
.
32.
Others at 333c2, 3l7a4.
33. Cornford, F.M., "Athenian Philosophical Schools” in The
aistory. Edited by Bury, J.B., s.A. Cook, F.E.
Adcock, volume VI, MacMillan Co., New York, 1933, page 313
.
34. I take "desire" here to signal an opaque context.
35. The Greek is entirely neutral on this point: oukouv
IS. aTTOTE
Siii To^ mm hmS. Si^ ds idas
<ai
oA^v njoviDv
_
oaroaTEoc"!
. There ic, -s no equivalent of
-that- in this
passage. ( 353 e 5 - 354al)
IS in contrast to what, for instance, Croiobie claims in
his an
^
^
connection between the Zmtnnnxan and the Bsnnblin and says:
Suppose there were a dialogue in which Socrates twice
said
.hxen't all beds beds by imatating the perfect
Bsdy, Showed that common opinion subscribed i„
practice to this view, and went on to prove some
standard Socratic position in the light of it, i am
sure we should be told that in this imaginary dialogue
Socrates sponsors the perfect particular view of Forms.
It is only because hedonism is a naughty view that
there are any reservations about saying that Socrates
maintains it in the Protaaoraa
I think it Should be Clear that whatever its similarities to the
EeBuHliC, the Eiotagoraa is by far a more perplexing dialogue.
For all of its difficulties, it is fairly clear what Plato is up
to in the Bepublic . He makes it even clearer by prefacing in
Book X the passage Crombie paraphrases with phrases like, "Are we
not in the habit of saying..." We are on entirely unfamiliar
terrain in the Erotagoras . Furthermore, there is in the Bennhlio
no attempt to explain a popular phenomenon through an imaginary
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discussion, the conversation, i
Socrates and Glaucon. cromb
n Book X, is strictly between
view.
37. The argument is presented thus by Socrates:
should reply that it is just. (330c)
"And do you say that [holiness] is itself such as
to be unholy, or such as to be holy?... how could
anything else be holy, if holiness itself is not to
be holy?" (330d)
"You seem to be saying that the parts of virtue are
related to one another in such a way that none of
them is like any other.” (330e)
"So, holiness is not such as to be something
just... but rather such as to be not just, and so
unjust." (331b)
mentioned
,
Tell me, is that thing that you have just
lentio a, justice, itself, just or unjust?" l
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and can be formulated simply as:
(i) Justice is just.
(ii) Holiness is holy.
(iii) The parts of virtue are independent.
(iv) It is not the case that: holiness is just
(v) Holiness is unjust.
The conclusion (v) is, of course, taken
so, constitutes, according to Socrates, a refutation of (iii,
36. Socrates presents the argument as follows:
"The opposite of folly is wisdom, is it not?-
( 332a)
"Acting foolishly is the opposite of acting
sensibly." (332b)
"Folly is the opposite of good sense." ( 332c)
"Each member of an opposition has exactly one
opposite." (332c)
"[So,] good sense and wisdom would seem to be one
and the same." (333b)
39
. This formulation ignores the more careful formulations
presented in chapter I concerning intrinsic and extrinsic
goodness, once he has formulated these distinctions, he makes no
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use of them in his argument.
Santas, Gerasimos,
-.piato-s f^otago^ and Explanations of
1973, page 283.
41. Vlastos, Gregory,
"Socrates on Akrasia"x
, fhoenix. Volume 23
,
pages 71-88, 1969.
«. It is worth addin, that Socrates may see a further problem
With (5). namely. <s, claims that it is hy considerin, ih.
that we are led to choose the act which involves less good, see
also Dyson, "Knowledge and Hedonism in Plato’s Protagoras " pages
32-38.
43. Taylor, in his commentary on the Platagons has incorrectly
formulated the general structure of the argument in such a way
that he supposes that Socrates has committed the fallacy of
denying the antecedent
:
If anyone regrlarly makes correct choices of
pleasure and pains, he employs the appropriate sort
of knowledge. He then ( 357d3-7
)
treats that as
identical with the thesis that anyone who fails to
make correct choices does not employ the
3-PPJ^opriate knowledge. (Taylor, pages 191-192)
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Taylor.s mistake ia in „ot aeein, that soctates aupposea
that one teguletly correct choices of pleasure and pain if
^ amy ii he employs the appropriate sort of Knowledge. from
Socrates can and does validly infer that if one fails to
make a correct choice Of Pleasure and pain, he does not employ
the appropriate knowledge.
44. It is an interesting consequence of this analysis of courage
that the courageous person does not act in of his fear, he
simply does not have any fear.
45. Where by this I mean that these relations are transitive and
assymetric
.
46.
Proofs Let
-Pxy be
-x is more pleasant than y'
, and let
'Bxy' be ’X is better than y
.
1. (x)(y)(Pxy -> Bxy) Premise
2. Shows (x)(y)(Bxy -> “Pyx)
3. Shows (Bab -> “Pyx)
4. Bab Assume
5. Shows “Pba
6. Pba — > Bba From 1
7. Bba 6,7
8. Bba — > “Bcib ordering
9. “Bab 8 , 9 Contra 4
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aiaiifiUl, volune 22, pages 39-42, 1928.
« By "subject niatter", „e must understand Irwin to mean
product ” Tm-i.-; tP <auc . I„,„,3
discussed below.
49. sometime after this chapter was written. l discovered that
passage is also discussed briefly by George Klosko in "The
Technical Conception of virtue". ih. ^
Ehilosophy, vol. 19
, pages 95-102
, 1991 .
50. Irwin Cites aaimas 153dl-e2 as evidence that Socrates
Objects to the disputed terms Critias introduces into the
definition of temperance. Thi.s misses the point of the passage.
Socrates' specific objective in criticizing Critias, in the
passage Irwin cites, is to deliver an ad hominum attack against
critias who is relying on the "endless distinctions" of Prodicus.
Socrates' real objection to Critias does not come until i64a-d.
If Socrates is worried about the craft analogy at all, here is
where that worry is expressed. if craftsmen must follow a
rational plan in practicing their crafts, then any theory which
allows craftsmen to practice their crafts through accident and
ignorance must be defective. But this is just what Critias'
definition of temperance allows. Hence, it is faulty. But Irwin
has missed this section of the argument completely, and so has
seriously misunderstood the entire passage.
215
This is the least well developed of the views of irwi„.s we
heve cohsideted. it was pointed out to „e hy Cynthia fteeland.
we Should he laaty about discussin, a, panadox of the
mnPl. n>ere ate at least two. inwin, i thinh, is
talhin. Shout the patadox which says that sohehody who possesses
Virtue. i.e„ Knows what are the right actions, ^,ht do
otherwise than virtue conmands. The dialogue actually ends with
the paradoxical conclusion that the person who voluntarily does
wrong is the good person. The most famous socratic paradox, that
nobody does evil voluntarily, makes at least a cameo appearance
the end of the dialogue when Socrates expresses doubt that
there could exist a man who does evil and disgraceful things
voluntarily
.
( 376b4-6
)
Taylor, a.e., £lato s. liifi Man and flia Hcxls, Meridian Books,
New York, 1956, page 260f.
54. Grube, G.M.A., "The Structural Unity of the
g^arter]y
, volume 27
, 1933
,
page 206.
£xotaq<?ras”.
55. If he finds himself comitted to hedonism, it
through the same process that led 'the many to
they are so committed.
is probably
discover that
56. Vlastos, "Was Polus Refuted?", Mfilican Journ;.i q£
Philology, Volume 88: 454-460, 1967.
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aiasfla, for instance, a rudimentary version of this doctrine is
presented. At 60c-d, Socrates notes how closely pleasure and pain
associated when he comments on how closely the pain from his
setter is followed hy pleasure when it is released. This view is
found most fully developed in the
Me friends call pleasures are. according to them, never anythin,
but escapes from pain .
" ( 44ci-2 )
one Of the purposes of the seems to be to reconcile
these two ways of understanding pleasure with the view of
Pleasure in which it is entirely separate from pain or painful
appetites. This discussion, of course, leads to the distinction
between pure and impure pleasure (5lc sq).
59. To avoid obvious
make reference to the
Neither Callicles nor
counterexamples, such a principle should
amount of pain experienced as well.
Socrates make any such attempt in this
discussion. Socrates does show his awareness of the need for
this complication in the Protaooras (e.g.. 3S4o-e).
60. Tenkku. Jussi. "The Evaluation of Pleasure in Plato’s
Ethics", acta ehilosophicfl Esimiga . voi. ii. 1955
.
pages 75-75
.
61. Irwin, on page 199 of his commentary on the Goroie. also
offers a suggestion tha Socrates was unfair. After callicles
agrees that the scratcher is happy because of his intake of
pleasure. Socrates infers that he is unable to distinguich
befwsen good 3.nd evil pleasure
.
Irwin says there:
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But callicles could easily distinguish
Pleasures, those which offer more pleasure,
bad ones, those which offer less.
good
from
Irwin s criticism here is ambiguous,
of the following
;
He could mean either
<i) Good pleasures are those whose consequences
produce more pleasure, bad pleasures are
those whose consequences produce less.
(ii) good pleasures are those which in
themselves are more pleasurable, bad
pleasures are those which are in themselves
less pleasurable.
It seems that Irwin has in mind the latter distinction since
his example contains no mention of consequences, "if i enjoy
eating steak more than I enjoy ice cream, then the pleasure of
eating steak is apparently a better pleasure, because more
pleasant, than the pleasure of eating ice cream."
Using quantity to rank pleasures, one better than another,
has already been discussed by Plato in the Protagoras
Providing a ranking of pleasure is not the same as providing a
distinction between good and bad pleasures. Any quantative point
at which one marks a line above which pleasures are good, below
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quantity of pleasure is not the aistinguiehing mark of good and
bad pleasures. Contrary to Irwin, Callioles has ncu.xaci presented no way
of distinguishing good from bad pleasure.
dtrictly speaking this argument is not valid. Kather than
Showing that Pleasure not identical with goodness it merely
Shows that the pair goodness-evil is not identical with the pair
Pleasure-pain. of course, hedonism as Plato understands it
Clair, both that pleasure is the only intrinsic good ^ that
pain 13 the only intrinsic evil. Thus, and argument which shows
that the pair goodness-evil is distinct from the pair
pleasure-pain also shows •n tht hedonism is false. l thank Earl
Conee for pointing this out to me.
63.
See Chapter li
64.
..Doing wen.. (4 is, presumably, synonomous with
"living well.. of which suggest the happiness of
an agent.
65.
Tenkku is wrong to suppose that one can object to (lo) by
pointing out that nobody is wholly good or wholly evil, while
most fall
-in the interval between them.” m that interval there
Will be those who are good to some degree and those whho are evil
to some degree, (i), is simply to be understood as claiming that
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a person is good to some degree iff th»ta person is not evil to
some degree
.
aas Tenwtu made a logical blunder by, in some way. confusing
<-)
-- (.3). 1 thinb not. However, his criticism of
-crates, reasoning is based on an even more serious misreading
the argument,
.anbbu supposes that the difference Plato sees
between goodness and evil ona , the one hand, and pleasrue and
pain, on the other, is 4-ve latter are indistinguishable
While the former are not. They are indistiguishable because they
aiways had or lost simultaneously. Tenkku explains this
pxinciple this way:
• .on the other hand, Plato seems to think that
Pleasure and pain are not distinguishable from each
other because of their simultaniety.
. .it does not
follow, however, from a co-existence of two
properties that they are not distinguishable from
one another.
Against this reading of Plato, Tenkku.s criticism is exactly
right, such a argument appears nowhere in the text, nor would
Plato have any reason to endorse such an argument.
67
. Masochists might object that their sensations of pain are
pleasant, but it is not clear that this is the case, when a
masochist is beaten, he find pleasurable the sensations we
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would irainarily regard aa painful, or while
he may take pleasure in the fact that he is
finding them painful
feeling pain. He
might even turn
In none of these
out to be a "lupisf, and regard pain as good,
oases is a single sensation both an instance of
pleasure and an instance of pain
68. As in Chapter ii,
to be metaphysically
I take these pleasant and painful things
private enough so that we need not worry
about cases where something is pleasant to me and painful to you.
69. in all of this discussion, l have ignored a second
of this argument which Socrates produces at 497c-d. it
^®pxesented as follows
:
version
can be
1. Goodness and evil are opposites.
2. There is no person, x, such that x is not
good at some time, t, and x is not evil at
t
.
3. there is some person, x, such that x is not
pleased at some time, t, and x is not
pained at t.
4.
Being a good person is not identical with
being a pleased person.
This argument has difficulties directly analogous
cf the argument we have just discussed.
to those
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70. While I have been following Irwin's translation through
.ost
Of this section on the here l have a used own
translation which makes much more sense i-han ttha Irwin's almost
incomprehensible
"then doesn't the 4--c n bad man turn out to be good
and bad similarly to the good man or even better?"
71. Nothing in the text indicates explicitly whether the range
of "t" is Single instants of time or durations of time, such as
entire lifetimes. it is not crucial to the argument which we
choose
.
72. What makes a structure or order appropriate is not discussed
in this dialogue, nor will it be discussed here. Plato takes up
this worry in the Republic
.
73. Santas, Gerasimos, agciates i Philosophy jj, piaho.„ Early
dialogues / Routledge and Kegan Paul, Boston, 1979.
74. Plato may be nervous in other dialogues about claiming that
the presence of goodness is a sufficient condition for a person
being a good person (Irwin suggests Lvsis 217b) He reveals no
such nervousness here in the gargias . I make these claims about
presence boldly and leave aside the enormous literature centered
on this concept. For our purposes, here, a journey down that
path is unwarranted.
It may well be that the goods Socrates has in mind are75.
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certain or.erings oi the soul or virtues, as Irvin su^ests (p.
219 Of his co^entary). This is difficult
. In the first place,
as Irvin notes, it is certainly not obvious that the presence of
auch a thing is sufficient to
.ahe us good. indeed, the
metaphysics involved in this argument are not discussed by
Socrates and Callicles. it needs, then, to be unoontroversial if
it is to be used to refute Callicles- ethical view. The dais.
that it is some ordering of our soul which makes us good is not
uncontroversial in the way the claim that pleasures in us make us
pleased is.
We have already noticed in the previous chapter that Irwin
claims that the pleasures referred to in this argument are not
pleasant sensations, but capacities or powers to achieve a
pleasant life in the long run. night this suggest that we should
not understand pleasures here as pleasant sensations? while
perhaps, Socrates would have been better off to discuss such a
doctrine, he certainly does not do so in the Gornias The
discussion of the psychology of pleasure at 493-494 shows that
Socrates is speaking of sensations of pleasure and pain. He
makes it clear at 494b-c that he is talking about the individual
pleasures of, for instance, eating and drinking.
76. I think Dodds ( gammentary page 335) is wrong to suppose that
this is one of the conclusions of the argument. Rather this has
been assumed all along, see 492C5-6, 470cl0.
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77. See Roderick Chisholm’s,
"Ethics of' c.tni O Requirement" for a
contemporary reliance on fittinanpao ar g ess
. Mt^yic^n Philosonhi
gliaxterly volume l, 1954
, page 147.
78. For more detailed disoussione of these features see Dodds
pages 20-22 and Irwin, Eiato’^ Ssiaias, pages 5-8 .
79. In addition, of course, the Ejo?tagoraa does not probe the
consequences of admitting that some pleasures are good and others
evil. That topic is discarded at 35ic-d.
80. Taylor, Plato, page 103.
81. see for instance Grube, Elate '3 Thought, p. xii, Paul
Friedlander, pp. 447.456
^
82. Plato actually talks about just and pleasant lives, but this
amounts to talking about just and pleasant persons.
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